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CENTRAL ASIA IN MODERN TIMES

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Devendra
Kaushik

CENTRAL ASIA IN MODERN TIMES

A HISTORY FROM THE EARLY 19th CENTURY

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by N. Khalfin,
Doctor
of History



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ABOUT THIS BOOK

India and Central Asia are almost neighbours, and have long had close economic and political ties. Baber, who came from Central Asia, founded the Mogul Dynasty of India, who for centuries had their capital at Delhi. Central Asia was a big market for the handiwork of Indian craftsmen, especially weavers, while goods from Central Asia were in great demand in the Punjab, Maharashtra and Bengal.

In the relatively recent past, India and Central Asia were colonies of the British colonialists and the tsarist autocracy, respectively. In 1917, there was a victorious socialist revolution in Central Asia, as in the whole of Russia. Thirty years later, after a long and hard fight, the peoples of India threw off the colonial yoke.

Geographical proximity and some similarity of historical development naturally generate interest in both countries for each other. People in the independent Republic of India have been giving special attention to the rapid flourishing of the Central Asian nations in the Soviet period, and their transition from feudalism straight on to socialism, bypassing the tormenting capitalist stage.

Unfortunately, most of the books and articles available in India on the modern history of the Central Asian Republics have been written by British and American bourgeois authors who were not concerned with telling the truth about the successes in socialist construction north of the Amu-Darya, beyond the Hindu Kush. These are the successes which outstanding leaders of the Republic of India, like Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarvapali Radhakrishnan

and Rajendra Prasad, recalled with enthusiasm after their trips to the USSR.

It may be assumed, therefore, that this book will be met with special interest. The author is an Indian specialist who collected his facts while on a scientific assignment in the Soviet Union. He lived in sunny Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan and well-known international meeting place, where he wrote and maintained a thesis which earned him the degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences.

Many nations say that it is better to see something once than to hear it described a hundred times. Devendra Kaushik was in a position to see for himself the new socialist society in Soviet Central Asia, which is equipped with complex modern technologies and is enjoying the fruits of advanced science and culture.

As a historian who has made a thorough study of the past of the Central Asian Republics, the Indian scholar was well placed to make a real assessment of the vast changes that have taken place in that part of the USSR. In fact he tells about the ways traversed by the peoples of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Kirghizia from the first half of the 19th century to our day (he deals with Kazakhstan to a lesser extent). He has made use of various published documents, statistical abstracts, the periodical press and archive material. His book is literally packed with facts, but these do not in any way embarrass the author, as riches sometimes do. His facts are well sifted and set out in an appropriate chronological sequence giving evidence of strict theoretical thinking.

The author describes the situation in the Central Asian khanates—Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand—in the first half of the 19th century, justly testifying to their extreme economic, military-political and cultural backwardness. He shows English intrigues and efforts at commercial and political penetration of Central Asia, and tsarist military expansion in the area. He is fully justified in saying that the regime set up there by the tsarist satraps was a colonial one, but he also notes the great importance of the activity there of progressive Russian scientists, among them historians, geologists, botanists, and zoologists. An analysis of the economy of colonial Turkestan leads the author to draw the right conclusion about the domination of pre-capitalist relations in the area.

A most valuable aspect of the book is that it is polemical.

He musters the facts to expose the slanderous inventions of bourgeois falsifiers of history who have tried to distort Soviet reality, among them Geoffrey Wheeler, Richard Pipes, Hugh Seton-Watson, Alexander Park and S. Zenkovsky. Devendra Kaushik disputes Wheeler's assertion that Bukhara had been flourishing even before the October Revolution. The British writer has tried to extol that dark survival of medievalism, the feudal satrapy of Bukhara, in an effort to reduce the impression created by the grand transformation in the Bukhara oasis in Soviet times.

Kaushik also refutes the false thesis peddled by British and American "Sovietologists" that the socialist revolution in Central Asia was imported and foisted on its peoples. He proves that among the exploited masses—Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz and Turkmens—the ground for a socialist revolution had been quite ready and that they fought heroically for the victory of the October Revolution, for the Soviet power, which they regarded as their very own. The Indian scholar ridicules Wheeler's assertion that today the Central Asian economy is a colonial one.

What I find most welcome is the author's constant concern to make a comparison of similar elements in the history of Central Asia and India. He makes a point of describing their relations in the modern period largely on the strength of his study of obscure documents from the National Archives of the Republic of India. In this context, I should like to mention the interesting information he gives about a visit to Soviet Russia by participants in the Indian national-liberation movement, and their meetings with V. I. Lenin.

I hope that in the homeland of these fighters for Indian independence, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, primary attention will be drawn to the second part of this book, which deals with the latest period in the history of the Central Asian nations—their struggle for the victory and consolidation of the working people's power in Turkestan, and the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, the national separation and establishment of sovereign national republics, the abolition of exploiting class, economic and cultural backwardness, and the socialist transformation of industry, agriculture and culture. These are all dealt with at length in this book. A study of them may help the author's compatriots to obtain a better understanding of the ways and means used in the socialist transformation of the once-

backward colonial areas of tsarist Russia and their conversion, in a short historical period, into sovereign and advanced industrial-agrarian republics.

The author's manuscript is given here with very few abridgements which have strictly no bearing on the subject. Wherever we have found it necessary to comment or specify any of the author's statements, we have done so in footnotes marked "Ed." We have also selected the illustrations.

N. A. Khal'fin,
Dr. Sc. (Hist.)

PREFACE

We in India have always been deeply interested in the events in Central Asia which have more than once influenced the course of our history. At a time when friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union with the people of India is increasing daily, it is natural that our interest in the historical background of the Soviet Central Asian peoples, who are actually our neighbours, should be intensified. The present work deals with approximately a century and a half of the modern history of Central Asia beginning with the early 19th century.

Although of great importance in the remote past as a crucible of diverse cultures and as a crossroad of civilisations, Central Asia was relegated to obscurity in the wake of epoch-making voyages by great sailors at the end of the 15th century. However, beginning with the early years of the 19th century something of the old importance of the region was revived under the impact of colonial rivalry between Tsarist Russia and Britain. The modern history of Central Asia thus begins with two rival western colonial empires casting their shadow over the region. The Central Asian peoples lay under the misrule of the feudal Khans in conditions of extreme economic and cultural backwardness. They were mere pawns on the chessboard of colonial rivalry between the two European Powers.

In preparing this work, I set myself the task of investigating the aims of the foreign policy of Tsarist Russia in Central Asia as it related to the internal situation, mainly economic, prevailing in the empire. The other object was a critical and all-inclusive study of the problem of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. Notwithstanding the aggressive character of the Tsarist government in Central

Asia, it never thought of annexing India because of the prevailing economic, military and political conditions. The bogey of a Russian invasion of India was demagogically stirred up by British imperialist circles to give moral cover to their expansionist activities in Central Asia. I have, with the help of Russian and Indian source material, exposed Britain's aggressive designs on Central Asia. The British intrigues in Central Asia had the effect of quickening the pace of Russian conquest of the region which was basically dictated by the expansionist needs of developing capitalism.

The Russian annexation of Central Asia had an *objectively* progressive significance for the historical development of the territory. It resulted in the emergence of a rudimentary capitalism which accelerated the process of socio-economic change.¹

The October Socialist Revolution of 1917 ushered in a new era in the life of the Central Asian peoples. Before the Revolution Central Asia was a colony of Tsarist Russia, a land with a pre-capitalist level of development. Its economy was backward and living standards wretchedly low. After the Revolution the peoples of Central Asia, together with other Soviet peoples, built a socialist society within a historically brief period. Under conditions of a socialist multinational state based on equality and freedom, an eloquent example of voluntary brotherly relations was demonstrated to the whole world by this former colony which had been forcibly retained within the framework of the Tsarist empire.

Like certain other Soviet nationalities, the peoples of Central Asia were the first in the world to bypass capitalism in their transition from pre-capitalist relations to socialism. Their experience is likely to be of interest to the nations which have broken with colonial slavery and embarked on the path of independent economic and political development. The present work describes in brief how the peoples of Central Asia established Soviet power, overcame their economic and cultural backwardness, built socialism, and the results they have since achieved.

¹ The Soviet historians regard as the main progressive aspect of this annexation the drawing together of the oppressed working people of Central Asia with the revolutionary forces of the Russian Empire, which was vital for the future overthrow of the rule of the tsar, the capitalists and landlords, for the victory of the socialist revolution throughout the country.—Ed.

An Indian approach to the study of modern Central Asian history has been thus far mostly neglected. A considerable amount of material concerning this region is to be found in the Indian archives and an investigation of this material and its bearing on the problems of Central Asia and India is really something to be desired. I have drawn upon this source material to some extent. A chapter on relations between Central Asia and India has also been included in this work. Under this heading, for the purpose of analysis, Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan has been included because of its close relationship to Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia.

To a host of learned Soviet scholars and writers whose researches and works I have made extensive use of, I owe a particular debt of gratitude.

I am likewise grateful to Soviet Professors M. G. Vakhabov, N. A. Khalfin, A. A. Gordiyenko, Kh. T. Tursunov, Messrs. G. A. Khidayatov, T. A. Tutundzhan and V. Trubnikov of Tashkent, who shared their ideas thus helping me to better visualise and understand the problems with which this work is concerned. I am extremely grateful to Prof. N. A. Khalfin for his kind consent to edit the book and also contribute a foreword to it.

My deep appreciation is also extended to my friends Messrs. Suresh Chandra Agrawal, Sadhu Ram, and Shakti Dhar who painstakingly read the manuscript and made many helpful suggestions.

To my friend Raya Tugusheva of Tashkent Radio I am deeply grateful for the aid and encouragement which have meant so much to me in the completion of this task.

This work has benefited from many types of aid. I wish to express a debt of gratitude to Dr. Buddha Prakash, who first aroused my interest in the history of Central Asia.

Appreciation for their courtesy and co-operation is due to the personnel of the various libraries where I sought the materials used in this study, particularly the Lenin Library in Moscow, the Alisher Navoi Library in Tashkent, the Library and Archives of the Institute of the History of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, the Library of the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, and also the British Museum, London. I am also grateful to the authorities of the National Archives, New Delhi, and the Punjab State Archives, Patiala, for their courtesy in allowing me

access to their records and permitting me to make use of them.

A Fellowship at the Lenin State University, Tashkent, from 1962 to 1965 was of great help in my collection of material from Soviet sources.

To others who contributed to this undertaking in various ways, I also extend my sincere thanks. However, the assessment and interpretation is my own and I accept full responsibility for any shortcomings.

DEVENDRA KAUSHIK

New Delhi,
January 1968

CHAPTER I

THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

The Land

Five Soviet republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia and Turkmenia—occupy a vast territory extending from Western Siberia in the north to Afghanistan and Iran in the south, from the banks of the Volga and the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east. Nearly 30 million people, or more than a tenth of the population of the Soviet Union, live in these republics. They cover an area of 4 million sq. km. or almost a sixth of the territory of the Soviet Union. Excluding the area of Kazakhstan, that of Central Asia proper comes to only about 1.3 million sq. km. Strictly speaking, the term Soviet Central Asia refers only to the four of the above mentioned five Soviet republics, and does not include the Kazakhstan which, despite ethnic and cultural affinities, is geographically distinct from Central Asia. It is a steppe region and has always been considered both by Tsarist and Soviet writers as a separate entity.

The entire region has extremely varied climatic and natural conditions. In the west and north there are extensive plains; in the east and south a considerable part of the territory is mountainous. A great mountain chain, from Kopet-dagh in the south-west to the Pamirs and Tien-Shan in the east, divides Central Asia from the rest of the continent. These areas are full of striking contrasts: enormous plains with depressions dropping to below sea level, and tall mountains eternally covered with snow; densely populated oases surrounded by almost uninhabited deserts; arctic frosts in the mountains and tropical heat in the lowlands. The climate in the north is temperate, while in the south it is hot becoming intensely dry in the summer. Being far removed from oceans, it represents a truly continental

climate. The mountain tops remain covered with snow all the year round, and in the valley of the Amu-Darya in Termez the temperature rises up to $+50^{\circ}\text{C}$ in the shade, the hottest in the whole of the Soviet Union, whereas in the central Tien-Shan and the Pamirs the average temperature in July is $+5^{\circ}$ and $+14^{\circ}$ respectively falling to -47° in winter. Except in the mountain regions, heavy snow-fall is very rare. The Aral Sea in the north remains frozen for several months of the year and so do the lower reaches of the Syr-Darya. Powerful winds are a common feature of the semi-desert and desert regions.

Geographically, Central Asia and Kazakhstan can be divided into four regions: the steppe consisting of northern Kazakhstan or the Virgin Lands Region; the semi-desert roughly constituting the rest of Kazakh SSR; the desert region lying to the south of the latter and extending up to the Persian frontier in the west and the Chinese in the east; and the mountain region of the Pamirs and Tien-Shan.

The large and small rivers of Central Asia which are perennially fed by snow bring life to its oases. The two big rivers are the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya, having their source in the Pamirs and Tien-Shan respectively. Among the lesser rivers are the Zeravshan, Chu, Murghab, Tejen and Atrek. In Kazakhstan flow the Irtysh, Ili, Ural and Ishim rivers. The important lakes of the region are the Aral Sea, the Lake Balkhash and the Lake Issyk-Kul.

Snowy mountains and arid deserts did not retard the economic and cultural progress of the peoples of Central Asia. There has existed since the remote past a highly developed agricultural civilisation based on irrigation. Favourable natural conditions such as long, warm summers, fertile loess soil, possibility of artificial irrigation, large pastures on plains and hills and rich mineral wealth, were responsible for the development of various economic activities.

The geographical location of Central Asia and Kazakhstan has been of decisive importance for trade. Before the discovery of sea routes, all the main trade routes connecting Eastern and Central Asia with Eastern Europe and countries of the Near East lay across this territory. Present-day air and land communication lines connecting the Soviet Union with Iran, Afghanistan, India and China also pass through Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

The People

Central Asia is one of the oldest centres of civilisation. Here, Soviet archaeologists have unearthed a large number of relics belonging to the early Palaeolithic age. Finds of the Mousterian and even earlier periods have been discovered from the Talas and Jambul area of Kazakhstan and from Tashik Tash in Southern Uzbekistan. Many Central Asian tribes, for example, those of the Jeitun settlement in Southern Turkmenia, were already cultivators and herdsmen in the Neolithic period. Cultivation of land was known to the Anau culture in Southern Turkmenia in the 4th millennium B.C. Early Iron Age culture of the 1st millennium B.C. existed in ancient Khorezm. It was mainly a farming and cattle-breeding culture. Khorezm had an elaborate system of canal irrigation. Other contemporary cultures which had reached a high level of farming and urban life were those of Bactria and Sogdiana. The people of the steppe region were aware of irrigation in the Bronze Age 11 thousand years before the Christian era.

The original population of ancient Central Asia and of the steppe region was of the same Iranian stock as the Persians. The oldest people known to us in Central Asia—the Sogdians of the Zeravshan valley and the Khorezmians inhabiting the lower banks of the Amu-Darya—belonged to the same stock. Their territory formed part of the first world monarchy known to history as the Achaemenid State. The Sogdians and Khorezmians are mentioned by King Darius (522-486 B.C.) as his subjects in his inscriptions. They took part in his expedition to Greece.

Khorezm had ceased to be a Persian province at the time of Alexander's invasion. But the Sogdians were still under Persian rule and fought against Alexander. The Achaemenid State was destroyed by Alexander and its territory integrated into the Graeco-Macedonian empire. After the collapse of the latter in the same century a considerable part of Central Asia was included in the Seleucid State. In the 3rd century B.C., the Seleucids in the western part of Central Asia were overthrown by native rebellions and the Parthians succeeded them. An independent Graeco-Bactrian state, however, survived the onslaught of the Parthians until 140-130 B.C. Some time later the Graeco-Bactrians were succeeded by the Kushanas. The Kushan period was one of cultural and economic expansion for Central Asia. The

prosperity of the region was partly due to its location on the "Great Silk Route" connecting China with Persia and the Roman world.

Kushan power began to decline at the end of the 3rd century A.D. In the 4th century A.D. a related tribe called the Ephthalites or White Huns, which was formerly under their rule, conquered Bactria and put an end to Kushan rule in Central Asia. But the White Huns did not rule for long. Between 563-567 A.D. the Ephthalites were conquered by the Turks from Semirechye and annexed to the great Khaganate stretching from Manchuria to the Black Sea. By the end of the 6th century A.D. the Khaganate separated into two parts, the western part of which was conquered by the Muslim Arabs.

The Arabs penetrated into Central Asia in the beginning of the 8th century under Ibn-Muslim, the governor of Khorasan. They carried sword and fire all over the region and destroyed wonderful cultural treasures such as the Penjikent temples and the Mug castle as well as other magnificent monuments. The acts of vandalism of the Arabs have been described with great indignation by Al Biruni. According to him the Arab commander Ibn-Muslim killed all scholars who knew the history and language of Khorezm, making it almost impossible to learn the history of pre-Islamic times. The Arabs met stiff resistance from the local people who were supported by the Turk tribes. This popular resistance continued for about half a century, in contrast to the Arab conquest of Sassanid Iran in only 15 years. Arab rule was marked by great oppression. The peasants groaned under high taxes, while the landed aristocracy enjoyed great privileges. The Arabs spread Islam in Central Asia at the point of a sword. In this conversion process they found a great force for forging the union of indigenous people with a common outlook. Along with Islam, spread the Arabic language, too, which became the language of administration, letters and science. The people, however, continued to speak the local Iranian and Turk dialects. The Arabs did not exercise any appreciable influence on the ethnic composition of the people. The groups of Arabs now living in Central Asia are the descendants of those who came considerably later in the time of Timur.

The Islamic conquest affected only the southern part of Kazakhstan whereas the Turk tribes in the steppe region still remained independent. The Turks first formed an

alliance with the Tiurgeshis in the 8th century in Semirechye, and later (8th to 10th centuries) with the Karluks. Towards the west, on lower Syr-Darya, a powerful union of Turk tribes and Oguzs held sway. These tribes combined cattle-breeding with crop cultivation and also had their trade centres in towns. The centre of the Oguzs was the Yangikent town. They were the descendants of the Ephthalites, who had been exposed to Turk influence in the 6th and 7th centuries. Besides the main Ephthalite-Turk ethnic element, at the time of the 8th to 10th centuries there entered in the composition of the Oguzs a considerable element of Indo-European tribes such as Tukhars and Yasov-Alans.

In the neighbourhood of the Oguzs, in the Aral Sea region, during this period a union of the Pecheneg tribes was effected; their ethnic base stemmed from the old Sakomassaget tribes who had also been exposed to Turk influence.

In the course of the 9th and 10th centuries there arose the state of the Samanids (874-999 A.D.) uniting Iran with Central Asia. Its centre was Bukhara. The Samanid State which incorporated Maverannahr, Khorezm, Syr-Darya region, part of Turkmenia, Iran and Afghanistan, played a great role in the ethnic and cultural history of the area. During the period of Samanid rule the Tajik-Persian language became widespread, and it was at this point that the great poets Rudaki and Firdausi wrote their monumental works. The Arabic language, however, continued to be the language of science.

In the late 8th and early 9th centuries, a great literary upsurge occurred in Central Asia. The work of Mohammed Ibn-Musa Al-Khorezmi, the founder of Arab mathematics, is related to this period. It is from the title of his work *Al Djabr* that the term algebra is derived. He was not only a mathematician, but also an astronomer, geographer and historian. His works represent a synthesis of Indian algebra and Greek geometry which form the basis of modern mathematical science. Al-Khorezmi made use of centuries-old Khorezmian traditions of mathematics, largely influenced by Indian and Greek cultures, which had arisen on the basis of such practical needs as irrigation, travel, trade and construction. It is through his works that the Arabs learnt the science of mathematics.

Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (died 950 A.D.) wrote philosophical

commentaries and is sometimes called the Aristotle of the East. He manifested a materialistic outlook which earned him the persecution of the mullahs. His materialistic ideas inspired the distinguished Central Asian scientist Abu Ali Ibn-Sina (980-1037 A.D.), the author of several works on medicine and philosophy. Among his medical works is the famous *Canon of Medical Science* which had been translated into Latin in the 12th century and used by physicians both in the East and West for approximately half a dozen centuries as an authoritative treatise on medicine.

Another towering figure of Khorezm culture was Al-Biruni (973-1048 A.D.). A contemporary of Ibn-Sina, he was born in a village in what is the present-day Kara-Kalpak Autonomous SSR. In addition to his *History of India*, an excellent historic-ethnographic monograph without parallel in mediaeval literature, he was also recognised as a great encyclopaedist, geographer, astronomer, mineralogist, ethnographer, historian and poet. A great and fearless patriot who criticised the conquerors for their vandalism, he also had great admiration and respect for the culture of other peoples. Al-Biruni had an intuitively materialistic outlook and stressed the role of human intellect in ascertaining the phenomena and laws of the physical world. The scientific and materialistic ideas of Ibn-Sina and Al-Biruni, however, were thwarted by the reactionary clerical ideology which dominated Central Asia in that period. In Maverannahr the mystic teachings of Sufism spread from Iraq in the 11th and 12th centuries.

Feudal relations had become predominant in Central Asia in the 10th and 11th centuries A.D. This began a new stage of development in the ethnological history of the region. Now commenced the formation process of *narodnosti* or national groups. The period between the 9th and 10th centuries gave rise to the formation of the Tajiks as a national group, having been the first among the peoples of Central Asia to do so. Their language had already developed within the Samanid State. The Sogdians and the Bactrians were their old ancestors.

On the land adjacent to Tajik territory, there arose the Uzbek *narodnost*. The historical ancestors of the Uzbeks were the local Central Asian peoples such as the Khorezmians, Sogdians, Massagets and Sakas. In the earlier period, Turk tribes from the steppe had migrated to the valleys of Zeravshan, Ferghana, Chach, Khorezm and other regions of

Maverannahr. As a result of intermingling with the local agricultural people, the Turks adopted their economic mode of life and cultural habits, and the local people who spoke the Iranian language, in turn, adopted the language of the Turks. This process of ethnic inter-mixture was actively going on during the 11th and 12th centuries. It was at this time that the main nucleus of a Turki-speaking people, known later by the ethnic name of Uzbeks, was formed on the territory between the Amu and Syr-Darya rivers.

The end of the 10th century witnessed the last phase of the Samanid empire's existence. Provincial governors refused to obey the authority of the centre, giving rise to divisive tendencies. A deep social crisis also enveloped the empire as a result of peasant unrest sparked off by heavy taxation. Sebuktegin laid the foundation of the Ghazni dynasty and Bogra Khan founded the powerful Turk dynasty of Karakhanids on the territory of Kashgar and Semirechye. The period of Karakhanid rule in Central Asia and Kazakhstan was of great significance for the ethnological and cultural history of this region. At this time, a union of ethnic groups of Eastern Turkestan and Central Asia took place resulting in mutual cultural interaction.

The Turk tribes were concentrated at that time in Semirechye and along the Syr-Darya, bordering on the Chach region. The most powerful of them was the Karluk tribe which occupied the vast area from the valley of the Talas river to the Tarim river in Eastern Turkestan. They were a cultured people living in towns and villages, and engaged in cattle-breeding, farming and hunting. The second big Turk tribe called Chigil settled in Taraz, mainly to the north-east of lake Issyk-Kul. According to historians, this tribe was rich in horses, sheep and cattle and as the Karluks lived in both towns and country villages. Another Turk tribe called Iagma which lived predominantly on hunting and cattle-breeding occupied the territory south of lake Issyk Kul in Eastern Turkestan. The Tiurgesh tribes, consisting of Tukhsi and Argy, whose state emerged in the 8th century, were conquered by the Karluks. These tribes had close cultural links with the people of Maverannahr and their Turk language was mixed with the Sogdian.

During this period the political unification of the local people of Central Asia with the Turk tribes in the Karakhanid state resulted in an intensive interaction of closer proximity. This intermingling of the inhabitants of the belt

of civilised agriculturists with the nomad and semi-nomad Turk immigrants is elaborately described in *Kudatku Bilik*, an excellent history, written at the beginning of the 11th century by Yusuf Khas-Khadzhib Balasaguni. In this period Turk ethnic elements in Central Asian oases increased and the local people gradually adopted the Turk language. On the territory of the modern-day Uzbek SSR the Turk-speaking people now constituted a majority. A study of *Diwan-lugat-at-Turk* written by Mahmud Kashgari, a Karakhanid Turk linguist, reveals that the process of formation of the Uzbek language had already made considerable headway in the 11th century.

In the same period, a decisive role was played by strong movements of steppe tribes and peoples living near the Aral Sea in the ethnic origin of the Turkmens, Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs. The ethnic origin of the Turkmens resulted from the tribal union of the Dakhs and Massagets of the Aralo-Caspian steppe whose exposure to Turk influence had taken place earlier. But the Oguz tribes, a part of which, according to Tahir Myervyeza, had already begun to be called Turkmen by the end of the 10th century, formed the main ethnic element in their composition. In the 11th century, in the course of their struggle with the Karakhanids there arose among the Oguzs of the lower Syr-Darya the Seljuk state. They conquered not only the possessions of the Karakhanids but also the Ghaznavid state lying to the south. The Seljuk Turk-Oguzs advanced into the territory of present Turkmen SSR from the Syr-Darya region. The Oguz tribal names were preserved among the Turkmen tribes right up to the beginning of the 20th century. The Seljuk movement had a considerable effect on the ethnic origin of Uzbeks also. It affected the exposure to Turk influence of the population of Khorezm and some parts of Bukhara. Even today an ethnic group known as "Turkmen" live in the Samarkand *oblast* (region). They represent the descendants of the Oguz Turkmens who settled here from the Syr-Darya and merged with the Uzbeks.

In the same period, the movement of another part of Oguzs on the heels of the Pechenegs in the direction of the South Russian steppe, and arrival in the Aral Sea region of the Kypchaks from the Irtysh, were of great significance in the formation process of the Kara-Kalpak national group. The old ancestors of the Kara-Kalpaks were the tribes from the Aral Sea area (the "Massagets of marshes and islands"

of the Greek authors) and Apasiaks, the ancestors of the Pechenegs. After the migration of a section of Pechenegs and Oguzs to the west, the remaining tribes in the Aral area drew closer to each other. Out of this Oguz-Pecheneg intermingling developed the Kara-Kalpak *narodnost*. The conquest of the Aral region by the Kypchaks in the 11th century opened a new stage in the cultural development of the Kara-Kalpaks. The Kara-Kalpaks adopted the language of the immigrants and by the 12th century A.D. the ethnic name "Kara-Kalpak" had already become current.

The ethnic development of the Kazakhs began mainly on the basis of the steppe tribes of Sakas and Usuns, in which Hun ethnic elements also played a considerable part. Additionally, the Turk Khaganate and early mediaeval states of South Kazakhstan also helped this process. In the 10th and 11th centuries the Kypchaks had formed several tribal unions in western and central Kazakhstan whose influence spread from the Irtysh to the Dnieper in the 12th century. The Kazakh national group emerged from the fusion of the Turk tribes of the steppe with the Kypchaks. Kypchak tribes also entered into the composition of other Turk peoples such as Uzbeks, Kirghizs, Kara-Kalpaks and Bashkirs.

The formation of the Kirghizs began on territory outside Central Asia, probably amongst the Turk tribes of the Eastern Tien-Shan. The Kirghizs had carved out a state of their own on the upper Yenisei in the 9th and 10th centuries which influenced the political history of Central Asia. The relation between the Yenisei and Tien-Shan Kirghizs remains a controversial question to this day. The process of intermingling of the Kirghiz tribes of Tien-Shan, who had advanced into what is today the Kirghiz SSR, with the indigenous population of Central Asia had begun at about the time of the Mongol invasion. Central Asian Kirghizs clearly manifest the cultural influence of the peoples of the Altai, Irtysh, Mongolia and Sinkiang, although many features of their culture did evolve as a result of their intercourse with the local population. The Yenisei Kirghizs clashed with the Russians in the 17th century and a major portion of them then settled in Jungaria while others merged with the Khakasses and Tuvans of Siberia.

In the 12th century the nomadic Kara-Kitais migrated from the Far East, formed a state in Semirechye and conquered Maverannah. Their arrival had a distinct effect on the ethnic structure of Central Asia. Obviously, a part of

them settled amidst the Turk tribes and adopted their language. The tribal name *Kitai* became widespread among the Uzbeks, Kara-Kalpaks, Kazakhs and Kirghizs.

The rule of the Kara-Kitais in Central Asia did not last long and at the beginning of the 13th century was succeeded by the Khorezm Shahs who destroyed the Seljuk power and created a grandiose feudal monarchy uniting Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. The rule of the Khorezm Shahs marked the highest development of feudalism reflected in the growth of towns, trade, crafts and culture.

The Mongol invaders under Genghis Khan destroyed the state of Khorezm Shahs in 1219-1221 A. D. The Mongols wrought great devastation and destruction causing the economic and cultural backwardness from which Central Asia for a long time would not recover. A greater part of the Mongol troops that conquered Central Asia consisted of Kypchak and other Turk tribes who had adopted the Mongol tribal names of Kungrad, Kiyat, Manghait, etc. The survival of these names among the Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks thus does not necessarily represent their Mongol origin. The Mongol conquerors were easily assimilated by the local people and adopted Islam as well as the Turk language.

In the 14th century, from among the Mongol tribe of Barlas, who had been exposed to Turk influence, there arose the great conqueror Timur who, after 38 years of incessant campaigns, established a state extending from India to the Volga and from Syria to China. Timur brought artists and architects as slaves from India, Iran and Syria, who constructed such impressive shrines as the Bibi Khanum mosque and the mausoleum of Gur Emir in Samarkand. His grandson, Ulug Bek was a great lover of science and it was during his reign that secular sciences came to be taught in the madrasah of Samarkand. Subsequently, Herat and Samarkand became great centres of science and learning. Ulug Bek constructed an astronomical observatory at Samarkand and his name is associated with such renowned astronomers as Kazizade Rumi, Giyasuddin Djamshed, and Ali Kushchi. His astronomical tables are remarkable for their precision. Ulug Bek met his tragic end at the hands of a fanatic mullah.

Herat became the centre of the Timurid state in the latter half of the 15th century. Here lived Alisher Navoi, the

famous Uzbek poet. In his works the old Uzbek language reached its highest perfection. The four collections of his lyrical poems called *Char Diwan*, *Hamza* as well as his other works are a valuable contribution to Central Asian and world literature. He struggled for secular learning, enlightenment and happiness of life. His contemporaries were such distinguished historians as Hafizi Abru, Abdurazak Samarkandi, Mirkhond and Khondemir whose works shed valuable light on the political, economic and cultural history of Central Asia and of other countries as well.

The break-down of the Golden Horde which began at the end of the 14th century influenced the ethnic development of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In the 15th century there developed among the Deshti-Kypchak new powerful tribal unions, one of which was situated on the territory of the White Horde in the lower Syr-Darya region. This union included a tribe which, since the 14th century, came to be known as Uzbek. By the end of the 15th century, these steppe tribes with Sheibani Khan at their head conquered the deteriorating Timurid state. The Uzbek tribes which followed Sheibani Khan to Central Asia settled there and gradually merged with the Turk and Tajik population. The term Uzbek now began to be used not only for the immigrants but also for the local population. With the inclusion of the Deshti-Kypchak Turk tribes, the ethnic origin of the Uzbek people was complete.

In the middle of the 15th century, as a result of feudal disintegration, small principalities sprouted in the basin of the Chu river, gradually developing into the Kazakh Khanate in the 16th century which concluded the formation process of the Kazakh national group. In the beginning the inhabitants of the Khanate were called Uzbek-Kazakhs and later, simply Kazakhs.

Thus by the 15th to 16th centuries, under conditions of developed feudalism and as a result of long historical evolution, all the principal national groups of Central Asia and Kazakhstan had been formed.¹

During the course of centuries, the peoples of Central Asia developed a splendid culture of their own and achieved remarkable success in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, arts and crafts, exact sciences and literature as well

¹ See *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 81-103.

as in the art of warfare, comparing favourably with the achievements of other ancient and mediaeval cultures. The Central Asian peoples borrowed much from the cultures of India, China, Mesopotamia and Iran and enriched it further with their creative genius. They also influenced in return the cultures of these neighbouring countries. The Chinese learnt grape cultivation, growing of alfalfa, the breeding of war horses and glass-making from Central Asia. The Mongol and Manchurian alphabets of today still bear the stamp of the Sogdian script which they had adopted in ancient times. Europe and Asia learnt the use of cavalry in warfare from Central Asia. The art of making paper and silk was brought from China to Europe through this very region. Central Asian scientists elaborated upon Arab mathematics and astronomy which were later adopted by mediaeval Europe. Central Asian architecture also exercised an influence on the development of architecture in adjacent countries.

The nationalities of Central Asia represent a complex mixture of various ethnic groups of antiquity. The Sogdians entered into the composition of the Uzbeks and Tajiks; Sakas and Massagets in that of Turkmens, Kara-Kalpaks, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and also partly that of Tajiks. The old Turk tribes played a role in the ethnic origin of a majority of peoples of Central Asia, both Iranian and Turki-speaking. Later on, Kypchaks entered into the composition of Uzbeks, Kazakhs and partly of Kara-Kalpaks and others. Thus, the peoples of Central Asia are all inter-related through old ethnic ties which account for a number of common features in their culture, economy and way of life. Their common historical development and joint struggle against foreign invaders strengthened these bonds of unity. However, the fact that each group also preserved its distinctive cultural traits, on the basis of which the different national groups in Central Asia were formed, should not be ignored. Writers supporting the theories of Pan-Iranism and Pan-Turkism deliberately minimise or ignore the presence of these distinctive elements. The concept of Pan-Iranism is a flagrant negation of the distinctive historical development of the peoples of Central Asia and an unwarranted exaggeration of the influence and impact of Iranian art and architecture on their culture. Pan-Turkism, too, has nothing in common with historical reality. It vainly attempts to unite arbitrarily the various Turki-speaking peoples into a single

unit disregarding the fact of their independent historical development. All of these sterile theories have ulterior political motives.

The peoples of Central Asia lived under the rule of the Khans of Uzbek dynasties for three centuries (16th to mid-19th centuries) until they were incorporated into the Tsarist Russian Empire. Though certain common elements such as language and culture already existed and incipient national consciousness had appeared, conditions prevailing under the rule of the Khans were not conducive to further national consolidation. The Mongol conquest disrupted the progressive development which had started under the centralised state of the Khorezm Shahs and brought with it an era of feudal disintegration. Central Asia, divided into feudal Khanates, lagged far behind in socio-economic and political development. Its economy was undermined by incessant internecine wars between the Khanates. The low level of development of productive forces, and stagnation in agriculture and crafts also adversely affected the formation of national groups.

Uzbek Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand were heterogeneous in their ethnic composition. In Khiva, there were Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs. Uzbeks were further divided into Sarts,¹ who were descendants of the old local population, and Deshti-Kypchak Uzbeks who still preserved their tribal and clan distinctions. The Khans of Khiva oppressed the Turkmens and Kara-Kalpaks by setting them on unproductive lands and imposing heavy taxes, forced labour and compulsory military service. Their uprisings were ruthlessly suppressed. In the Khanate of Bukhara, the privileged feudal Uzbek aristocracy persecuted the Tajiks.

The assertion by some Western writers that the heterogeneity of the ethnic composition of the Central Asian peoples is merely a later invention of the Soviet regime to counteract Pan-Turkism, is a gross distortion of facts. As early as 1843 N. Khanykov, who visited Bukhara, had written that the people of that Khanate were composed of seven widely different sections living in their own distinctive way without

¹ The name "Sart", which was in use before the 1917 Revolution, was not related to the Uzbeks and denoted social status rather than ethnic origin, meaning "settler", "citizen" and in some cases "merchant" or "tradesman".—Ed.

any hope of merger into the single whole.¹ As a result of bloody feudal wars much of the population was depleted. Secular literature died and the influence of the church increased. Brilliant achievements of mediaeval Central Asian astronomers, mathematicians and medical men fell into oblivion, and pursuit of the natural sciences came to be considered sinful. The domination of social life by the bigoted dogmas of Islam had a paralysing effect on the growth of national consciousness. The unwary, unenlightened people were misled by the religious propaganda of the mullahs harping on the myth of the unity of all Mussulmans which was later to be exploited by the advocates of Pan-Islamism. Notwithstanding all the intolerable social oppression and cultural stagnation, the creative genius of the peoples gave birth to many a shining poet and progressive thinker who opposed social injustice and oppression and broke with tribal traditions and religious ideology. Amongst them, for example, was the wonderful Uzbek poet Turdy (end of 17th and early 18th centuries). He not only issued clarion call to fight, but himself participated in the armed struggle of the people against the misrule of Subhankuli-Khan, the feudal despot of Bukhara. In this struggle Turdy desired the cohesion of the disunited Uzbek tribes. A similar call for unity of Turkmen tribes was given by Makhtum Kuli, the great Turkmen poet and thinker.

Despite the unfavourable conditions of those times, the peoples of Central Asia had each developed a common language, way of life and a distinct culture. But their ethnic development to a higher stage was retarded by their economic, political and cultural backwardness. It was only after the merger of Central Asia and Kazakhstan into the Tsarist Russian Empire that rudimentary capitalist elements began to appear. On the whole, the merger of the backward Khanates into the more developed Russia played an *objectively* progressive role. The end of internecine wars and penetration of capitalist relations helped remove feudal stagnation. The construction of railways, expansion of commerce and development of marketable agricultural products such as, for example, cotton, brought this remote territory of the Russian Empire into the vortex of the world market. On the

¹ See N. Khanykov, *Opisaniye Bukharskogo khanstva*, St. Petersburg, 1843, pp. 53, 75.

basis of this new capitalist development these national groups of Central Asia began to consolidate into bourgeois nations.¹

But this process of consolidation could not be completed and was retarded by the Tsarist regime's policy of military feudal imperialism and colonial oppression. It was completed not on a capitalist but on a socialist basis after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution. The October Revolution opened up for the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan the path to independent national development. The Soviet government's accomplishment of fixing the national state boundaries in 1924, helped the peoples of Central Asia in their national consolidation effort. The formation of national republics led to their speedy cultural and economic advancement. As stated above, the national consolidation of these peoples was the result of objective historical processes, and allegations concerning the artificial creation of Soviet national republics are deliberately misleading and politically motivated.

Since the establishment of Soviet power six socialist nations have been formed in Central Asia, viz., Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Kara-Kalpak. The Uzbeks, totalling 6,015,000 are the fourth largest nationality in the Soviet Union; 5,973,000 live in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (5,038,000 in the Uzbek SSR). The total number of Kazakhs in the Soviet Union is 3,622,000, of which 2,795,000 live in their national republic, the Kazakh SSR. The Tajiks total 1,397,000, of which 1,051,000 live in the Tajik SSR. There are 924,000 Turkmens living in the Turkmen SSR as against 1,002,000 for the whole of the Soviet Union. Out of total Kirghiz population of 969,000 in the USSR, 887,000 live in their Kirghiz SSR. The Kara-Kalpaks numbering 173,000 have an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR where 168,000 reside.

Besides these principal nationalities, there are also several lesser ones. Among them are 95,000 Uigurs (mostly concentrated in the Alma-Ata *oblast* of the Kazakh SSR and in the Ferghana valley of the Kirghiz SSR); 22,000 Dungans, who are Chinese Muslims; 212,000 Koreans; and 780,000 Tatars (445,000 in the Uzbek SSR and 192,000 in the Kazakh SSR).

The Slav element in the population of Central Asia and

¹ See footnote to p. 10.—Ed.

Kazakhstan consists of Russians (6,215,000), Ukrainians (1,035,000) and Byelorussians (107,000).

Outside Soviet Central Asia, 1,200,000 Uzbeks and over 2,600,000 Tajiks live in Afghanistan; 650,000 Turkmens live in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan; and in the People's Republic of China, in Sinkiang, live 509,000 Kazakhs, 71,000 Kirghizs, 14,000 Uzbeks and an equal number of Tajiks.¹

¹ All the figures given above are based on the 1959 Census. See *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 11-12.

CHAPTER II BEFORE RUSSIAN CONQUEST

The Khanates of Central Asia

Prior to the Russian conquest, there existed three Khanates on the territory of Central Asia. Bukhara in the basin of the Zeravshan river and Khiva on the lower Amu-Darya were older than Kokand which came into existence towards the close of the 18th century. In the beginning of the 19th century, Kokand annexed Tashkent, an important political and trade centre which existed as an independent city state. To stem the tide of the turbulent Kirghiz and Kazakh nomads, the Kokand Khanate established a chain of forts on the Syr-Darya, Chu and Ili rivers.

The founder of Kokand Khanate was Alim Khan of the Min dynasty who in 1798-99 succeeded his father, Narbuta Bi, since 1744 the Bek of Ferghana. The Khanate of Bukhara was founded by the Mangit dynasty in 1753. The early rulers were self-styled Khans. Among them, Haidar (1800-1826) was the first to call himself Emir. His successor Nasrullah was a tyrannical despot who pursued an expansionist policy towards the neighbouring Khanates. The Khanate of Khiva was the successor to the old kingdom of Khorezm. During the 18th century it was ruled by Uzbek *inaqs* or powerful nobles who held administrative power under the Khans, the descendants of Genghis Khan. Inaq Iltuzer declared himself the Khan of Khiva at the beginning of the 19th century and established a dynasty which ruled until 1920. During the second half of the 19th century, Russian influence spread throughout the region, and Tsarist Russia became the paramount power. The Khanate of Kokand was annexed by her and Bukhara and Khiva were reduced to vassal states.

In the beginning of the 19th century the population of the three Central Asian Khanates was 4 million, increasing

to 5 million by the middle of the century. Among the Khanates, Bukhara was the most populous, about 3 million; Kokand had 1.5 million, and Khiya, having only 0.5 million, was the most sparsely populated.¹ A major portion of the population was settled in the oases and river valleys, especially of the Syr-Darya, Amu-Darya, Zeravshan, Kashka-Darya and Surkhan-Darya and mostly in such big towns as Tashkent, Bukhara, Kokand and Samarkand. Nomadic tribes roamed in the semi-deserts, deserts and mountains, which constituted the bulk of Central Asia's vast territory.

All the three Khanates were economically backward feudal states, with many survivals from slave-owning society.

Trade in slaves captured from Russia, Persia and other adjoining countries was prevalent there. Among the Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads there existed powerful remnants of the tribal-clan system. The main occupation of the people was cattle-breeding and horticulture. Very little cotton was produced and even that was of an inferior quality. Towns were centres of handicraft production and trade. Cotton and silk cloth produced by craftsmen in Bukhara, Kokand, Tashkent and Samarkand was sold in different countries of the East and also in the Russian Empire. The territory was rich in natural resources, but the extraction of valuable minerals on a small scale was responsible for their higher cost as compared to that of the minerals imported from Russia.

Taxation was heavy and mostly realised in kind which had an adverse effect on the development of money-commodity relations. Feudal oppression and exactions by money-lenders held up the growth of handicrafts and agriculture. Feudal fragmentation, incessant internecine wars, and internal struggle of the various national groups impeded the economic development of the Khanates.

The class struggle of the *dehkans* of all national groups against heavy exploitation by the Emirs and Khans, *beks*, *bais*, *bees*² erupted into anti-feudal popular uprisings which became a common feature in the first half of the 19th century. Among such anti-feudal movements the revolt of the Kitaikipchaks (an Uzbek tribe of Bukhara) in 1821-25, of

¹ N. A. Khal'fin, *Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii*, Moscow, 1960, p. 19, also *Prisoyedineniye Srednei Azii k Rossii*, Moscow, 1965, p. 52 by the same author.

² *Beks*—feudal governors of provinces. *Bais*—rich land- or cattle-owners. *Bees*—tribal or clan chiefs.—Ed.

Samarkand artisans in 1826, of Khivan poor townsmen and peasants in 1827 and 1855-56, of Tashkent masses in 1814, and similar other uprisings in South Kazakhstan in 1856-58 are particularly noteworthy.¹ Illegal tax collections and rapacity of Kokand officials, especially of Tashkent *beks*, was the cause of the uprising of Kazakh tribes who stormed the Turkestan town in 1858. The Russian traveller N. A. Severtsov, who had been taken prisoner by Kokand soldiers, was an eye-witness to this disturbance and described its causes in detail.² All Russian travellers agree in attributing the great unrest among the people in the Khanates to the deplorable conditions of feudal oppression.³ Their testimony refutes the assertion made by the British writer, G. Wheeler, about the commercial life in the Khanates being "exceedingly brisk", his motive being to deny the objectively progressive effect of the annexation of Central Asia by Tsarist Russia.⁴ P. I. Nebolsin wrote from Orenburg on 14th November, 1850 that the people of the Khanates were extremely poor and oppressed, and the rich merchants hid their wealth to save themselves from the rapacity of the officials.⁵

Russia and Central Asia

Trade and diplomatic relations of the Khanates with Russia were more or less of a regular nature. In the latter half of the 16th century, eight missions from Russia came to Central Asia; in the 17th century twelve Khivan and thirteen Bukharan missions visited Russia. The Russian

¹ P. P. Ivanov, *Ocherki po istorii Srednei Azii (XVI-seredina XIX v.)*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 135-39, 167, 200, 212.

² N. A. Severtsov, "Mesyats plena u Kokandtsev", *Russkoye Slovo* No. 10, 1859, pp. 290-92.

³ See N. Muravyov, *Puteshestviye v Turkmeniyu i Khivu v 1819-20 godakh*, Moscow, 1822, p. 101; A. Ch[ernayeva], "Chernayev v Srednei Azii, 1857-59", *Istorichesky Vestnik*, June 1915, p. 844; V. V. Velyaminov-Zernov, "Svedeniya o Kokandskom khanstve", *Vestnik Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva*, 1856, Part I, pp. 113-115; N. G. Zalesov, "Posolstva v Khivu i Bukharu Polkovnika Ignatyeva v 1858 godu", *Russky Vestnik* No. 2-3, 1871, p. 56; M. I. Ivanin, "Khiva i Reka Amu-Darya", *Morskoi Sbornik* No. 8-9, 1864, p. 169.

⁴ See G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, London, 1964, pp. 44, 47.

⁵ See P. I. Nebolsin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii s Srednei Aziyei", *Zapiski Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva*, Book X, Moscow, 1865, p. 15.

missions carried back valuable information about the region. The connections between Russia and Central Asia were not limited to the mere exchange of missions and trade caravans. In the 17th century a large number of Uzbeks from Bukhara and Tashkent settled in Siberia, among whom there were traders, peasants and artisans. The Russian government gave them several concessions in the Orenburg, Astrakhan and Bashkir regions.¹

These ties were further strengthened in the 18th century when a large part of Kazakhstan was incorporated into Russia in response to the appeal of the Lesser and Middle Kazakh Hordes. In the 19th century the economic relations between Russia and Central Asia acquired a new magnitude. If, in the beginning of the 19th century, the yearly export from Russia was to the value of 1 million rubles, in 1825 it rose to 4 million rubles, and by the middle of the century, to 15 million rubles. There was a corresponding increase in the import of goods from Central Asia, whose value increased from 2 million to 10 million rubles during this period.² In only one decade (1840-50), the volume of trade increased by 60 per cent.

The first half of the 19th century was a period of great significance in the economic life of Russia. The old feudal-serfownership economy was disintegrating, giving place to new capitalistic relations. The old peasant-artisan economy was rapidly acquiring a commodity production character and the number of factories was constantly increasing. The number of industrial enterprises in Russia increased from 2,402 to 5,261 between 1804-24, rising to 15,388 in 1860. In 1804, only 95.2 thousand workers were employed in industrial enterprises; in 1825, 210.6 thousand; and in 1860, 656.1 thousand.³

In this period of intensive development of capitalism in Russia, the problem of markets assumed great importance. The internal market itself was small, and from the thirties of the 19th century Russian textile exports began to fall rapidly. By the fifties, the cheaper machine-made British

¹ *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, I, p. 98.

² S. Radzhabov, "Prisoyedineniye Srednei Azii k Rossii", *Obyedinyonnaya nauchnaya sessiya, posvyashchennaya progressivnomu znacheniyu prisoyedineniya Srednei Azii k Rossii*, Scientific Papers, Tashkent, 1959, p. 13.

³ P. I. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, Vol. I, p. 535.

and German textiles had driven out Russian products from the US market and in addition the USA was constructing its own factories. Metal exports also declined in the face of hard competition from Britain and Sweden. In such circumstances, Russian industrial circles began to pay more serious attention to the capture of Central Asia as their external market. Thus we find A. Semyonov recommending the acquisition of a wide market in Central Asia for Russian textiles, silk and iron-ware.¹

As early as 1836 a Special Committee was appointed by Tsar Nicholas I to examine various suggestions about trade relations of Russia with Asia. Among its members were ministers of foreign affairs, war and finance, as well as heads of various other government departments. In the same year, A. I. Verigin demanded establishment of close economic relations with the Khanates where Russia was not confronted with competition from other European Powers.² The importance of Russia's trade with Central Asia began to be stressed in trade journals and industrial circles. G. I. Danilevsky who visited Khiva in 1842 also lent his support to the suggestion for the development of Russian trade with Central Asia. In 1849, a distinguished geographer and traveller Chikhachov drew attention to the importance of Central Asian trade for the Russian Empire. He felt that the absence of Anglo-American competition was a point in favour of increasing Russian trade with this region. He was supported by his contemporary Y. V. Khaykov. A programme for the development of economic relations of the Russian Empire with Central Asia was formulated by P. I. Nebolsin who, at the instance of the Russian Geographical Society, visited Orenburg and the Caspian region in 1850 to collect trade information. In his letter to Muravyov, one of the leaders of the society, he advocated an active policy in Central Asia. At the same time he submitted a proposal to divert the Amu and Syr rivers to the Caspian in order to increase the possibilities of trade with Central Asia. The proposal, though unrealistic for those times, was, nevertheless, an indication of the seriousness then attached to the development of trade with Central Asia.

¹ A. Semyonov, *Izucheniye istoricheskikh svedenii...*, Part III, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 72.

² N. A. Khalin, *Prisoyedineniya Srednei Azii k Rossii*, p. 66.

Although the proportion of Central Asian trade to the whole foreign trade of Russia was still insignificant in the fifties of the 19th century (being little more than 2.5 per cent),¹ it had a bright prospect for further growth.

British Designs on Central Asia

Central Asia became not only an object of economic expansion of the British Empire, but also of her military and political penetration. British colonial circles were eager to widen their colonial possessions for the sake of larger markets for their manufactured goods and for easy procurement of raw materials. This task was facilitated by the backwardness of the eastern countries. With this object, the British waged a series of colonial wars against Asian states.

The expansionist aims of Britain with regard to Central Asia were already manifest in 1812, when William Moorcroft, a senior official of the East India Company, sent a group of specially trained agents into Central Asia. Meer Izzut Oollah undertook an extensive journey through this region and carried out reconnaissance work. He travelled a long distance from Attock to Kashmir, Tibet, Yarkand, Kashgar, Kokand, Samarkand, Bukhara, Balkh, Khulma, Bamian and Kabul. He gave a detailed description of the Bukhara Emirate down to the number of officials and made pro-British propaganda in his discussions with Klych Ali Bek, the ruler of Khulma, South Turkestan.² Thus the ground was being carefully prepared for British colonial expansion in Central Asia. Subsequently, in 1819-25, Moorcroft and George Treback made a supplementary study of Bukhara on the pretence of purchasing horses for the Company's forces.

In the early thirties an expedition to Bukhara was led by a British intelligence officer, Alexander Burnes, who collected military and socio-political information needed by the British for their predatory plans in Central Asia. Mohan Lal, a Kashmiri Pandit, also accompanied him in this mission. That the Burnes mission was mainly intended for pro-

¹ N. A. Khalifin, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

² *Travels in Central Asia by Meer Izzut Oollah in the Years 1812-13*, Calcutta, 1872, pp. 58-75, 93.

curing political and military intelligence is clear from the account given by Mohan Lal in his *Travels*. Mohan Lal was of the opinion that the climate for establishing "commercial or political" relations by the British with Bukhara was extremely favourable. He stressed that "no time ought to be lost" in this, for "no power is likely to anticipate our (the British) intentions at present".¹ Mohan Lal collected detailed intelligence about the military strength of Bukhara.² Too much is often made of the unofficial character of the Moorcroft mission to Bukhara. It is pointed out that his journey to Bukhara received but a reluctant acquiescence from the government of India, and that the Governor-General refused to accord him a political designation. But Moorcroft was paid a salary covering the period of his travels, and his papers were considered the property of the Bengal government.³ When the Kunduz chief asserted "that the English government kept up an extensive establishment of spies at every principal city between India and Turkestan, and named several individuals whom he knew to act in that capacity", Moorcroft did not deny their existence and explained "their originating in the necessity of counteracting the designs of the King of the French, who had declared his intention of marching to invade British India, which made it incumbent on the government of that country to procure news of his approach".⁴ That the purchase of horses was just a cover for espionage activities is evident from the fact that later on, the English members of the Afghan Boundary Commission purchased but very few horses, and Col. Ridgeway, who was authorised by the Indian government "to expend £300 upon first-class Turkoman stallions for breeding purposes, did not draw one penny upon his credit".⁵ The horses were found to be of little use.

¹ Mohan Lal, *Travels in the Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkestan to Balkh, Bokhara, and Herat and a Visit to Great Britain and Germany*, London, 1846, pp. 150-51.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 138-39, 162.

³ Horace Hayman Wilson, *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab by Mr. William Moorcroft and Mr. George Treback from 1819 to 1825*, prepared for the press from original journals and correspondence, Vol. I, London, p. XXVI.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 472-73.

⁵ G. N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, London, 1889, pp. 130-31; see *Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission* by Lt. A. C. Yate, 1887, p. 457.

In 1838 Herat became a centre for British intelligence and subversive activities which were directed by Major D'Arcy Todd. Col. Stoddart was sent to Bukhara from the British Consulate in Teheran. Other agents were despatched from Herat to Khiva and Kokand. In 1839 Major Todd sent to Khiva a certain Mulla Hussain who presented a rifle to the Khan. Soon Capt. James Abbott followed him there. He fell into Russian hands on 1st May 1840 while engaged in reconnoitring roads and fortresses near Novo-Alexandrovsk. When arrested, he posed as a representative of the Khan and produced a forged document to this effect. He was brought to Orenburg and thence to St. Petersburg from where he was sent to London. When Abbott's mission failed to produce the desired result, i.e., the conflict between Russia and Khiva, Richmond Shakespeare was sent there on a subversive mission. According to Soviet historian Khalfin, judging from Shakespeare's papers preserved in the Soviet Central State Archives, it is clear that certain new "defensive" measures were planned ostensibly for the "security of India" which was a favourite British pretext for the expansion of their empire. In reality these were meant to facilitate the seizure of semi-independent states of South Turkestan. To provide an excuse for entering Russia from Khiva, Shakespeare put forth the plea of accompanying Russian slaves. In September 1840 he reached Orenburg but was placed under surveillance and despatched to London.¹

According to Rawlinson, James Abbott, who was despatched to Khiva by Major Todd, the British envoy at Herat, proposed after the fashion of the days of Malcolm and Elphinstone that Russians should be permanently excluded from these areas and "a defensive-offensive alliance was suggested with England as a reward for this breaking with the common enemy". Rawlinson, however, states that Abbott in doing so exceeded his instructions, which only referred to the liberation of Russian slaves.² Vambéry attributes to the British the plan of forming "an offensive-defensive alliance" against Russia with the three Khan-

¹ See N. A. Khalfin's article "Britanskaya ekspansiya v Srednei Azii v 30-40-kh godakh XIX v. i missiya Richmond Shakespeare", *Istoriya SSSR* No. 2, 1958.

² H. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, London, 1875, pp. 153-54.

ates.¹ He, however, finds fault with the choice of Stoddart and Conolly who proved unfit to attain this object.

The British, Rawlinson tells us, were "preparing to occupy Syghan, on the northern slope of the Hindu Kush, and a further advance on Bokhara" in the late thirties.² This, however, could not materialise in the face of stiff resistance by the brave Afghans. During the Crimean War England had planned to introduce a strong force into Central Asia through Georgia. But as they "could never reckon on French co-operation", the plan had to be given up.³

In the forties, the British began to dump their textile goods in Bukhara at a lower than cost price. They were menacing Russian trade from two sides, viz., from the Black Sea and from India. The Report of the Department of Foreign Trade confirmed the contraction of Russian textile exports to Bukhara during 1845-47. In 1852, Klyucharyov complained about the fall in prices of Russian textiles in Kokand on account of extraordinary export of British goods to all Central Asia Khanates in that year.⁴

In their struggle against Russia for domination of Central Asia, the British used Turkey as a close ally. With their connivance, Turkish missions were sent to the Khanates to instigate them against Russia. Turkish agents became especially active during the Crimean War. British designs to draw the Khanates into their orbit did not materialise because of their closer links with Russia. Moreover, Bukhara grew suspicious of the double role of the British who were at the same time encouraging the Afghans to attack the Khanates on the left bank of the Amu-Darya in South Turkestan.

For some time, the British were cautiously approaching Central Asia because of the difficulties created by the 1857 uprising in India. But once it had been suppressed, the British bourgeoisie again began to prepare for further action in Central Asia. In 1858 a Parliamentary Committee was established to study trade development with Central Asia.

In the early sixties, the British again intensified their intelligence and subversive activities in Central Asia under the direction of Col. Walker, Superintendent of the Grand Trigonometrical Survey. Col. Walker was assisted in this

¹ A. Vambéry, *History of Bokhara*, London, 1873, pp. 384-88.

² H. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.

⁴ N. A. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii*, Moscow, 1960, p. 47.

task by a band of specially trained native agents prominent among whom were Pundit Munphool, Faiz Mohd, Bhai Diwan Singh and Ghulam Rabbani. The latter's diary, whose translation is preserved in the Punjab State Archives, Patiala, is an extremely interesting document. Ghulam Rabbani left Peshawar on September 10, 1865 and returned in early 1867. During this period he visited Bukhara, Kokand, Khojent, Samarkand and Tashkent. He stayed in Bukhara for two months and eight days and proceeded from there to Kokand in February 1866, staying there for one month. At Bukhara, he made "acquaintance with the members of the Bukhara Court", and detailed a report on this.¹ In his report, he gave an exacting description of the surrounding areas, the circumference of the town, width of its walls with 12 gates, which, in his opinion, was "not capable of defence". He also wrote that "the army was undisciplined" and had 200 guns which were quite useless. Information about the military equipment and defence potential of Chiragchi, Shahr-i-Subz (in Bukhara) and the Russian fortifications near Jizzak was also sent by him.² Through the influence of Mulla Iwaz Muhammed, Mirza Baba Kitabdar and the news-writer Muhammed Niaz, he had an audience with Khan Khudayar Khan. From Kokand, Ghulam Rabbani made three trips to Tashkent in which he made a meticulous study of the fortifications, reservoirs, etc. He even mentioned such minute details as the colour of the water in the rivers, and the nature of the rocks and minerals. Taking advantage of the panic among the merchants because of the Russian seizure of Tashkent, Rabbani offered to approach the Russian General Chernayev for ensuring the safety of their lives and property. This voluntary offer of "humanitarian" service to the Kokand merchants was in reality a cloak, like the "purchase of horses" and "liberation of Russian slaves" on previous occasions, for some ulterior political motive. Ghulam Rabbani recorded in his diary: "No one would risk his life by undertaking this journey (to Tashkent), but the writer who had an object in view (stress added) volunteered to do this."³ The object becomes apparent when we find him following General Cher-

nayev to the Chirchik river in the suburbs of Tashkent, keeping a watch on his movements.

On his return to India, he was accompanied by a *vakil* of the Bukhara Court. At Balkh, he met Faiz Mohd (another British agent) along with the *vakil* and left for Badakshan on urgent summons by Bhai Diwan Singh. The *vakil* proceeded to Kabul by himself where he was later joined by Rabbani.

The aggressive British designs in Central Asia roused serious concern in Russian ruling circles. Motivated by the requisites of developing capitalism, the Russians hastened to annex Central Asia, thereby forestalling the British.

¹ *Travels in Central Asia*, Punjab State Archives, Patiala, M/357/4986, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

CHAPTER III
RUSSIAN CONQUEST
AND ANGLO-RUSSIAN
RIVALRY

The Russian Advance

Russia's expansion into Asia began in the sixteenth century. The Muscovite Grand Duchy began its march on Asia as soon as it had overthrown the Mongolian yoke. In 1552 Ivan the Terrible occupied Kazan and in 1556, Astrakhan, on the Volga Delta. The Pacific was reached at the end of the seventeenth century. The Cossacks, who undertook this expansion, met little resistance from the primitive tribes and the latter were soon outnumbered by Russian settlers. The southward movement from Siberia began in the eighteenth century, first into the steppe region and later into Turkestan. Russia's expansion into the steppe region may be said to have begun in 1730 with the acceptance of Russian control by Abulkhair, the Khan of the Lesser Horde. The Russian advance towards the Khanates began chiefly in the first half of the nineteenth century.

In 1824 a "scientific" expedition was sent to conduct a barometric study of the Caspian and Aral Sea areas, supported by half a battalion of Cossack infantry and six cannons. In 1834 a military base was established at fort Novo-Alexandrovsk on the north-eastern coast of the Caspian with the object of improving trade with Khiva. In 1839 followed the Khiva expedition under General V. Perovsky with 5,000 soldiers, 22 cannons, 10,000 camels and 2,000 Kirghiz porters and camel drivers. This expedition, like the previous ones under Bekovich and Muravyov, was unsuccessful. Only 1,000 soldiers managed to return and the rest perished in an unusually severe winter. Preparations for a second expedition started immediately and the Khan of Khiva, on hearing of it, asked for peace. He released all

Russians imprisoned in Khiva and threatened to impose the death penalty on those of his subjects who attacked Russian merchants. A formal treaty, too, was signed with Khiva by which it undertook not to attack Russians and cease taking slaves. But Khiva still persisted in her hostile attitude towards Russia. The Khan openly sided with the Kazakh rebels and instigated them against Russia.

The Russian government now changed its method of dealing with the Central Asian Khanates. It decided to proceed slowly but methodically instead of sending a sweeping military expedition across the desert which was doomed to failure. In 1846 the Governor of Orenburg established a fort on the Syr-Darya near the Aral Sea where a fleet of ships covered the advancing Russian columns. The Kazakh revolt under Kenissary had been suppressed by then. In 1853 General Perovsky captured Ak-Masjed, a fort belonging to Kokand. Here the Russian advance stopped for the time being due to the Crimean War.

The defeat of Tsarist Russia in the Crimean War resulted in the transfer of Russian interest from the Balkans and the Near East to the Far East and Central Asia. The path of the Russian Empire in Europe, as Karl Marx wrote, was now barred. Instructions sent in 1858 by A. Gorchakov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, to the Russian Ambassador in London, Brunnow, reflected this policy change. The Foreign Minister stressed the desire to obtain full freedom of action for Russia in the East. Britain was to be told quite firmly that she must give due consideration to Russia's interests in Asia if she wanted to live in peace with her. The instructions to the Russian Ambassador in London laid down "the strengthening of the influence of Russian industry, trade and culture in Asia" as the main object of Russian policy.¹ In January 1856 General Blaramberg declared that the future of Russia does not lie in Europe and that she must therefore turn her interest to Asia. In 1857 Y. A. Gagemeister noted that Russia's growth rate of trade with Asia was much higher than with Europe and that while manufactured goods formed an insignificant portion of her exports to Europe, they constituted half her exports to Asia. He recommended the annexation of Cen-

¹ B. Nolde, *Peterburgskaya missiya Bismarka 1859-1862*, Prague, 1925, pp. 64-65; N. A. Khalin, *Prisoyedineniye Srednei Azii k Rossii*, p. 83.

tral Asia for economic reasons. The region was ideally suited to cultivation of cotton and the Syr-Darya was navigable up to the vicinity of Tashkent.¹ The economic prospects of a Russian conquest of Central Asia was a quite popular theme with statesmen, industrialists, generals, and journalists of Russia. The works of A. Semyonov concerning the Russian Empire's foreign trade and industry as well as the works of Y. Gagemeister and F. Terner (advisers to the Finance Minister), A. Shipov, famous industrialist and trader, I. Berezin, V. Grigoryev, orientologists, M. Ivanin, traveller-publicist, roused in Russia a great interest in Central Asia. Journals like *Russky Vestnik*, *Morskoi Sbornik*, and *Ekonomicheskyy Ukazatel* devoted many pages to the developments in Central Asia. A. Shipov emphasised the role of Central Asia as a potential supplier of raw materials, especially cotton, to Russia.²

This wide campaign for incorporation of Central Asia into the Russian Empire received a favourable response from the ruling circles who were closely linked with the bourgeoisie. In 1856 the Caucasian Commander A. I. Baryatinsky submitted to Tsar Alexander II a project for construction of a railway from the Caspian to the Aral Sea to replace the old caravan routes. Baryatinsky was concerned at the British activities in Iran and his proposal was meant to counter-act their effect. The project came up for discussion before an Extraordinary Committee which approved it despite the opposition of Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister, and General Perovsky. The Committee adopted the plan of establishing direct communication from the Caspian to the Aral Sea and further to the Amu- and Syr-Darya, but postponed its execution for a more suitable time.

Even before the Crimean War, industrial firms, trading companies and transport organisations engaged in commerce with Central Asia were making their appearance. The government gave encouragement and support to Mercury Steamer Company (established in 1849) and the Trade Houses of Baranov and Yelizarov. Kokorev, a leading Russian industrialist, and Khrulyov, the hero of Sevastopol,

¹ Y. A. Gagemeister, "Vzglyad na promyshlennost i torgovlyu Rossii", *Russky Vestnik* No. 1, 1857, pp. 38-39.

² A. Shipov, *Khlopchatobumazhnaya promyshlennost i vazhnost yeyo znacheniya dlya Rossii*, Moscow, 1857-58, p. 42.

submitted a memorandum on the Caspian routes and pointed out their special importance for trade with the Central Asian Khanates. The Trans-Caspian Trading Society was organised with a capital of 2 million rubles. It had the backing of Baryatinsky and the Grand Prince Konstantin Nikolayevich. In 1858 Benardaki put forth the suggestion of establishing a fishing centre at Krasnovodsk. He also outlined a plan for trade with Turkmen tribes which was approved by the Governor-General of Orenburg. This, however, could not be implemented at the time.

Gorchakov appointed Kovalevsky as Director of the Asian Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under his supervision an all-inclusive study of the neighbouring countries was made and the way prepared for the expansion of Tsarist Russia into Central Asia. Commercial, political and intelligence missions were sent in 1858 to Iran, Khanates of Central Asia and Kashgar. The three Russian missions (of N. Khanykov, N. Ignatyev and Ch. Valikhanov), though different in form (Khanykov headed a "scientific" expedition, Ignatyev an official diplomatic mission and Valikhanov went as a Muslim trader), had the common object of making an intensive study of the prevailing political and economic conditions in neighbouring countries. These missions collected valuable information about the people of Khorasan, East Iran, Central Asian Khanates and West China, and also about the British penetration of these regions. At the same time they also tried to increase Russian influence there. After the return of the Ignatyev mission from Khiva and Bukhara, the Tsarist government began active preparations for direct expansion in Central Asia. The joining of the Orenburg line with that of West Siberia was favoured by Ignatyev and also by Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg. In 1860 the Tsarist government sent intelligence missions to Issyk Kul and Pishpek area.¹ In 1861 Major-General Tsimmerman reported on the conditions in the Kokand Khanate. He recommended increased pressure on the Khanate to permit increased circulation of Russian commodities in the Central Asian market.

Another powerful advocate of vigorous action against Kokand was D. A. Milyutin, the Minister for War, who acted on the advice of General Bezak, the Governor-General

¹ N. A. Khalfin, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18.

of Orenburg. Bezak visited the Syr-Darya line in 1861 and formed the opinion that Tashkent should be captured as soon as possible. He thought that Russia would thus secure a convenient frontier with Kokand, while her control of Tashkent would facilitate promotion of trade. Trade routes from Bukhara, China and Russia passed through Tashkent. Therefore, Russia's occupation of this city was apt to increase trade with these countries, particularly with Chinese Turkestan, as well as strengthen her influence on Bukhara.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared that an over-active policy in Central Asia would antagonise Britain. Bezak, however, felt that Britain would not display any extraordinary sensitivity towards Russian expansion up to the Syr-Darya which she might, in case of an advance up to the Amu-Darya. Although the Tsar approved Bezak's views, another four years were to elapse before Tashkent was brought under Russian control. Tashkent was finally captured in 1865 by the prompt and largely unauthorised action of the local commander, General Chernayev.

In October 1864, the very month in which Chernayev made his first unsuccessful assault on Tashkent, the expediency of such a step was categorically rejected on the ground that it would inevitably involve the Russian Empire in all Central Asian disputes. But there were many equivocal statements in the official Foreign Office memoranda disclaiming desire "to extend the limits of Russian influence by conquest". Thus, while the plan of operations in Central Asia approved by the Tsar in November 1864 emphasised the necessity of refraining from further advances in Central Asia, the statement about the "inevitability" of capturing the whole of the Kokand Khanate made nonsense of the entire talk about the inexpediency of "the further extension of the imperial domains".

When, in June 1865, Chernayev captured Tashkent, he was, according to Khalfin, taking action "which in fact fully corresponded with the ideas both of the government and the military-feudal aristocracy of the Russian Empire, and of commercial and industrial circles". He understood perfectly well that the repeated appeals by the diplomatic department for the cessation of further advance in Central Asia were a special kind of manoeuvre, a smoke-screen, resulting from fears of protests from Britain. Chernayev took advantage of the strong support of expansionist ele-

ments in the capital and among his own close associates. He knew that "not only would he not be taken to task for his 'independent' action, but that, on the contrary, he could count on receiving decorations and promotion".¹

Tashkent was captured by Chernayev with a total Russian loss of 25 killed and 89 wounded, resistance being very limited. At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the intention of incorporating Tashkent into the Russian Empire. It favoured turning Tashkent and its surrounding territory into a separate Khanate under complete control of Tsarism, playing the role of a buffer state between the Russian Empire and Bukhara. This view was opposed by Chernayev, but it was supported by Kryzhanovskiy, the newly appointed Governor-General of Orenburg. The people of Tashkent, when called upon to elect their Khan, declared in a statement addressed to Chernayev that they preferred the civil government of Tashkent to remain in the hands of Chernayev, with the religious and judicial administration vested in the *Kazi Kalan*, or supreme judge of Canon Law, subject to confirmation by Chernayev. In August 1866 Tashkent was declared part of Russia.

In 1867 the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was established with its headquarters at Tashkent and General K. P. Kaufman appointed as the first Governor-General. In March 1868 Emir Muzaffar-Eddin of Bukhara declared a holy war against the Russians. General Kaufman stormed Samarkand in April 1868 and defeating the troops of Bukhara entered the city on May 2. Bukhara was humbled by the capture of Samarkand and the imposition of a treaty which reduced the Khanate to a vassalage.

During 1864-68 the two most important Central Asian Khanates, Kokand and Bukhara, were completely defeated. The decision to annex them was rejected for diplomatic reasons. Peace treaties were concluded in 1868 with Khan Khudayar Khan of Kokand and Emir Muzaffar-Eddin of Bukhara, whereby they relinquished the lands actually conquered by Russia, confirmed their dependent status and gave the Russians highly favourable trade terms.

The Kokand Treaty gave Russian merchants the right to visit all towns of the Khanate, establish caravanserais there and appoint their commercial agents. Discrimination be-

¹ N. A. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 178-79.

tween Russian and Muslim merchants as regards import duties was to be abolished and Russian caravans on their way to neighbouring states were to be allowed unhindered passage. The Russians were to pay a duty of only 2.5 per cent, the same as was charged the Muslims and additionally the treaty gave them preferential treatment over other foreigners. The Khanate lost almost half of its territory, while the remaining half became a protectorate of Russia. The treaty with Bukhara was signed by the Emir in June 1868. It provided for incorporation of Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan and the whole district of Zeravshan into the Russian Empire, in addition to the payment of an indemnity of 500,000 rubles. It also contained clauses relating to commercial benefits. Bukhara as Kokand became a vassal of Russia.

Khiva's turn came five years later. In the spring of 1873 she was overrun by Russia and forced to accept terms dictated by Russia. A peace treaty was signed in August 1873 between General Kaufman and Seid Mohammed Rahimkhan, the ruler of Khiva. This treaty forced the Khan to acknowledge that he was "the humble servant of the Emperor of All the Russias" and to renounce "all direct and friendly relations existing with neighbouring rulers and Khans". The whole of the right bank of the Amu-Darya and the adjoining lands belonging to Khiva were transferred to Russia, which also obtained the right of free navigation on the Amu-Darya. The Russians obtained the right to construct warehouses and docks on the left bank of the Amu-Darya and the privilege to establish factories. Russian merchants and caravans were granted freedom to travel throughout the whole Khanate, and the Khan undertook to provide them with special protection. In addition, they were also exempted from payment of custom duties. The treaty also contained an article which granted extra-territorial rights to Russians in Khiva. There were also clauses relating to the abolition of slavery in Khiva and to instalment payment until 1893 of a war indemnity totalling 2,200,000 rubles. The treaty with Khiva was a typical colonial treaty resembling those imposed by the Western powers on China. This treaty, as well as those with Kokand and Bukhara earlier, assured Russia an economic hold over these three Khanates.

An interesting light on the reaction of the Khivan people towards the annexation of the Khanate by Tsarist Russia is

shed by the remark of a British contemporary who had watched the events in Central Asia quite closely. Thus Mac Gahan wrote that he had no doubts that before the indemnity was paid, the Khan's death or some other event would enable the Russians to take power in their hands, perhaps even at the request of the people themselves.¹

Next came the turn of the Tekke Turkmens who inhabited the Atrek valley and the Sarakhs of the Merv oasis. The subjugation of Khiva marked a new era in the history of Russian advance. The last semblance of organised opposition to the Russian onslaught disappeared and the Tsar found himself the unquestioned suzerain of the great Khanates. Westwards, Russian influence was firmly implanted in the Caspian port of Krasnovodsk, which was founded in 1869 by General Stoletov. The Amu-Darya marked the new limits in the West. But the tract between the Amu-Darya and the Caspian was still unvanquished. There was no organised state here and the region was the abode of the Turkmens, the story of whose subjugation forms the final chapter in the history of the Russian conquest of Central Asia.

But before Russia could march against the Turkmens, a hostile movement spread in Kokand. The rebellion headed by Nasiruddin, the son of Khan Khudayar Khan, was quelled and the Khanate of Kokand was absorbed into the Russian Empire on March 2, 1876. It was renamed the province of Ferghana.

The Trans-Caspian military district formed in 1874 was placed under the charge of Major-General Lomakin. In 1877 Lomakin made an attempt to occupy the Tekke fortress of Kizil Arvat, 200 miles east of Krasnovodsk, but had to retreat in the face of stiff resistance. An attempt was made by him on Dangil-Tepe in the district of Geok-Tepe in the Akhal oasis, but the Turkmen warriors foiled it. To retrieve this loss of prestige, General M. Skobelev was sent to conquer the Turkmens (he had participated in campaigns against Khiva and Kokand and had captured Adrianople and Plevna in the Russo-Turkish war).

Lomakin had relied on the use of camels which perished by the thousand in the long difficult march. Skobelev, therefore, invoked the help of steam. A special railway battalion

¹ T. A. Mac Gahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*, London, 1874, p. 295.

was formed and keeping pace with the progress of the campaign proceeded the construction of the Trans-Caspian railway. A distillery was established at Krasnovodsk for a plentiful supply of drinking water. All preparations having been made, an attack was launched against the Turkmens. The beleaguered Turkmens fought gallantly and Geok-Tepe was conquered after heavy fighting. With its fall the Akhal oasis fell into Russian hands.

Now Merv alone remained to be annexed. The latter was added to the Russian Empire by skilful diplomacy, through the efforts of an astute Caucasian Muslim, Alikhanov, who had an ally in Gul Jamal, the widow of the last great Turkmen chieftain Nur Verdi Khan. On January 31, 1884, the Turkmen tribal chiefs met at Ashkhabad and swore fidelity to the Tsar. Soon afterwards the Sarik tribe south of Merv yielded and the conquest of the whole region was then completed.

The historical significance of the Russian conquest and annexation of Central Asia is a subject on which Soviet and Western historians express widely divergent opinions. The annexation by Tsarist Russia extended Tsarism's colonial oppression to Central Asia. However, the incorporation of these peoples into the Russian Empire had a different aspect, too. It joined their fate with the progressive forces of Russia, with the Russian revolutionary movement. Consequently, the merger of Central Asia into Russia had an *objectively* progressive character. This *objectively* progressive historical character of the Russian annexation is sometimes exaggerated by some Soviet writers, a few of whom have gone to the absurd length of describing the merger with Russia as an "age-old dream" of the peoples of Central Asia. But Soviet historians have, by and large, taken a sensible approach towards this question. Thus we find A. M. Aminov, a Soviet Uzbek scholar, lashing out at the "tendency to magnify the progressive significance" of the merger of Central Asia with Russia.¹ He writes:

"This should not lead to the suppression of the reactionary essence of imperialism, the nature and aims of the colonial policy of Tsarism striving to obtain the maximum profits by plundering the riches of Central Asia."²

¹ A. M. Aminov, *Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Srednei Azii*, Tashkent, 1959, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.

Tsarism established a ruthless colonial regime in the territory of Central Asia, whose interests were in conflict with the interests of both the indigenous masses and the Russian working class. More recently, the trend towards over-emphasis of the progressive character of annexation of Central Asia was again a subject for criticism by M. P. Kim, Associate Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Kim charged Soviet authors with a "certain modernisation" of approach on this matter. He was critical of the argument, often advanced in Soviet literature, that if the peoples of Central Asia had not merged with Russia, they would not be united in a brotherly union of Soviet peoples after the October Revolution. He said:

"Historical truth, like every other truth, is concrete. When we speak about the progressive results of the merger of peoples with Russia, we have in mind the progressive changes in the socio-economic and cultural life of these peoples in *concrete historical conditions* of old feudal or bourgeois-landlord Russia. We speak about the progressive results together with a recognition of the harm caused to them by the loss of national independence."¹

The Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia

Even in the first half of the 19th century, when the main Russian thrust against Central Asia had not yet begun, the British government had given its peculiar explanation of Anglo-Russian relations. According to the British, Russia was continually advancing towards the borders of India, annexing one region after another. The object of the Russian advance was said to be India and Britain was depicted as acting only in the interests of the defence of India and the integrity of the Ottoman empire, through which lay the bridge between Europe and India. This view was constantly spread by publicists like D. Urquhart and later H. Rawlinson.

But this was a highly prejudiced view. It was not as though Russia simply advanced and Britain was merely on the defensive. In fact, there converged upon Central Asia

¹ *Istoriya i sotsiologiya*, Moscow, 1964, pp. 127-28.

two aggressive currents.¹ Both Britain and Russia followed an aggressive policy with regard to Central Asia, each putting the blame on the other.

The real causes of the rivalry between the two powers lay in strategical considerations and trade interests as well as in the desire to strengthen their control over the countries already conquered. The British colonialists in India feared that the approach of any foreign troops to her frontiers would inevitably lead to an outburst of popular anger against their rule. They were, therefore, also eager to spread their influence, and if possible, complete domination over the adjacent countries—Persia, Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Burma. Conquests on the part of both these powers were usually motivated by the need to obtain sources of raw materials and markets for the commodities produced by their capitalist industries. In this sense, for example, the cotton of Central Asia acquired a great significance for Russian industry.

The general policy in Central Asia was determined by the British cabinet in London, its concrete implementation being left to the Viceroy in India. British agents who were usually intelligence officers went to Afghanistan, Turkmenia and Western China, where they also employed native agents. The agents of the Sultan of Turkey also actively helped the British. The British policy in Central Asia of espionage and subversive activity played no less an important role than official diplomacy. On the Russian side as well, the Governor-General of Turkestan exercised a considerable measure of independence from the control of St. Petersburg and maintained an intelligence network among the local feudal rulers and tribal chiefs.

The main object of British expansion in Central Asia was Afghanistan. From there the British were preparing to penetrate into Turkmenia. The British waged the First Afghan War in the thirties of the 19th century when the expanding empire of Russia was yet far from the frontiers of India. This aggressive war was imposed upon a not unfriendly Afghanistan at a time when the siege of Herat by Persia had been abandoned and Vitkevich, the Russian agent, had been recalled and repudiated. In 1869 ended the period of feudal struggles that had been continuing in Afghanistan for the preceding six years. Emir Sher Ali

¹ *Istoriya diplomatii*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1963, p. 60.

overcame his opponents and established a centralised state in Afghanistan under his control. Lord Mayo decided to prevail upon the Emir and convert him into an instrument of British influence in Afghanistan. Sher Ali was invited by Lord Mayo to visit India and they met at Ambala towards the close of March 1869. The Emir insisted upon conclusion of a treaty of alliance and demanded recognition by the British of his younger son Abdullah Khan as his successor to the Afghan throne. But Lord Mayo did not agree to it. The British had no desire to give up their game of playing one claimant to the throne against another. He, however, assured the Emir of British friendship.

In the beginning of 1869 the Liberal government of Britain headed by Gladstone proposed to the Tsarist government the creation of a neutral zone in Central Asia between the territorial possessions of Britain and Russia. This zone was to be respected by both powers and was designed to prevent their territories from having a common border. The Russian government agreed to the creation of such an intermediate zone and suggested the inclusion of Afghanistan in it with the view of preventing her from being annexed by Britain. The British government proposed a considerable extension of this zone towards the north. This led to a lengthy series of communications between the two governments which resulted in what is commonly called the "Clarendon-Gorchakov Agreement". The British government was of the view that Afghanistan would not fulfil the condition of a neutral territory as its frontiers were ill-defined.

The Duke of Argyll and his colleagues in India proposed that the Upper Oxus should be the limit which neither power should permit its forces to cross. These negotiations concerning the neutral zone were again renewed when T. D. Forsyth, an officer of the Indian administration, visited St. Petersburg in November 1869. An agreement was reached with him which was later ratified by the Tsar and the British government. It was agreed that all those provinces which were in actual possession of Sher Ali should be recognised as the territory of Afghanistan. It was also agreed that Britain should exercise her influence over the Afghan Emir to restrain him from starting hostilities against Bukhara and other Central Asian states. Similarly, Russia was to keep Bukhara in check and use all her influence in the interest of peace.

However, the actual territorial extent of Sher Ali's possessions was a disputed matter and nobody, not even the Emir himself, knew its dimensions. It was therefore agreed that both sides should collect information concerning this matter. Such a proposal enabled both parties to gain time and permitted a wide field for conflict and compromise. Soon differences between the two powers arose over the agreement reached in 1869. The British government affirmed that all those dominions which had once formed the possessions of Emir Dost Mohammed, the predecessor of Sher Ali, *ipso facto* belonged to the present incumbent of the Afghan throne. This viewpoint of the Viceroy of India, Lord Mayo, as contained in a despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll, was communicated to the Russian government through its ambassador in London. But the fact was that some of the Khanates over which Dost Mohammed had ruled were not in Sher Ali's possession.

The Russian government was not inclined to recognise them as possessions of the new Emir Sher Ali whom it considered to be a British agent. On October 17, 1872, Earl Granville wrote a lengthy note to Lord Loftus for the attention of the Imperial Russian government in which he defined the limits of the Afghan territories under Sher Ali. It suggested that Badakshan and Wakhan provinces form part of Afghanistan. The Russian government in its reply *vide* the despatch of December 7, 1872 recognised the frontier of Afghanistan on the Amu-Darya below the territory of Badakshan and Wakhan up to Khoja Saleh. But it declined to recognise these two provinces as part of Afghan territory. The Tsarist government, however, changed its stand later and agreed on January 31, 1873 to the demarcation proposed by Britain as the northern frontier of Afghanistan.

Thus concluded the Anglo-Russian discussion and correspondence regarding Afghanistan which began in 1869. The agreement is known as the Agreement of 1873. It had the merit of having established the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. An advantage which Britain unilaterally procured from Russia by the agreement was a repeated and positive assurance to treat Afghanistan outside her sphere of influence. But so far as the question of establishing a "neutral" or "intermediate" zone between the possessions of the two powers was concerned, the idea was definitely given up

in 1873. The British, who had their aggressive designs on Afghanistan, were never really enthusiastic about such a proposal. Lord Mayo's government was reticent to endorse it from the very beginning. Lord Mayo had written to London:

"The best thing to secure would be a pledge by both Russia and England of mutual non-interference with each other's interests, unratified by any definite treaty."¹

In giving concession to the British over recognition of Badakshan and Wakhan as parts of Afghanistan, the Tsarist government pursued its own objective. It wanted to soften British opposition to the conquest of Khiva. An extraordinary council meeting under the chairmanship of Tsar Alexander II on December 4, 1872 had decided to organise an expedition against Khiva.²

Khiva was conquered by Russia without any serious international complications. There were however some protests in the British press. After more than six months, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, sent a letter to British ambassador in St. Petersburg with instructions to submit a copy of same to the Tsarist government. The letter pointed out that in the event of further Russian advances towards Merv, the Turkmen tribes might take shelter on Afghan territory which could result in clashes between Russian and Afghan troops. The British government expressed the hope that the Russian government would respect the "independence" of Afghanistan as an important requisite for the security of British India and tranquillity of Asia. But the British government did not protest against the subjugation of Khiva by Russia. Gorchakov in his reply reassured Britain that Russia considered Afghanistan outside her sphere of influence. He suggested that the Afghan Emir, if he was really eager to avoid conflict with Russia, should make it clear to the Turkmen chiefs that they could not depend on his support.

In further negotiations with Britain, Gorchakov pointed out in his memorandum of April 29, 1875 that rivalry between the two powers was prejudicial to their mutual interests. It was desirable, in his opinion, to preserve between their possessions an "intermediary zone" to avoid this

¹ Quoted by D. K. Ghosh, *England and Afghanistan*, Calcutta, 1960, p. 165.

² *Istoriya diplomatii*, Vol. II, p. 66.

rivalry. Afghanistan was an ideal buffer state and only recognition of its independence by both sides was needed.

The Conservative government of Disraeli which replaced the Liberal government of Gladstone in 1874 came into power under the banner of expanding the colonial empire of Britain. In the seventies there was a marked increase in the interest of the British bourgeoisie in colonial expansion. This attention to colonies grew with the intensification of competition for world markets, particularly from Germany. This new phenomenon was related to the beginning of the transition of capitalism to its imperialist stage. The Disraeli cabinet took the path of expansion and colonial annexation in the most varied regions of the world—South Africa, Egypt, Turkey and the Middle East. The British government intensified the activities of its agents in Persia and Turkmenia effecting military and political intelligence there. It strove to create a united front of Muslim rulers of this region against Russia. The government of Disraeli was also making preparations to subjugate Afghanistan.

The two powers could have negotiated in this period a settlement for the division of Central Asia. In May 1875 they joined hands against Germany and relations between them appeared to have been improving for some time. Lord Derby declared before the Russian ambassador in London that nothing could prevent Russia and England from coming to an agreement in Asia as there was room enough for both of them.¹ But the British government rejected the idea of a buffer state as the basis of negotiations with Russia. It did not agree to the Russian proposal for joint confirmation of the independence of Afghanistan. In October 1875 the British cabinet declared that it reserved full liberty of action with regard to Afghanistan. To this Gorchakov replied in February 1876 reaffirming the old Russian position which regarded Afghanistan outside her sphere of influence. He further declared that the Russian government considered negotiations concerning the intermediary zone concluded. Both powers, while fully preserving their freedom of action with respect to countries of this region, were, however, to give due regard to each other's interests and refrain from direct contact between their territories.

¹ *Istoriya diplomatii*, Vol. II, p. 68.

Russia immediately made use of this "freedom of action" first proclaimed by Britain. On February 17, 1876 the Tsarist government issued an order incorporating the Khanate of Kokand into the Russian Empire. Viceroy of India Lord Mayo and his successor, Northbrook, were opponents of an immediate conquest of Afghanistan. They advocated a policy of "patience" and "waiting". This policy came under attack from the proponents of the "forward policy" advocated by Rawlinson. Disraeli upon coming to power implemented this policy. The government of India was instructed to demand from the Emir of Afghanistan permission to maintain British residents in Herat and Kandahar. Lord Northbrook, who opposed this new policy, was forced to resign. In April 1876 Lord Lytton succeeded him as Viceroy. In May 1876 Lytton demanded that Sher Ali receive a British mission at Kabul. A study of the Viceroy's correspondence on the subject reveals an impatience of mind and intransigence in action. The story of the thirties was once more repeated in the Second Afghan War, and again in the name of the security of the Indian Empire against the aggressive designs of Russia. It is worthwhile to note in this connection that the Viceroy who was so anxious for the security of India was completely indifferent to the ravages of the great famine which took a toll of five million lives. For the glory of the British Crown he could hold a magnificent *darbar* at Delhi at a time when millions of Indians were dying in every town and village of the country stricken by plague and hunger.

In Turkmenia British agents instigated local chieftains against Russia. Tsarist Russia was conscious of the British menace to Turkmenia from Iran and Afghanistan where British influence was increasing. During the seventies and eighties of the 19th century Khorasan became a base for British military expansion in Central Asia. In 1873 Col. Baker, Capt. Clayton and Lt. Gill were sent to study the basin of the Atrek river. Baker submitted a report to the British government in which he praised the fighting qualities of the Turkmens. In his opinion, 120 thousand excellent horsemen of Turkmenia could guard a large territory if headed by European officers.¹ Baker also published articles

¹ V. Baker, *Clouds in the East. Travels and Adventures on the Perso-Turkmen Frontier*, London, 1876, pp. 341-42.

in London on the military geography of this region. In 1874 Napier was sent there to study the possibilities of using the Turkmen tribes as "cannon fodder" in Britain's struggle against Russia. He met pro-British Khans, supplied them with arms, prepared road maps and gathered information about navigation on the Caspian Sea. On his return, he urged the government to interfere more actively in the events taking place on the Iran-Turkmenia frontier.

In 1875 Col. MacGregor set out for Merv from Meshed. He bribed Turkmen feudals to help him in reaching Merv. He could not accomplish his journey to Merv as the British government forbade him to continue his travel, fearing protest from the Russian government. He, however, travelled 20 kilometres towards Merv across the river Tejen. Subsequently, Capt. Burnaby was assigned the task of reaching Merv from Khiva. But he, too, could not fulfil it. He was prevented by Russian authorities from going to Merv and forced to leave Central Asia. Towards the close of 1876 Napier once again appeared in Meshed to carry out his subversive activities among the Turkmens.

In 1877 Capt. Butler, who had participated in the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in China, surveyed the basin of the Atrek river. He was personally directed by the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, to organise the Turkmens in the Akhal and Merv oases against the Russians. But the Russian authorities learnt about his mission and he had to be recalled on their protest. Later, when Lord Lytton declined to pay him the expenses he had incurred in Turkmenia, he described his mission in the press exposing Lord Lytton as an organiser of subversive activities. In his article published in the *Globe* of January 25, 1881 he detailed how he took part in reconstructing the fortifications of Geok-Tepe according to the latest European techniques. He also helped in the establishment of two other fortifications east of Geok-Tepe. British journalist, Charles Marvin openly acknowledges that if Baker, MacGregor, Napier and Butler had not appeared on the north-east frontier of Persia, Russia would have been saved a number of campaigns.¹ Beginning with 1873 and up to 1881, hardly a year passed without a British agent being sent to foment trouble among

¹ C. Marvin, *Reconnoitring Central Asia*, London, 1886, pp. 246-49; N. A. Khalifa, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-39.

the Turkmens. Lord Lytton had a plan to annex Merv. As early as 1878, when the British were preparing to enter Afghanistan, Lord Lytton had written to the Secretary of State for India about his proposal to create a separate West Afghan Kingdom consisting of Merv, Maimana, Balkh, Kandahar and Herat under a ruler of British choice and dependent on British support for its existence.¹ This then was the real reason of the "Mervousness" which seized the government of India when Russia annexed Merv.

The Tsarist government hastened to annex Turkmenia in order to prevent the British from going north beyond Afghanistan. The British government raised the question of the demarcation of the Afghanistan frontier with Russia on the basis of the 1880 treaty. A joint commission was formed to delimit the boundary. The British officers in this Commission incited Emir Abdur Rahman against Russia. The British government did not of course desire the establishment of good-neighbourly relations between Russia and Afghanistan. In 1884 fomented by the British, the Afghans sent their forces into the oasis of Penjdeh which was inhabited by Turkmens of the Sarakh tribes. This resulted in a bloody clash with the Russians in which the Afghans were badly beaten back. The British hand behind this clash is clearly proved by the statement of the Naib Salar who commanded the Afghans. He said:

"I am glad that we fought the Russians at Penjdeh, for now we know who are our friends and who are our foes. Those at least who bade us fight and left us to be annihilated . . . are not our real friends."²

Russia was little to blame for this clash. She wanted demarcation of the frontier in harmony with geographical and ethnographical conditions of the border region. Britain rejected outright the ethnographical basis advocated by Russia.

But despite British provocations, the Afghan Emir took a moderate stand on the frontier dispute. He did not want to be embroiled in a war with Russia. The British recognised the Penjdeh oasis as a Russian possession. In return, Russia agreed to hand over to Afghanistan the Zulfiqar region.

¹ B. Balfour, *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, 1899, p. 247.

² Quoted by D. K. Ghosh, *India and Afghanistan*, pp. 196-97.

The agreement was effected by a protocol signed in London on September 10, 1885. During 1886-88 the boundary in this region was demarcated on the spot by an Anglo-Russian Commission and not by a Russo-Afghan Commission.

The Pamir question was the last complicated problem of Anglo-Russian relations in the 19th century. The centre of Anglo-Russian rivalry shifted to the "roof of the world" towards the end of the eighties and beginning of the nineties. The Tsarist government claimed rights over the Eastern Pamirs as a successor to the Kokand Khanate. So far as the bekdoms in the Western Pamirs were concerned, the 1873 agreement with Britain had left them to the Russian sphere of influence, situated as they were to the north of the Amu-Darya. The region became a hotbed of British intrigues as Tsarist Russia remained preoccupied with the Turkmen affairs. Russia could have easily annexed the Pamirs after her conquest of Kokand, but this poverty-stricken, thinly-populated region appeared to her then of no economic importance. Yet she never renounced her rights to the Pamirs. The 1876 Alai expedition was the earliest manifestation of her desire to assert her authority over the Pamirs.

The Russian Geographical Society was displaying interest in a scientific study of the Pamirs, and accordingly, sent A. Regel there in 1882. The Shugnan ruler, Yusuf Ali, received him with honour. Regel also wanted to visit Badakshan, but was not given permission by the Afghan authorities. In 1883 Emir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan sent troops to occupy Shugnan and Rushan. In the beginning, the Russian authorities did not react too strongly to this. But when the Russian press took up the matter, a note was despatched in December 1883 to the British government. The Afghan occupation was described as a clear violation of the 1873 agreement. The British maintained silence for five months and when a reminder was sent, they replied that Afghanistan considered Shugnan and Rushan as part of Badakshan given to it by the 1873 agreement. The Russian government could not further pursue this matter as it was heavily engaged in Turkmenia. Meanwhile, unrest among the people of Shugnan continued to rise. Taking advantage of internal troubles in Afghanistan in 1888, the people of Shugnan invited the descendant of their ex-ruler to return from Bukhara. They also sought help from Tsarist

Russia. However, the uprising in Shugnan was soon ruthlessly suppressed by Abdur Rahman.

The British intensified their activities in the Pamirs region. In 1886 Col. Lockart studied the passes leading to the Pamirs through the Hindu Kush. A. Durand from Gilgit continued this intelligence work in 1888 and 1889. Major Cumberland and Lt. Bower visited Tagdumbash Pamir in 1889. Under the pretext of hunting, Littledale also followed them. In 1890 a special expedition set out for the Pamirs under Captain Francis Younghusband. The Russian Consul at Kashgar, N. Petrovsky, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advising them that the British wanted to give half of the Pamirs to Afghanistan and were also secretly trying to come to an agreement with China.¹ The Younghusband expedition activated the Tsarist government which for some time had been following a policy of "wait and see" towards the Pamirs. It resulted in the visit of Governor-General of Turkestan A. Vrevsky to the Alai valley. M. Ionov was sent to the Pamirs at the head of a Cossack battalion. Capt. Younghusband was expelled from the valley of Bozai Gumbaz by Col. Ionov. This signified a shift from diplomatic correspondence to decisive action on the part of Tsarist Russia. It should, however, be noted that despite this new vigorous policy on the Pamirs, Tsarist Russia harboured no designs over the small states such as Hunza and Nagar on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush. The rulers of these states sent several missions to seek Russian help against the British. But the Tsarist government persistently refused to interfere in the affairs of British India.²

The British annexation of the Kanjut territory in 1891 aroused a feeling of alarm in St. Petersburg. An extraordinary meeting of the Imperial Council held on January 12, 1892 decided to send an intelligence expedition to the Pamirs. It also recommended negotiations with Britain and China for demarcation of frontiers in the Pamirs region. In another meeting held in April 1892 to discuss the Pamir problem the War Minister took an extremist view while Foreign Ministry officials pleaded for a cautious policy. It was decided to avoid any movement to the Hindu Kush Passes and to

¹ N. A. Khalifa, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

² *Ibid.*, p. 393.

conduct negotiations for demarcation on the basis of the 1873 agreement.¹

In April 1894 Russia and China agreed to preserve the existing order in the Pamirs region and respect their mutual positions there. The Russian government then approached the British. On March 11, 1895 notes exchanged between the Earl of Kimberley, the British Foreign Secretary, and M. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador in London, resulted in an agreement. Shugnan and Rushan were ceded by Afghanistan to Russia. They were later given to Bukhara by Russia. Bukhara surrendered a part of Darwaz on the left bank of the Amu-Darya to Afghanistan. The spheres of influence of Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria were to be divided by a line which, starting from a point on that lake near its eastern extremity, should follow a mountainous course to the Chinese frontier. The line was to be marked out and its precise configuration settled by a joint commission of a purely technical character. Both Britain and Russia engaged to abstain from exercising any political influence or control, the former to the north, the latter to the south of the above-mentioned line of demarcation. The British government stipulated that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence and between the Hindu Kush and the boundary running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Emir of Afghanistan and shall not be annexed by Britain. The British government also committed itself not to construct any military posts or forts in this territory.

The actual demarcation in the Pamirs region was smoothly carried out by the joint commission. It created an eight-mile wide "long attenuated arm of Afghanistan reaching out to touch China with the tips of its fingers" as the buffer between India and Russia. The Pamirs Agreement of 1895 was a "link in an important chain of events". Another amicable agreement had been reached with Russia during that decade notwithstanding the prevailing scepticism. Events in Central Asia were paving the way for the eventual entente with Russia which transpired in 1907.

The years following the Pamirs Agreement witnessed a gradual relaxation of Anglo-Russian tensions. There was little room for further disputes concerning the Afghan

¹ N. A. Khalifin, p. 396.

boundaries after the settlements reached in 1885 to 1895. At the turn of the century, relations between the two powers again deteriorated. Lord Curzon revived the "forward policy" again. Rivalry with Russia spread from Manchuria to Persia and even included the Tibetan plateau. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War opened a further period of stress and strain in Anglo-Russian relations. Old animosities were roused by the Russian navy's seizure of the British ship *Malacca* in the Red Sea and the Dogger Bank clash involving fishing trawlers.

But the Russo-Japanese War proved to be a turning point in Anglo-Russian relations. It revealed to Britain the hollowness of the Russian Empire. The attention of Britain was now focussed on a new and greater danger from a more powerful and virile Imperial Germany gradually emerging as a potent rival of Britain with her *Flottenpolitik*, *Welt-politik* and *Drang nach Osten*. Her menacing attitude had grown during the Boer War and her plans for a Berlin-Baghdad Railway endangered British supremacy in the East. Edward Grey believed that an understanding with Russia therefore was absolutely necessary. The Moroccan crisis resulting in the Algeiras Conference helped to promote it. Russia was an ally of France with whom Britain had resolved all her colonial feuds. In February 1907 British diplomat Nicolson handed over to Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky an outline of the view of the British government. After an exchange of several drafts a Convention was signed between the two powers on August 31, 1907 at St. Petersburg. It was known as the "Convention Relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet". The Pact of 1907 cleaned off "the slate the causes of antagonism between the two historic rivals".

The first of the three agreements constituting the Convention of 1907 concerned Persia. The preamble talked about the agreement between the two powers "to respect the integrity and independence of Persia", "preservation of order" and "equal opportunities for trade of all other nations". In spite of these high-sounding principles, Britain and Russia agreed upon a division of Persia into three zones, the northern and southern to be reserved respectively for exclusive Russian and British spheres of influence, and the middle zone to remain neutral. The second agreement related to Afghanistan. The Russian government declared Afghanistan outside the sphere of Russian influence

and agreed to conduct all political relations with that country through the intermediary of the British government. The British government, in its turn, declared that it had no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan or interfering in its internal government. The British and Russian governments affirmed their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan. The third agreement concerned Tibet. Both, Britain and Russia, recognised the suzerain rights of China in Tibet and engaged to respect its territorial integrity. They also agreed to abstain from all interference in its internal administration as well as not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese government.

The 1907 Convention, although inaugurating an era of good relations between the two imperialist powers,¹ was deeply resented by the Persians and Afghans whose national sovereignty was curbed and limited by these arrangements. In Tibet, the people living in superstition and ignorance imposed by Lama rule lacked the consciousness to protest and the Lamas, who had previously been chastised by the British, were only too happy to obtain an affirmation of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet by the two great European powers. At the present time, however, when the Chinese have tightened their grip over them, they have denounced this agreement as imperialistic from their exile in the Indian Himalayas. In Afghanistan, Emir Habibullah never recognised the 1907 Convention. He demanded of the Peace Conference after the First World War a recognition of the independence of his kingdom. His successor Amanullah rose against the British. In his struggle for new treaty relations with England based on genuine equality, he was encouraged by the policy of the new Soviet government in Russia. On March 27, 1919, the Soviet government recognised the full independence of Afghanistan and established diplomatic relations with her. In June 1919 the British reluctantly also gave recognition to Afghan independence.

The Anglo-Russian rivalry was used by leaders of the Indian National Congress to strengthen their demand for

¹ To be more exact, the 1907 Convention only blunted the Anglo-Russian rivalry for the time being. The struggle between the two imperialist powers to establish their influence in the East did not cease, Britain being particularly active.—*Ed.*

greater Indian participation in the defence forces of the country, modification of arms acts, increase in the remuneration of the Indian army and higher grades for the Indians in service, etc.¹ The Congress opposed the increase in military expenditure to meet the threat of "Russian invasion". The Eighth Congress Session in 1892 adopted a new approach to the question of increased military expenditure. It declared that this increase had been caused principally by the military activity going on beyond the natural defence lines of the country, in pursuance of the imperial policy of Britain in its relation with some of the Great Powers in Europe, and urged Britain to bear an equitable portion of this military expenditure.

The National Congress moved to oppose the "forward policy" on the north-west frontier of India. At the Seventh Congress Session in 1891, Dinshaw Wacha refuted the government's assertion that the "forward policy" followed from the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Wacha accused the government of India of having "initiated aggression under one pretext or another". He declared: "Russia only responds to the British move. Outpost answers outpost and gun answers gun". He called for a complete reversal of the "forward policy" which he described as "an unwise and aggressive policy which, under the hollow pretext of defending the Empire, secretly aims at extending its frontiers".² S. N. Banerjea in his presidential address to the Eleventh Congress in 1895 severely criticised the annexation of Chitral. He did not believe that Russia would actually invade India. Similarly, the annual Congress Session of 1897 expressed its deep and earnest conviction that the frontier policy of the government injured the best interests of the country and urged its abandonment.³ Opposition to the "forward policy" was also voiced at the 1898, 1903 and 1904 sessions of the Congress.

The British in India continued to harp on the bogey of Russian advance even after the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. Pt. Nehru wrote in 1928:

"We have grown up in the tradition, carefully nurtured by England, of hostility to Russia. For long years past the

¹ Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, Calcutta, 1960, pp. 37-39.

² *Report of the Seventh Indian National Congress*, pp. 28-36.

³ Bimla Prasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

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CHAPTER IV UNDER TSARIST COLONIAL RULE

The Socio-Economic Structure

In the latter half of the 19th century Tsarist Russia conquered and annexed the Khanate of Kokand and reduced the size of the other two Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva which had been drawn into the orbit of the Empire as vassal states. The annexed territory in Central Asia and southern Kazakhstan was organised into the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan. In 1916 the population of Russian Turkestan was 7,464,100, of Bukhara, 2,236,437 and Khiva, 640,000.¹

Turkestan as the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva was also multinational. Their population consisted of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Kara-Kalpaks and other peoples. Having subjected Khiva and Bukhara to its suzerainty, the Tsarist Russian government supported the thrones of their Khan and Emir with its troops and helped the despotic ruling circles of these feudal states to exploit their toiling masses in various ways.

In the colonial period, Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva were predominantly agricultural regions. In 1913 only 19 per cent of the total population lived in towns and urban settlements.² According to the All-Russia Agricultural Census of 1917, the number of people engaged in agricultural pursuits in Turkestan was 5,375,538 among whom 3,581,873 were engaged in settled agriculture, the rest being nomadic cattle-breeders. In Turkestan, and to a far greater extent in Khiva and Bukhara, feudal social relations were domi-

¹ A. A. Gordiyenko, *Sozdaniye Sovetskoi natsionalnoi gosudarstvennosti v Srednei Azii*, Moscow, 1959, p. 13.

² *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Srednei Azii v 1963 godu*, Statistical Survey, Tashkent, 1964, p. 8.

bogey of a Russian invasion has been held up to us and has been made the excuse of vast expenditure on our armaments. In the days of the Tsars we were told that the imperialism of Russia was for ever driving south, coveting an outlet to the sea, or may be India itself. The Tsar has gone but the rivalry between England and Russia continues and we are now told that India is threatened by the Soviet government."¹

Free India has broken away with this "tradition".

¹ J. Nehru, *Soviet Russia*, 1928, p. 191.

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
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nant. In some regions like the Kazakh-Kirghiz areas of Turkestan and the Turkmen areas of Khiva and Bukhara there are still many survivals of the patriarchal-tribal way of life among the nomadic people.

Turkestan, in the words of Lenin, was a straightforward colony.¹ The Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, though they continued to exist "independently", in fact differed very little from Turkestan and were also "something like colonies".² The process of capitalist development in Central Asia followed very slowly and unevenly because Tsarism and the feudal regimes of Bukhara and Khiva purposely tried to preserve the feudal and patriarchal relations. Hence, the region remained until the October Revolution an extremely backward agrarian colony of Tsarist Russia. It was one of these backward countries where "pre-capitalist relationships" still dominated.³

It is true that the Tsarist government carried out some land reforms in Turkestan which opened up the path of development of capitalist relations in the villages of Central Asia. Yet these reforms did not liberate the toiling peasantry from its feudal dependence and enslavement. Big landowners continued to exploit the *izdolshchik* (the peasant who cultivated someone else's land on a crop-sharing basis). The most prevalent form was called *chairikari*, the name being derived from the one-fourth share in the crop which the peasant got. As a large number of peasants did not possess their own work animals, agricultural tools and seeds, etc., they fell into the clutches of feudals and money-lenders.

Progress in the field of irrigation was limited in the colonial period. In 1910, only 4,758,000 *dessiatines* of land were irrigated in the whole of Central Asia which was only 2.6 per cent of the entire area. The total area of irrigated land in the five *oblasts* of Turkestan was 2,808,000 and in Bukhara 1,600,000 *dessiatines*.⁴ Some irrigation works were undertaken in Trans-Caspian *oblast* and the Hungry Steppe southwest of Tashkent. Richard A. Pierce writes about the achievements of the colonial regime in the field of irrigation:

"During half a century, only two major irrigation proj-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 242.

⁴ P. I. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, Moscow, 1948, II, p. 543.

ects were brought to fruition in Russian Central Asia—one in the Hungry Steppe and the other on the Murghab. Neither of these fulfilled the original hopes of their designers or the great expectations of those who had foreseen vaster achievements encompassing the entire region."¹

The extensive canal-building project in the Hungry Steppe, begun in 1874 on the orders of Governor-General von Kaufman, finally had to be abandoned in 1879. The local people called it *tonguz-aryk*, or "pig canal". The grandiose scheme put forth in 1912 by A. V. Krivoshein, involving the resettlement of 1,500,000 Russian peasants on newly irrigated lands, was never effected.

Both agriculture and cattle-breeding in Turkestan and to a greater extent in Khiva and Bukhara were primitive. The implements used in agriculture were antiquated as a result of which labour productivity and land yield were very low. Peasants had no idea of agrotechny and they had hardly heard of veterinary science. Land, water and animals were concentrated in the hands of feudals and *kulaks*. More than 65 per cent of the total number of peasant households in Turkestan were *batraks* (landless peasants).² In Khiva and Bukhara feudal domination was still worse. The private land of the Khan and other feudals in Khiva comprised two-thirds of the total irrigated and fertile land; state and *wakf* land, one-seventh and land under the ownership of peasants, only one-tenth.³ In Bukhara, 65 per cent of the total cultivable land was under the feudals and 24 per cent was *wakf* land.⁴ The main burden of taxation fell on the peasants. In Khiva, there were 25 different taxes on peasants, and in Bukhara, 55. Peasants were forced to work on the construction and repair of canals and this form of labour was often used by the feudal classes for their private use also. In Khiva slavery also existed. The attempt made by G. Wheeler to prove, on the basis of some casual remark by the German explorer Rikmer-Rikmers and a number of out-of-context quotations from Bartold's works, the "pros-

¹ R. A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960, p. 181.

² A. A. Gordiyenko, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

³ M. Y. Yuldashev, *Materialy pervoi nauchnoi usesoyuznoi konferentsii vostokovedov*, Tashkent, 1953, p. 205.

⁴ M. Hikmatov, *Zemelno-vodnaya reforma v Zeraushanskoi oblasti*, Tashkent, 1953, pp. 3-4.

perous" state of life in Bukhara is hardly convincing.¹ Bartold, it may be pointed out, also cites Schuyler's opinion about Emir Muzaffar of Bukhara whom the people "hated for being unjust and cruel." Under him, writes Bartold, continued "a system of extortions ruinous for the people".² He describes the objections of the Russian press to the elaborate praises of the Emir as just.³

After its annexation, Central Asia was converted into a raw material supplying base for the metropolitan industries. Tsarist administration paid great attention to cotton cultivation and encouraged it at the expense of wheat and other agricultural products. The Director of Land Administration in Turkestan wrote in 1913: "Every *pood* of Turkestan wheat means competition with Russian and Siberian wheat; every *pood* of cotton means competition with American cotton. Hence, it is better to import food grains into the territory and free the irrigated land there for cotton cultivation".⁴ The high tariff on cotton imported from abroad enabled the administration to obtain higher prices in the internal market, and the policy of levying equal taxes on land used for cotton cultivation and for other less lucrative food grains gave an impetus to the former, making it the main cash crop of agriculture. Additionally, a number of agrotechnical steps taken by the administration helped in the development of cotton cultivation. In 1892, three million *poods* of American variety of cotton was exported to Russia from Turkestan. Cotton export rose from 873 thousand *poods* in 1880 to 4,960 thousand *poods* in 1900, rising to 13,697 thousand *poods* in 1913. The land of the Uzbeks formed the core of the Central Asian cotton belt, though cotton was also grown in southern Kirghizia and in parts of modern Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

But the development of cotton cultivation did not improve the material conditions of the *dehkans* (peasants) who lived in poverty as before. A new exploiter entered the scene when metropolitan capital began to finance cotton cultivation through local firms. The cotton purchaser, who acted as a sort of middleman between the industrialist and

¹ See G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, London, 1964, p. 85.

² V. V. Bartold, *Works*, Vol. II, Part 1, Moscow, 1963, pp. 420-21 (in Russian).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 424.

⁴ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, Vol. II, p. 261.

Middlemen ripped off peasants ensured

the cotton producers, exploited them. The credit advanced to the *dehkans* bore an exorbitantly high interest rate as a result of middlemen. The middlemen, who obtained credit from private banks and cotton firms at the rate of 8-9 per cent interest, advanced it to the cotton producer at the rate of 40 to 60 per cent interest.¹ The debts accumulated by a majority of small peasants were so great that they could not be repaid within a lifetime. They were often obliged to sell their land to the *bais* to meet their debt obligations.

In 1914, according to official figures, 25 per cent of all peasant families in the Ferghana region became landless as a result of sale or mortgage of land.² In the Samarkand region 35.7 per cent and in Ferghana 54.5 per cent of all peasant families owned land up to only one *dessiatine* on the eve of the October Revolution. With the growth of cotton cultivation, there was an increase in the marketability of agricultural economy leading to penetration of rudimentary capitalist relations into the villages, but there did not appear large capitalist cotton plantations using hired labour. The crop-sharing system continued to be the dominant system in Central Asia.

The social structure of the Turkmen, Kirghiz and Kazakh nomads as also of the Kara-Kalpaks and a part of the Tajiks living in the hills of the interior needs careful investigation. The survival of patriarchal-tribal social institutions among these nomadic peoples was quite strong. The existence of a complex tribal-clan system among them gave some writers ground to speak about the tribal system preserving itself up to the beginning of the 20th century. But in fact the tribal system among these peoples had already been destroyed many centuries before and in the 18th and 19th centuries they only preserved its traditions in their social structure. In this respect their nomadic and semi-nomadic cattle-breeding economy was a great factor which allowed for survival of patriarchal traditions for a long time. The exploiting classes like the Khans and *beks* among the Turkmen, the *manaps*³ and *bees* among the Kirghiz and the kulak *bais* were vitally interested in preserving the patriarchal-tribal traditions to be used as a cover for their ex-

¹ A. V. Krivoshein, *Zapiska o poyezdke v Turkestansky krai v 1912 g.*, p. 18.

² V. Y. Nepomnin, *Istorichesky opyt stroitelstva sotsializma v Uzbekistane*, Tashkent, 1960, p. 40.

³ *Manaps*—well-to-do owners of arable land or large herds.

rich and Econ

Prod so much
cotton - (forced to through N.B.
tariffs) were not
enough - food.

Also

clans
consequences
social

NB
exploitation of the poor. In a society where economic disparity was great, common ownership of pastures, land and water could have little meaning. The exploitation of poor nomads, though patriarchal in form, was nonetheless feudal in essence.

clean canals
must be strong hence
poor ripped off
Among the Turkmens cultivable land and water were distributed by the village community every year. This practice which was called *sanashik* had its basis in the juridical fiction of the common tribal ownership of land and water. The members of the tribe cleaned canals and defended their *auls* in war. Hence land and water were distributed only to grown-up men, capable of cleaning and digging canals and wearing arms. Later on this tradition was changed and shares in land and water were given only to the married members of the tribe. The rich Khans, *beks* and *bais* who married even their small children thus got an opportunity to concentrate land in their hands. On the other hand, the poor, who could not marry because of high bride prices, became largely landless. The pastures could be used by all members of the tribe according to the tribal traditions, but wells and water tanks without which cattle-breeding was not possible belonged to the rich.

Admin
Similarly, the Kirghiz exploiting classes, too, used the tribal-patriarchal traditions to mask their essentially feudal exploitation. The pastures, though outwardly belonging to the tribe, had actually been appropriated by the *bees* and *manaps* who exploited the people as feudals. That cattle-wealth was highly concentrated in few hands is borne out by the result of an investigation conducted in the Pishpek *uyezd* in 1912-1913. 5.52 per cent of the total households which formed the three upper classes of *manaps*, *bees* and *bais*, possessed 38.51 per cent of all the cattle, while 49.22 per cent of households possessed only 11-12 per cent.¹ 47.75 per cent of the families did not have any agricultural implements of their own. This shows the extent of class difference in the Kirghiz village society. These differences were not minor notwithstanding many customary tribal rights of common use of pastures and common tribal ownership of land.

The administration of Turkestan was entrusted not to the Ministry of the Interior but to the War Ministry. The Governor-General appointed by the Tsar enjoyed wide

powers and concentrated in his hands the entire military and civil administration of the territory. He had great powers in matters relating to Bukhara and Khiva as well. He appointed from among the representatives of Russian nobility and military officers the *oblast* and *uyezd* administrative officers.

At the head of the *oblast* administration there stood the military governor, in whose hands were concentrated all affairs, military and civil, including dispensation of justice. Heads of *uyezd* and city administration were as a rule appointed from among the military officers. Besides the military administration at the *oblast* and *uyezd* level, the Tsarist government also made use of the so-called popular elective lower village administration. The posts of *volost* (lowest administrative unit consisting of a few villages) administrators and village officials—*starshinas*, *aksakals* and *kazis*—were filled through election. The appointments were, however, confirmed by the military governor of the *oblast*. These elected officers worked under the control of the *uyezd* administrator. Elections were a farce as only persons of means could get elected. By the use of their wealth and influence, the *bais* and feudals always managed to monopolise these posts in their hands. That bribery played the main role in these elections is admitted by Count Palen in his inspection report of Turkestan.¹ Moreover, the military governor had the power of changing these elections or appointing the *volost* administrator, village *starshina* (headman) and the *kazi* directly without any election. The class interests of these elected officials and the colonial administration being the same, i.e., to exploit the poor, they co-operated with each other very well. The elected local officials joined hands with Russian colonialists against their own toiling people. All sorts of extortions and misuse of authority against them became a matter of daily occurrence. Most of the *uyezd* commandants, writes R. Pierce, levied "additional taxes on the natives, usually to a degree that not only covered normal expenses but enabled them to live in luxury".² "The military administration of European Russia habitually rid itself of its worst officers by sending them to Turkestan."³

→ corruption
→ rigged elections etc

¹ K. K. Palen, *Otchyot o revizii Turkestanskogo kraja. Selskoye upravleniye*, St. Petersburg, 1910, pp. 97-103.

² R. A. Pierce, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹ *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, II, Moscow, 1963, p. 178.

Advances of Tsars → Railway → for military opps
base to house the Euro settlers → Low handicraft → Cotton &

The Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara were typical feudal despotic monarchies. The Khan and the Emir were virtually absolute in their powers of life and death over their subjects. They ruled the people with the active help of a landed aristocracy and priesthood. The territory of the Khanate of Khiva was divided into 22 *bekdoms* and that of Bukhara, into 29 *hakimates*. At the head of the *bekdom* stood the *bek* and *hakim* in the case of *hakimate*, appointed by the Khan and Emir. These officials ruled arbitrarily with the help of an army of petty officials.

Although Tsarism purposely tried to keep Central Asia as its agricultural raw-material base, its military and strategic interests and also the narrow interests of the Russian bourgeoisie obliged it to construct 3,377 kilometres of railway line and 14 railway repair workshops and depots which employed a total of approximately 24,000 workers. Railway construction in Central Asia began in the middle of the eighties of the last century. In 1888 Samarkand was joined by rail with Krasnovodsk, in 1898 with Andijan, and with Tashkent, a year later. In 1906 Tashkent was also joined by a branch line with Orenburg. The introduction of railways marked the beginning of the end of economic seclusion of the different regions inside Central Asia and also the end of isolation of the whole of Central Asia. But the influence of railways on the internal consolidation of the different regions was yet negligible. Nevertheless, it was a new phenomenon which opened up a great prospect for the future of this region.

The Russian bourgeoisie also had to allow a raw material processing industry to develop in the territory. It was in its own interest and involved no competition with it. Cotton ginning, oil, soap, beer, brick manufacturing and wool cleaning industries began to be established in Central Asia. By 1914, there were 818 semi-handicraft enterprises working in Turkestan. Out of these, 425 were located on the territory of modern Uzbekistan and 296, in the Trans-Caspian region of modern Turkmenistan.¹ There were 9 small power houses in Turkestan which produced only 3.3 million kwh of electricity annually.² The extraction of mineral wealth was not very developed and the output of oil and coal was very low.

¹ A. A. Gordiyenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Евро in 1914

The narrow development of Central Asian industries is attested to by the fact that cotton ginning in 1913 constituted 81.2 per cent of the total industrial output.¹ In 1913, of the 425 capitalist industrial establishments on the territory of modern Uzbekistan, 209 were cotton-cleaning plants.² Enterprises engaged in the processing of agricultural raw materials accounted for approximately 90 per cent of all industrial production.³

The total numerical strength of the industrial proletariat in Turkestan in 1914 was 49.9 thousand workers. Out of these 25.5 thousand (51 per cent) were engaged in industries and 24.4 thousand (49 per cent) in railways.⁴ 72 per cent of the industrial workers were from local nationalities of Central Asia and 23 per cent were Russians. In the railways, however, Russian workers formed the bulk of the total strength (80 per cent).

Though cotton was the main product of Turkestan, the textile industry was located in the central regions of Russia. The Central Asian national bourgeoisie, emerging from the ranks of the rich *bais*, money-lenders and traders, was still too weak to establish its own large industries. Hence it was content to play its dependent role relying on the Russian bourgeoisie. Among the peoples of Central Asia only the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs had a national bourgeoisie, the Kirghizs, Tajiks and Turkmens having hardly any of any significance. The industrial proletariat was also numerically weak. Even among the Uzbeks where it was most numerous in comparison to other peoples, it constituted only an insignificant part of the entire population. There were before the Revolution only 12,702 Uzbek industrial workers.⁵ So far as the Turkmens, Kirghizs and Tajiks were concerned, their level of capitalist development was still lower. In Kirghizia, there was no national bourgeoisie of any significance and all mining industries were in the hands of Russian and Tatar bourgeoisie. The number of Kirghiz workers in 1913 amounted to only 1,144.⁶ In Turkmenia,

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. I, Book II, p. 225.

² M. Vakhabov, *Formirovaniye Uzbekskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii*, Tashkent, 1961, p. 101.

³ *Istoriya rabochego klassa Uzbekistana*, Vol. I, Tashkent, 1964, p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵ M. Vakhabov, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁶ *Formirovaniye sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR*, Moscow, 1962, p. 499.

industrial development was confined to the Trans-Caspian region alone and there were very few Turkmen workers. In 1916, there were only 242 Turkmen industrial workers of whom only seven were skilled labourers.¹ In Tajikistan, there was almost no modern industry at all, and in the six small concerns engaged in cotton-cleaning and oil and coal mining in the northern part of the modern Leninabad region, there were only 206 Tajik industrial workers.²

Thus the Central Asian economy before the Revolution was an economy dominated by feudal relations of production. Lenin spoke of Turkestan as one of those countries which did not succeed in advancing along the path of capitalist development and which had no "industrial proletariat" of any significance.³ This, however, did not negate the process of the birth of capitalist relations in the colonial Central Asia. While it is true that the region had not undergone the whole length of capitalist development, it had, nevertheless, embarked upon the path of capitalist development with the appearance of railways and industries engaged in the initial processing of agricultural raw material.

The Tsarist colonialists and the feudal rulers of Bukhara and Khiva were not concerned about the health of the people or their cultural development. There were only 212 doctors in Turkestan, almost entirely confined to cities. People living in villages were deprived of any medical facilities whatsoever. In Bukhara and Khiva the government did not organise any medical service for the people at all and they depended on charlatans and religious quacks for their treatment.

Conditions in the field of education were not any better. In 1915, only 2.3 per cent of the Turkestan state budget was allocated for health and education, while 86.7 per cent was earmarked for the military, law enforcement and administrative functions. In Turkestan in 1914-15, there were 335 state educational institutions with an attendance of 31,492 persons. And there were in 1899, 11,964 mosques with 11,860 mullahs! More than 8,000 persons were receiving religious education in various types of religious schools. In Bukhara and Khiva the control of education by the mullahs was even worse. In 1920, there were 3,000 mosques and 877

madrasahs in Khiva. The army of mullahs in Bukhara numbered 40 thousand. The percentage of literacy among the Uzbeks was 2%, Turkmens 0.7%, Tajiks 0.5%, Kirghizs and Kara-Kalpaks 0.2%.¹ The handful of literates were mostly *bais*, mullahs and khans and very few peasants. Literacy was totally absent among nomads and women. The Kirghizs, Kara-Kalpaks and Turkmens did not even have their own written language.

Cultural Developments

In the colonial period a few significant developments in the cultural sphere may be noted though, basically, the period remained one of cultural backwardness. Of great importance was the opening of secular schools and other cultural institutions in Turkestan. The first Russian school was opened in Samarkand in 1870.² The then Governor-General, Kaufman, attached great importance to the local people's sending their children to Russian schools where secular and scientific subjects were taught. But the Russian schools attracted very few native students. Their popularity declined with the years, due to the exclusion of Muslim religious education while Christian religion was taught to Russian students.³

Another experiment to attract native children to schools was the establishment of Russian-native schools. Such a school was established in Tashkent in December 1884 at the initiative of Said Gani, a rich Uzbek.⁴ By 1911, there were 105 such schools. The school curriculum was divided into two parts, viz., Russian language and arithmetic, etc., taught by a Russian teacher and Muslim religious instruction by a mullah.⁵

These new developments in the cultural life of the inhabitants were of great significance. Under the influence of Russian culture, there appeared the idea of reform of the old schools so as to adapt them to new conditions of life. The new schools came to be called 'new-method schools' from their adoption of the phonetic method of study. This

¹ *Formirovaniye sotsialisticheskikh natsii...*, p. 597.

² A. A. Gordiyenko, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 243.

¹ A. A. Gordiyenko, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

² V. V. Bartold, *Works*, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 299.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁵ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, II, p. 329.

usul-i-djadid (new method) brought to its advocates the appellation *Djadidists*, i.e., the adherents of the new method. The movement for the new-method schools was born in the Crimea, Caucasia and the Volga region towards the end of the 19th century. Its pioneer was a Tatar bourgeois nationalist—Ismail Bek Gasprinsky.

The new-method movement also spread to Central Asia. By 1917 the total number of new-method schools in Turkestan rose to 92. But this new development, important though it was, did not change the old cultural and educational pattern of Turkestan. The old *magtaps* and *madrasahs* still continued to play a predominant role in education and their number continued to grow. If, for example, there were in Tashkent in 1876 11 *madrasahs*, the number grew to 22, that is, it just doubled itself in 1910. The total number of *madrasahs* in three *oblasts* of Turkestan grew from 313 in 1900 to 328 in 1911.¹ The number of *magtaps* and *madrasahs* taken together rose from 6,445 in 1894 to 7,665 in 1913.²

It was not surprising that the progressive Russian culture with its schools, libraries, museums, hospitals and theatres, etc., did not penetrate into the life of the masses of native people. There were many obstacles in its way, on the one hand Tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie, and on the other native exploiting classes, Muslim religious leaders and feudal elements. Nevertheless, the value of the commendable work done by many Russian scholars, scientists and philanthropists cannot be minimised.

There came to Central Asia after its annexation by Tsarist Russia, not only civil and military colonial officials, "the scum" of Russian society, but also the noblest representatives of the progressive Russian intelligentsia—scholars, scientists and teachers, democratic-minded middle level as well as minor officials, artisans and workers. Here arrived many great Russian geographers, geologists and biologists, as for example, P. P. Semyonov-Tianshansky, N. A. Severtsov, A. P. Fedchenko, I. V. Mushketov, G. D. Romanovsky and others. V. V. Bartold and N. I. Veselovsky played a leading role in the collection and study of valuable material on Central Asian history and culture. A public library was opened in Tashkent in 1870, made possible by gifts of books

¹ V. V. Bartold, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-17.

² *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, II, p. 328.

from various cultural institutions of St. Petersburg and Moscow and from donations by many Russian scholars. At the initiative of A. P. Fedchenko a museum was organised in Tashkent in 1871. The appearance of newspapers and magazines and the introduction of book printing was also an important innovation in the life of the territory. A number of scientific societies were organised at the initiative of Russian scientists for the study of geography, anthropology, archaeology, astronomy and medicine. All this certainly made a contribution towards enriching the cultural life of Central Asia.

These developments could not but have a powerful impact on the local intelligentsia and resulted in a rapid intellectual awakening among the local people. Contact with representatives of progressive Russian culture stimulated their aspiration for new secular knowledge and there soon arose among them a movement for the pursuit of this. Such a movement for new cultural and educational advance is often wrongly mixed up with *Djadidism*. The estimate of *Djadidism* as a progressive movement of local intelligentsia is the result of a historically erroneous assumption regarding the disappearance, at the beginning of the 20th century from Central Asia, of the democratic movement for popular enlightenment and its replacement by *Djadidism*. Moreover, the fact that in many countries which liberated themselves from colonial rule recently the national bourgeoisie played a leading role in the national liberation movement and in some cases continued to play a somewhat progressive role in the construction of the new society, has led some individual investigators to view *Djadidism* as a progressive movement.¹

This, however, is a wrong conclusion. The cultural awakening of the peoples of Central Asia under the impact of the advanced Russian culture provided a firm basis for the formation of a movement for popular enlightenment. In the seventies and eighties of the 19th century, a group of intellectuals had emerged from among the people of the

¹ A reference to the views of R. Vaidyanath of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, may be made here in this connection. He attributes to the *Djadidists* the ultimate goal of "awakening of national consciousness and achievement of national freedom" through the reorganisation of the educational system and other cultural reforms (see his book *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, 1917-36*, New Delhi, 1967).

Central Asian colonies of Tsarism which propagated the Russian language and culture and initiated the movement for secular schools and reform of the educational system. The main aim of this group of intellectuals was to further enlighten the people. To this group belong the names of such educationalists as Abdusattar Khan, Ishak Khan, Furqat, Mukimi, Zavki, Hamza Hakimzade Niazi (Uzbek), Ahmed Danish Asiri, Sadriddin Aini and others (Tajik) and Chokan Valikhanov and Ibrai Altinsarin (Kazakh). They not only advocated a new advanced culture but also exposed bourgeois morality as well as the social order. Uzbek poets Furqat, Mukimi and Zavki poured scorn and ridicule on *bais*, officials and priesthood. It is an oversimplification to divide the local intelligentsia into just two groups—the *Qadimists* (defenders of the old) and *Djadidists* (defenders of the new).

The nascent national bourgeoisie of Central Asia, already at the beginning of the 20th century, began to use the cultural awakening of the people in its own interest. In due course, there formed an ideological and political movement which received the name *Djadidism* in historical literature. "*Djadidism*," to quote the words of the learned Uzbek Soviet historian, M. G. Vakhabov, "formed itself as nationalistic ideology of the local bourgeoisie of colonial Central Asia." "This ideology," according to him, "grew in the period of the rise of workers' revolutionary movement and the mass national liberation struggle when the local bourgeoisie broke itself away from the popular masses and began to act as an ally of Tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie."¹

What distinguished the Central Asian bourgeois political ideology from the political ideology of the national bourgeoisie in many Asian and African countries, were the specific colonial conditions of Central Asia. While in many African and Asian countries bourgeois political ideology developed under conditions of a weak workers' movement, in Central Asia which formed an integral part of the Tsarist Russian Empire the bourgeoisie, both local and Russian, was afraid of the powerful movement of the Russian work-

¹ M. G. Vakhabov, "O reaktsionnoi prirode i antinarodnoi roli Djadidizma", "Natsionalny vopros nakanune i v period provedeniya Velikoi Oktyabrskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revolyutsii" (Materialy k sessii Nauchnogo Soveta AN SSSR), Issue I, Moscow, 1964, pp. 52-53.

ing class. Moreover, the national bourgeoisie in Central Asia was too weak to play an independent role. It only acted as an agent of the imperialist Russian bourgeoisie.

In the years of the 1905-07 revolution the activities of the *Djadidists* were widespread. In the years 1906 to 1909, they published a number of newspapers such as *Taraqqi*, *Khurshed*, *Sohrat* and *Asia*. The *Djadidist* press propagated the ideas of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism and tried to rally the people under this banner utilising influential business men and *bais*. *Djadidist* papers wrote nothing about the difficult conditions of the people, the growing pauperisation of the toiling peasants and artisans, their exploitation by the *bais* and money-lenders and the arbitrariness of the colonial administration. Yet these were precisely the questions agitating the people. No wonder then, that the *Djadidist* press had but little popular influence. At the time of the 1916 uprising the *Djadidists* took sides against the people, supporting the mobilisation drive of the Tsarist government. They had alienated the masses which began to understand their reactionary role.

It is true that *Djadidism* had some liberal tendencies in comparison to clerical and feudal elements. The defence by the *Djadidists* of the new European culture and opposition to old feudal ways was, of course, common to them and other enlightened democrats. But in contrast to the latter they did not defend the interests of the entire people. They championed, instead, the interests of their own class—the bourgeoisie. Even in their struggle against clerical elements they never took a wholly consistent position, rather they desired to adapt the dogmas of Islam to the interests of the national bourgeoisie.

It would be improper to describe the *Djadidists* as the intellectual heralds of a national liberation revolution. Their liberalism also belonged to a stage already past by the people of Central Asia who now stood at the threshold of proletarian revolution. Any comparison of the *Djadidists* with the Brahmo Samaj movement founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy in colonial India for social reforms and cultural regeneration, is entirely misleading because of the difference in the historical development of India and Central Asia. Raja Ram Mohan Roy remains a progressive social reformer and an enlightened democrat because he propagated modern liberal ideas at a time when the forces of revolutionary transformation of society had not entered the stage of In-

dian politics. But the *Djadidist* Bekh Budi ceased to be a pure reformer and educationalist and became an active reactionary when he appealed to Mussulmans to form a separate political party of their own and join hands with the Constitutional Monarchists against the Social-Democrats. The *Djadidist* leaders endeavoured to convince the working people that the "Muslim nation", i.e., all Mussulmans were united and between their different classes there were no contradictions. This they were doing at a time when class contradictions were becoming more and more acute and a revolutionary situation was rapidly developing. This new revolutionary historical situation and their reactionary role in the face of it distinguishes the Central Asian *Djadidists* from Indian social reformers.

To sum up the above discussion on the social and class structure of the peoples of Central Asia and their economic and cultural level of development, it may be noted that, notwithstanding many important changes in their economic and cultural life in the colonial period, as for example, the rise of new towns, construction of railways, emergence of capitalist relations in agriculture, rise of capitalist light industries and a general intellectual awakening, the general picture was still one of dominant pre-capitalist relations, of cultural backwardness and ignorance and of Islamic domination. However the alienation process of the masses from the feudals, mullahs and the newly-born national bourgeoisie was also clearly noticeable. It became particularly marked in the period of the workers' revolutionary movement in 1905-07 and later during the active period of the national liberation movement in 1916 and the subsequent years. It reached its high mark in the period following the February Revolution of 1917.

The Nationalist and National Liberation Movement

Many uprisings and revolts against the Tsarist regime occurred during the colonial period. All of them, however, cannot be justifiably called national liberation movements. In this connection it is important to remember that in the early years of colonial rule many progressive changes took place in the economic and cultural life of the people. After the dark days of Khan misrule with its despotism and open

extortions, the people could not but appreciate the new changes brought about by the Tsarist regime. Hence, when the feudals and religious leaders rose in religious-nationalist movement for the restoration of the Khan under the reactionary slogan of *gazavat* or holy war, the people did not rally behind them.

In the seventies and eighties of the 19th century such revolts were fomented by the "pretender Khans" in the Ferghana valley. These revolts were supported by only a few privileged feudals and mullahs whose interests and privileges were adversely affected by some of the measures adopted by the Tsarist administration. In 1885 Dervish Khan Tiura headed a movement for the restoration of the rule of the Khan. He was joined by Muminbai who organised an armed detachment in the Ferghana region. This revolt was easily suppressed by Tsarist troops. Dervish Khan fled to Kashgar and Muminbai was taken prisoner.

The revolt of Dervish Khan did not enjoy mass support. Similarly, the rebellion of Madali Ishan, the so-called Andijan uprising, was also not a popular movement. Madali Ishan hailed from Bukhara where he studied and served in the Emirate for some time. He came to Andijan in the early seventies where he amassed great wealth by dubious means and acquired some local influence through his *murids* or disciples. The Ishan settled in the village of Ming-Tepe where he founded a religious order. He was, however, far removed from the common people and his followers came mostly from the feudal sector. His call of May 17, 1898 for a holy war against Russians received no response from the people, and when he marched on Andijan, he could gather no more than 1,000 persons. His rebellion was suppressed without much difficulty and he fled to the hills. It was followed by severe repression on the part of the colonial administration which wanted to frighten the people into subjection by a demonstration of strength. Ming-Tepe was razed to the ground by artillery fire and 208 persons headed by Madali Ishan were executed.

The real nature of these early rebellions against Tsarist rule has been a subject of great controversy in Soviet historical writings. Thus the authors of the *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana* described the rebellion of Madali Ishan as a national liberation struggle.¹ The work was reviewed by

¹ *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*, Tashkent, 1947, p. 368.

Izvestia and strongly criticised for its presentation of feudal-nationalist revolts led by Muslim priests and instigated by agents of imperialist powers as popular revolutionary movements.

The reappraisal and re-evaluation of historical events is an ever continuing process in all countries of the world. This is particularly true of events and movements which occurred in the not too distant past. A proper historical perspective is formed only with the march of time. It is a perfectly normal process and Soviet historiography is no exception.

Of course, there was a period when Soviet historians (Uzbek as well as Russian) somewhat underestimated the objectively progressive significance of the merger of Central Asia with Russia. It was to a certain extent an inevitable product of the period immediately following the October Revolution when everything connected with the pre-revolutionary past was totally decried and condemned. Under such conditions early Soviet writers looked upon all movements of the colonial period against Tsarist rule as revolutionary mass struggles for liberation. The works of several Soviet writers of the twenties and thirties which upheld such a position can be cited. Thus Y. Fyodorov in his work *Ocherki natsionalnogo osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya v Srednei Azii* (Tashkent, 1925) joins up all movements of the colonial period, even those headed by Muslim priests with no popular participation, under a single heading "national-religious liberation movement" (pp. 14-18). He also characterised the Andijan rebellion of 1898 as a national liberation movement. P. G. Galuzo in his book *Turkestan—koloniya* (Tashkent, 1935) indiscriminately views every opposition to Tsarist rule as a national liberation struggle, beginning with the uprising led by Sultan Kenissari in the thirties of the last century, the revolt in Samarkand in 1868, the uprising of the Shahr-Subz *bekdom*, the insurrections in Kokand in 1875 and 1876, the Cholera Riots in Tashkent in 1892, the rebellion of Madali Ishan in 1898, and ending with the uprising of 1916.

Such a view was typical of the Soviet historiography in that period and had nothing to do with the "bourgeois nationalist deviation" of some Uzbek writers, for Fyodorov and Galuzo are not Uzbeks. It was the product of a period wherein a tendency towards complete denunciation of the past predominated. The *Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana*

carried on this tradition into a period when a more objective assessment of events of the past was expected of Soviet historians and for this it was rightly criticised by *Izvestia*. It may also be mentioned that such an approach was criticised even in that early period when it was considered authoritative.¹

Nor is the present Soviet evaluation of the movements against Tsarism a product of "Great-Russian chauvinistic deviation" as Richard Pipes and Seton-Watson would like us to believe. Pipes in a symposium on *Soviet Colonialism* called this recent stress on the progressive role of the Russian conquest of Central Asia as the "historiographic aspect" of "Russification" of Central Asian peoples. Seton-Watson dubbed the arguments of the Soviet historians as "a quasi-Marxist version of the doctrine of the white man's burden which Kipling would have understood".² There is, however, not a grain of truth in these assertions. The recent view of Soviet historians concerning the objectively progressive character of Tsarist annexation of Central Asia is a well-considered view based on an objective analysis of facts, some exaggerations notwithstanding.

The approach which regards all movements against Tsarism as national liberation movements is not sound because it ignores the fact that in all these movements, with the exception of a few such as the Cholera Riots in Tashkent in 1892 and the uprising of 1916, the masses did not participate. The revolt of Sultan Kenissari cannot be treated as a national liberation struggle of the Kazakhs. It is true that in the beginning Kenissari succeeded in rallying a number of Kazakh nomads, but upon discerning his feudal character they soon deserted him and he died ultimately fighting not the Tsar's Russian troops but the Kirghizs. To characterise the intrigues of Shahr-Subz *beks* for the Bukhara throne and the abortive attempts of Muslim priests and the aristocracy to rouse the people against Tsarist rule under the slogan of a holy war as they did in Kokand in 1875 and 1876, in Ferghana in 1885 and in Andijan in 1898 as national liberation movements, is an utter travesty of historical facts.

¹ See P. Antropov, *Chto i kak chitat po istorii revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya i partii v Srednei Azii*, Samarkand-Tashkent, 1929, p. 30, and also an article by G. Turkestansky in *Kommunisticheskaya Mysl* No. 3, 1926-27, pp. 190-222.

² H. Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism*, London, 1964, p. 65.

A few general observations about the national liberation movement in Central Asia in the colonial period may perhaps facilitate a better understanding of the movement. The period of Khan rule found the people of Central Asia weary of internecine wars. Hence, in the beginning they welcomed the Tsarist establishment of a regime which provided for internal order and personal security. Tashkent, it may be recalled, was captured by a force of two thousand Russians. Only the Turkmen tribes offered any serious opposition to Tsarist conquest.

The Tsarist conquest of Central Asia took place in an environment of sharp rivalry with Britain which forced Tsarism to pursue a cautious policy towards the peoples of Central Asia. Here, Tsarism made no attempt to interfere with Islam. Christian missionaries were restricted in their activities among the Muslims of Central Asia. Towards the end of the 19th century, however, as Anglo-Russian rivalry gradually became less intense, the situation changed and there began the repressive phase of Tsarist policy. But the rise of the national liberation movement towards the close of the century was largely due to the emergence of capitalist relations in Central Asia, which increased the economic misery of the toiling people and awakened their national consciousness. The economically ruined *dehkans* and poor artisans now entered the stage of political action. To this period belong the Cholera Riots in Tashkent and the uprising of 1916 throughout the whole of Turkestan.

These two movements can with full justification be described as popular liberation struggles against colonial rule. They have been recognised as such in all recent Soviet historical writings. In this evaluation antagonism to religion has played no part. The Cholera Riots in Tashkent are recognised as a popular movement by all Soviet writers notwithstanding the participation of religious elements. Marxism has always recognised that religious persecution of the peasantry can lead to a liberation struggle under religious slogans. In this connection the characterisation by Marx of the Hussite wars as "Czech peasants' national war under a religious banner" may be recalled.¹ But as noted above, Tsarism did not follow a policy of religious suppression in Turkestan. Hence religion did not play any role in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Central Asia.

¹ Marx and Engels, *Arkhiiv*, Vol. VI, 1939, pp. 3-4.

Towards the close of the 19th century the peasant of Central Asia began his political action against the Tsarist colonial administration. The penetration of capitalism into the rural economy of the region had ruined the *dehkans*. The pauperised peasantry organised raids on the rich as well as on colonial officials as a form of protest against the miserable conditions of colonial rule. In the three *oblasts* of Ferghana, Samarkand and Syr-Darya, where colonial exploitation was most acute, the number of raids organised by the cotton-growing peasantry increased each year. Between 1887 and 1898, 668 such raids took place. In Ferghana, where the process of economic ruination of the peasantry was most intense, the number of peasant raids amounted to 429. In Samarkand 182 raids and in the Syr-Darya region 57 raids were reported during this period.¹

The peasant movement also took the form of clashes with the administration. Between 1887 and 1898, 25 such clashes were reported involving 34 officials and resulting in 20 casualties. By the end of the century more and more *dehkans* and nomads began to participate in the national liberation and class struggle. The native cattle-breeding nomads also entered the arena of struggle against the *kulaks* and Cossack colonisers by seizing their cattle.

The peasants continued this form of national struggle in the first decade of the 20th century. Peasant raids² which increased slowly up to 1905 were stimulated by the 1905 revolutionary upheaval. Between 1905 and 1908, they increased by 83 per cent. The 1905 revolution proved to be a turning point in this respect. It activated the political struggle of the *dehkans* who then openly began to oppose Tsarist colonial rule. However their movement remained unorganised and spontaneous in character. In the revolution of 1905-07, the native proletariat, though numerically weak, also underwent a great political schooling. In 1906, when workers from local nationalities were recruited in place of Russian workers on strike, they also joined the strike almost spontaneously. Local workers participated in rallies and

¹ P. G. Galuzo, *Turkestan—koloniya*, Tashkent, 1935, p. 90.

² P. G. Galuzo in an article "Dva etapa natsionalno-osvoboditelnogo dvizheniya v Srednei Azii" in *Pravda Vostoka* No. 172 (1666) of July 30, 1928 and in his book *Turkestan—koloniya* refers to peasant raids on the rich. But he has nowhere called them "attacks on Russians" as R. Vaidyanath has done on his authority (R. Vaidyanath, *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, 1917-36*, New Delhi, 1967).

demonstrations along with Russian workers. After the failure of the Moscow December uprising a state of siege was declared in the whole of Turkestan and Social-Democratic organisations were closed during this acute repression. The new wave of mass revolutionary movement which began in Russia in 1912 did not fail to touch the soldiers and workers of Turkestan. In July 1912, a powerful armed uprising of soldiers occurred in Tashkent. But this, too, was ruthlessly suppressed by the colonial administration.

A mass national liberation uprising of the peoples of Central Asia against Tsarism occurred in 1916. All the peoples of Central Asia participated in it. The imperialist war resulted only in the further aggravation of colonial exploitation and plunder of Central Asia. The Tsarist administration requisitioned animals and levied additional taxes which resulted in a sharp deterioration of the people's economic condition. The price of bread increased as its import from Russia was curtailed. The situation became worse due to crop failure and hunger began to stalk the land.

The occasion for a widely popular movement against Tsarism was provided by the Decree of June 25, 1916, which concerned the mobilisation of the local male population for work behind the front. It caused popular indignation because of the manner in which the decree was implemented by the local administration. The rich *bais* and other well-to-do sections of society escaped from service by bribing or by hiring some one in their place, the severity of the decree thus falling completely on the shoulders of the poor.

There began spontaneously in different regions of Central Asia uprisings of *dehkans* and the urban poor. Crowds of angry people stormed the *volost* administration and tore up the requisition lists of men for service behind the front, killing several officials. The movement was on the whole unorganised and had no common control or guidance centre. In a majority of districts it was directed against arbitrary Tsarist rule, colonial administration as well as against the local *bais* and feudal elements. For the most part, it had the progressive character of a national liberation struggle. However, in some districts, feudal and clerical elements in league with German and Turk agents succeeded in giving it an anti-Russian colour. In the Jizak *uyezd*, in Tejen and Giurgen the movement took such a turn.

The uprising of 1916 was suppressed by Tsarist arms with great cruelty. Especially severe was the repression against the Kirghiz nomads. About 300 thousand of them fled to China from the Semirechye. Their lands were confiscated and turned over to Russian settlers. The uprising of 1916 played a significant role in the history of the peoples of the colonial territory in spite of its failure. It turned from an anti-colonial into an anti-feudal movement. Commencing with spontaneous demonstrations against mobilisation it grew into an armed struggle. It did not aim at secession from Russia, but only at freedom from national-colonial oppression. The strength and extent of the movement testified to the maturity of the revolutionary situation in Central Asia. The mobilised workers and *dehkans* who lived and worked in Russia became politically active under the influence of Russian Bolsheviks and on their return to Turkestan became the vanguard of the native masses in the period between the February and the October Revolution. They took a leading part in organising the Soviets of the toiling Muslims.

The uprising of 1916 failed but it taught the Central Asian people a great lesson in revolutionary struggle. It convinced them that only with the help and guidance of the Russian proletariat and only through a socialist revolution could they liberate themselves from national and colonial oppression. Betrayal by the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia, which at this juncture were lackeys of Tsarist imperialism, also opened the eyes of the masses.¹

Ripening of the Socio-Economic and Political Pre-conditions for Socialist Revolution

The socialist revolution in Central Asia erupted as a result of the presence of necessary socio-economic and political pre-conditions for it. Some writers argue that because of the underdevelopment of productive forces and low cultural level of the peoples of Central Asia such pre-conditions did not exist. They harp upon the absence of a

¹ For an interesting scholarly study of the 1916 uprising see Kh. T. Tursunov's *Vosstaniye 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane*, Tashkent, 1962.

sizable industrial proletariat among the local people, without which they cannot think of a socialist revolution. The crux of all their arguments is the assertion that the October Revolution had no roots of its own in Central Asia and was imported there from Russia by the Russian Bolsheviks.¹ In their historically fallacious conclusion regarding the "import" of socialist revolution from Russia, Western writers received much support from such Soviet authors of the past as Safarov, who, at one time, held an important position in the Party and Administration.²

Such an approach is, however, contrary to historical reality. In the epoch of imperialism, the question of the presence of prerequisites for a socialist revolution has to be studied in the context of the world imperialist system, and the possibilities of anti-feudal and national liberation revolutions growing into socialist revolutions cannot be ruled out.

In relation to Turkestan, a correct approach must not be limited to an analysis of the prerequisites for socialist revolution in the isolated periphery alone, but in the entire country. The national liberation struggle of the Central Asian peoples against Tsarist colonialism which grew in intensity and extent with every year in direct relation to the workers' revolutionary movement in Russia and mainly under the influence of the latter, has to be taken into consideration. Moreover, besides the objective socio-economic factors the role of the subjective factor has also to be taken note of.

The merger of Central Asia with Russia enabled a rapid development of the socio-economic prerequisites for a social-

¹ See A. G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan*, New York, 1957; R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954; W. Kolarz, *Communism and Colonialism*, London, New York, 1964; H. Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism*, London, 1964; Briand Krozier, *Neo-Colonialism*, London, 1964.

² For Safarov's highly biased and unobjective views see his work *Kolonialnaya revolyutsiya—opyt Turkestana*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1921. This author did not find any "slightly-spread revolutionary movement" in Turkestan before the February Revolution (p. 53). The February Revolution itself, in his opinion, reached Turkestan "by telegraph" (p. 54). He asserted that Russian workers in Turkestan had "no revolutionary ideology, no revolutionary tradition" and that there was no common interest between them and the local people. He described all Russian workers in Turkestan and the dictatorship of the proletariat there as having a "typically colonial exterior" (p. 71). Safarov's authority has been most widely quoted in the West.

ist revolution. The emergence of capitalist relations in the colonial period further sharpened class antagonisms. This led to the ultimate victory of the socialist revolution in Central Asia. For the appraisal of the situation in Turkestan before the Revolution, it is necessary to take into account not only the development of the productive forces, but also the conditions of class struggle, the severity of national oppression, etc. It is not necessary that there should be a directly proportionate relationship between the economic and political maturity of a country for a socialist revolution. As Lenin pointed out, it is difficult to say "who will begin it and who will end it".¹ All speculations about the immaturity of Turkestan from the viewpoint of socialist revolution are tantamount to a negation of the objectively progressive results of the merger of Central Asia with Russia and a denial of political and economic changes brought about by it. Economic disparity in Turkestan widened as a result of its incorporation into Russia. The relation of different classes to the means of production changed and the process of class differentiation in agriculture and industry further deepened.

To maintain, as Hayit and Mustapha Chokayev have done, that class differences were absent among the Muslims of Central Asia who formed a united Muslim nation to which the very concept of class struggle is alien, is contrary to actual facts. While it is true that the industrial proletariat in Turkestan was quite small, this does not mean that proletarian elements were not predominant in its population. The agricultural proletariat and semi-proletariat together constituted a substantial majority of the population. Lenin, it may be pointed out, spoke of the "urban proletariat" and the "rural proletariat" and referred to their union against *kulaks* and the peasant bourgeoisie.² He referred to the "poor peasants" as semi-proletarians.³ In his *Ten Theses on Soviet Power* he described the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry (semi-proletariat) as one of the objectives of Soviet Power.⁴

No serious student of Central Asian history can ever deny that the population in Turkestan villages were in the overwhelming majority proletarians' and semi-proletarians. According to the All-Russia Agricultural Census of 1917,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 246.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, p. 392, also Vol. 33, p. 465.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 385, also Vol. 28, p. 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, pp. 153-54.

the number of hired labourers engaged in agriculture in the settled region of the Ferghana *oblast* was 22,217, Samar-kand *oblast* 23,027 and the Syr-Darya *oblast* (without the Amu-Darya division) 15,067.¹ Figures for other regions are not available in their entirety. However, even these few available figures indicate the extent of class differentiation existent in village society. This large army of *batraks* (landless agricultural labour) formed the agricultural proletariat. Then there was a large section of poor peasants *charikeri* and the *mardikeri* who had little land of their own and who cultivated the land of the *bais* on a crop-sharing basis subject to unfavourable and difficult terms. The handicraft industries of Turkestan employed 108,324 persons.² The social composition of this sector of the population in 1908-09 consisted of forty per cent poor handicraftsmen, twenty-five per cent middle handicraftsmen and twenty-four per cent wage earners, the rest being well-to-do handicraftsmen.³ This mass of people was the creator of socialist revolution and a new life.

From the very first days after the merger of Central Asia with Russia the toiling masses came into contact with the "two Russias"—the Russia of oppressors and exploiters, of the Romanovs and Stolypins, exploiting and oppressing both the native Asian peoples and the Russian peoples, and the Russia of revolutionaries fighting against social and national oppression. The people of Central Asia met not only the Tsarist colonialists, Russian *kulaks* and traders, but also Russian peasants and industrial workers, scientists, teachers, writers and revolutionaries.

This progressive character of the drawing together of the Central Asian toilers with the great Russian people became all the more clear when Russia became the centre of the world revolutionary movement and the Russian working class, having formed its militant revolutionary party, became the vanguard of the international revolutionary movement. The rising tide of revolution in Russia also greatly influenced Central Asia. The progressive forces in Central Asia issued a call for joint struggle along with the Russian proletariat against feudal and colonial oppression. Having

¹ Kh. T. Tursunov, *Vosstaniye 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane*, Tashkent, 1962, p. 100.

² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

³ M. G. Vakhabov, *Formirovaniye Uzbekskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii*, Tashkent, 1961, p. 177.

realised that the working people of Russia were suffering oppression from the same capitalists and landlords, the Central Asian masses clearly saw their common fate linked with that of the Russian proletariat.

The Russian proletariat undoubtedly played the leading role in the socialist revolution of Central Asia. It acted as an instrument in rousing the class consciousness of the native workers and in forging an alliance with the *dehkans* who were gradually trying to extricate themselves from the influence of the feudals and the clergy, and who since the close of the 19th century had begun to enter the arena of political struggle, though spontaneously and in an unorganised fashion.

A new factor was present in the Russian colonial conquest of Central Asia which was absent in the colonial conquests of other European powers. It was the establishment of direct contact between the colonial subjects of the Russian Empire and the common Russian people. The colonies of Russia were territorially linked and served as avenues for the emigration of the latter.

This was of vital importance to the development of the necessary pre-conditions for a socialist revolution in the Russian colonies. On the other hand, the British proletariat for a number of reasons, among them, geographical separation from colonies, was prevented from taking the initiative as regards socialist revolution in the colonies. The British proletariat could not play the same progressive role in the colonies (e.g., in India) because it was largely under the influence of a labour aristocracy. It may be recalled here that the Labour Party in Britain opposed self-rule for India on more than one occasion. But even if the British working class had not been under the influence of a labour aristocracy, geographical separation would have, nonetheless, been a serious inhibiting factor. Hardly any British worker was present in India, whereas thousands of Russian workers were employed in Central Asian railways and other industrial enterprises. Though British capital no doubt did build railways in India for a more thorough exploitation of its raw material resources, not a single British worker participated in the construction projects. In addition to Russian workers, there was also a large number of Russian peasant settlers in Central Asia. Many of them were not *kulaks* and had common interests with the *dehkans*.

Some authors have tried to show that a permanent clash

of interests existed between the Russian settlers in Asia and the native people, which precluded any co-operation between the two. Safarov's assertion that 1/3 to 1/2 of the entire Russian population of Turkestan was composed of "parasitic strata" is a gross distortion of facts.¹ He includes in this "parasitic" class all Russian urban inhabitants without distinction. If one agrees with him, all Russian men of letters and science like N. M. Przhevalsky, P. P. Semyonov-Tianshansky and others become colonialists, and all workers, members of a privileged labour aristocracy.

The entire Russian population of Turkestan amounted to 540,674.² Of this 185,303 lived in towns and 330,469 in villages; 16,648 lived in town-like settlements and 8,254 near the stations along the railway line. Among the Russian town settlers approximately 26,000 were industrial workers,³ of whom about 20,000 were railway workers. From the memoirs of such workers as Manzhara, we know that the Russian railway workers enjoyed no special privileges. They received the same pay as their counterparts in Russia. To draw an inference about the existence of a privileged Russian labour aristocracy in Central Asia from the difference in the pay of skilled Russian workers and unskilled native workers, is to display an ignorance of the very concept of labour aristocracy. If Russian workers in Central Asia belonged to the labour aristocracy, how can the discontent among them leading to big strikes and demonstrations be explained? A labour aristocracy, bought by the metropolitan bourgeoisie with its colonial super-profits, would have been a supple instrument of colonial exploitation. Strikes and demonstrations by the British employed in railways in India were never heard of.

The assertion that all Russian settlers in villages were *kulak* exploiters is also far from the truth. Figures from the Semirechye, one of the important regions of Russian émigré settlement, show that the process of class differentiation was current even among the Russian settlers. In the old Russian settlements in the Semirechye, there were 11,959 households with a population of 78,591. Out of these 10,531 were Russian households with a population of

¹ G. Safarov, *Kolonialnaya revolyutsiya—opyt Turkestana*, p. 52.

² *Statistichesky yezhegodnik, 1917-24* gg., Vol. 1, Part 3, Tashkent, 1924, pp. 42-44.

³ On the basis of figures given in *Istoriya rabochego klassa Uzbekistana*, Vol. 1, Tashkent, 1965, pp. 31-32.

72,117 persons and 1,428 non-Russian with a population of 6,474. 3,322 (19.5 per cent) households (out of which 2,204, i.e., about 70 per cent, Russian and 1,118, i.e., 30 per cent, non-Russian) were landless. Landless households and households with small land holdings up to 5 *dessiatines* formed about 50 per cent of all households in the *oblast*: 68 per cent of the households were engaged in supplementary work besides agriculture; 2,660 persons worked as agricultural labourers; 377 worked in industries and 2,082 worked as artisans and handicraftsmen.¹ Among the Russian peasant settlers in the Chimkent *uyezd* of the Syr-Darya *oblast*, about 35 per cent of the peasant families worked as agricultural labourers and 34 per cent as industrial workers.² The administrator of the Trans-Caspian *oblast* described the material conditions of Russian settlers as "lower than the middle section of the people".³ Bartold indicates that a large number of Russian peasants who rented land from the Cossacks also migrated notwithstanding the government's opposition.⁴

In India, the picture was quite different. According to the 1931 census, there were 90,608 male persons of European origin in the country, of whom 59,692 worked in the public force, 3,972 in public administration, 3,507 in trade, 6,758 in transport, 4,080 in industry, 1,435 in exploitation of minerals, 3,069 in animal husbandry and vegetation, and 4,012 in the professions and liberal arts.⁵ Although not explicitly mentioned in the Census table, it is a matter of common knowledge that in industry, mining and transport Europeans worked mostly in high executive positions and as regards animal husbandry and vegetation, were farm and plantation owners. Thus very few were ordinary workers. Similarly, out of 8,313 females of European origin in India 5,089 were employed in the professions and liberal arts.

The revolution in Central Asia was a socialist revolution in the peculiar conditions of pre-capitalist relations still prevailing there. It was an integral part of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a continuation and further development of events which began in October 1917 in

¹ Kh. T. Tursunov, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-31.

² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ V. V. Bartold, *Works*, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 322.

⁵ J. H. Hutton, *Census of India*, Vol. I, Part II, 1931, pp. 420-21.

Petrograd and Moscow. The victory of the October Revolution at the centre of Russia and the great help given by the Russian proletariat played a significant role in the victory of the revolution in Central Asia. The leadership of the revolution definitely belonged to the Russian proletariat which enjoyed the full confidence and support of the broad masses of toilers in Turkestan.

The revolution in Central Asia would not have succeeded without a socialist Russia supporting it. This, however, does not mean that the revolution in Central Asia was imposed by Russian workers. The working people of Central Asia greeted the revolution as their own affair and took an active part in both making and defending it.

History teaches us that a revolution without deep roots among the broad masses of people and forcibly imposed from the outside is never enduring. Such a revolution, even if it were to win as a fluke of history, could not have successfully faced a host of powerful enemies, internal as well as external. The people of Central Asia themselves chose the path of revolution, accomplished it, and defended its gains.

From the beginning of the 20th century, an alliance began to form between Tsarism and the native *bais* and mullahs against the rapidly emerging alliance of the Russian proletariat and the native workers and *dehkans*. The process of alienation of the local masses from the national bourgeoisie which had already begun in the period 1905-07 was completed at the time of the 1916 uprising. The national bourgeoisie of Central Asia, playing a role subservient to the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie, betrayed the interests of the masses. The victory of the February Revolution opened up new prospects for the national liberation movement in colonial Turkestan. The working people of Turkestan had by this time become convinced that they could achieve their liberation from national and colonial exploitation only with the help of the Russian proletariat, and they began to organise political activity. There appeared after the February Revolution a number of their class organisations—Soviets, committees and unions of local working people. Soviets of local toilers began to emerge towards the end of May and beginning of June 1917. Organisationally, the Russian working class also lent great assistance. The native workers, on their return home from service behind the front, took a leading part in the formation of these organisations. The Soviets of Muslim Workers' Deputies

carried on a determined struggle against native exploiters from the very beginning. The exploiting elements also organised themselves into such organisations as the *Shuro-i-Islamia* and the *Ulema*. It is true that, at first, the native masses did display some confidence in these reactionary organisations because of cultural backwardness and lack of political preparedness. But class contradictions became more acute and, consequently, the popular Muslim masses rapidly lost whatever little confidence they had in these reactionary organisations. At the time of the October Revolution, the polarisation of class forces was completed. A revolutionary situation had fully developed and the crisis fully matured. All this inevitably led to the outbreak of socialist revolution in Central Asia.

CHAPTER V
INDIA
AND CENTRAL ASIA

Imperialism
or Indian Security?

The political, economic and cultural intercourse between the peoples of India and Central Asia dates back many centuries. Central Asia was the region through which pilgrims and traders passed on their way from China to India and *vice versa*. Likewise, trade routes between the West and the East lay through this region which was an important cross-roads of civilisation and commerce before the discovery of sea routes. Strabon wrote about the flow of Indian goods along the Oxus, the Caspian Sea, Trans-Caucasia and further west along the Black Sea coast. The ancient monuments discovered on the territory of modern Soviet Central Asian Republics and the Sinkiang region of China also indicate the close ties that existed between the two peoples.

These political and cultural ties continued through the middle ages. The friendly visits of the Khwarezm scholars Al Biruni and Abdurazzak Samarkandi form a brilliant chapter in the history of these contacts. The relations between the two peoples grew further during the course of the three-hundred-year rule of the dynasty founded by Babur.

During the latter half of the 19th century the importance of India increased considerably in the British colonial system. India, with her vast area, enormous material resources and population, became at once "the base and bastion" of the British power in the whole of Asia and East Africa. The British imperialists used India as a springboard for further colonial conquests. They waged aggressive wars in the Sudan, Egypt, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Burma and China, using Indian soldiers, and imposed their cost on India. The people of India were made to pay for the maintenance of the India Office at London, the colonial establishments at Aden and

other ports on the Red Sea, the consulates in China and the embassy in Persia.

Jawaharlal Nehru's opinion concerning the falsification of the modern period of Indian history by British writers should spur Indian scholars on to re-examine this period more critically than is often done. Nehru wrote:

"British accounts of India's history, more especially of what is called the British period, are bitterly resented. . . . Truth hides somewhere at the bottom of the deepest well, and falsehood, naked and unashamed, reigns almost supreme."¹

Britain's imperialistic activities extended to the countries adjoining India: Sinkiang, Afghanistan, Upper Burma and Tibet. These territories played an insignificant role as markets for Britain's industrial products and sources of raw materials. However, their importance increased from the viewpoint of strategy in the epoch of imperialist struggle for final division of the world, inasmuch as they were situated on the approaches to China and Central Asia.

The foreign policy of British colonial power in India was always aggressive. Its basic direction was determined in the first place by the international position of Britain. In the second half of the 19th century the focal point of British colonial policy was concentrated on the "Eastern Question", i.e., the struggle for inheriting the decaying Turkish Empire. Russia was the principal enemy in the Near and Middle East. This fact determined the development of British expansion on the frontiers of India, mainly in the northern and north-western directions against Kashgar, Afghanistan and the southern regions of Turkmenia. The British colonialists regarded these territories as a springboard for struggle against Russia in Central Asia.

The aggressiveness of Britain's frontier policy varied with the fluctuations of the situation inside India. There arose two schools of thought. The "forward policy" on the frontiers of India, which harped on the vulnerability of the north-western frontiers in the defence system, called for the strengthening of India's defences in territories beyond her natural frontiers. The advocates of this policy argued that the conquest of Central Asia by Russia was a great threat to British India. The other school denied such a danger and defended a "close border policy", rejecting the idea of an active advance beyond the frontiers of India. It aimed at a

¹ J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, London, 1956, p. 287.

consolidation of the internal position in the colony. Due to the historical circumstances of the period, the "close border policy" predominated from 1857 up to 1875. The serious internal complications following the popular uprising of 1857 made an active advance difficult. This temporary abandonment of the "forward policy", however, did not mean an outright rejection of penetration into the bordering territories. By a skilful use of diplomacy, the British continued to widen their sphere of influence; they were preparing conditions suitable for renewal of active aggression. The British policy in Kashgar and Afghanistan provides clear evidence of this. The so-called policy of "neutrality" and "non-interference" advocated by Lawrence with regard to Afghanistan also was not motivated by a genuine respect for her independence and territorial integrity. The Conservative Secretary of State, Cranborne, wrote to Lawrence "that the Viceroy's observant attitude towards the contending parties was the only one in accordance with British interests. Indian resources are wanted for other work besides extension of territory *just now*" (stress—D.K.).¹ In fact, Cranborne was more interested in Upper Burma than in Afghanistan. Lawrence still saw no necessity for, or advantage in, closer relations with the Afghan rulers. "A day may come when it is wise to do so (as Lytton later did), but that day has not yet arrived," wrote the Viceroy.²

In Kashgar, during the above period, the British were using commerce as a cover for their expansionist activities. With rare frankness G. J. Alder admits:

"The British policy in Eastern Turkistan was always, from the sixties of the nineteenth century onwards, a blend of commercial means and political ends. . . . Trade was only a weapon. All the Viceroys of the period were well aware that trade is 'the great lever of political influence'. Lawrence and Ripon anxious to confine India's political responsibilities within the Indian border did nothing to encourage the Kashgar trade. All the others, because they wished to extend British influence, did encourage it."³

This observation of the British writer is no doubt true. But

¹ Cited by S. Gopal, *British Policies in India*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 43. "Closer relations" to the British meant only the reduction of Afghanistan to a vassal state.

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ G. J. Alder, *British India's Northern Frontier, 1865-95*, London, 1963, p. 98.

his explanation that the wish of the British to extend their influence to Kashgar was due to "its special importance for Indian security" is far from the truth. The bogey of a Russian menace to India was raised by the British as a smoke-screen for their prospective aggression across the northern and north-western frontiers of India. Alder contradicts himself at another place in the same work by saying:

"Kaufman's plan of annexation of Sinkiang by Russia was vetoed in 1880 on the grounds that its returns would not justify the time and expense it would involve. . . . There were sound political as well as military reasons why Russia would not wish to forsake an excellent natural frontier and become responsible for even more troublesome Asiatic Muslim subjects. . . . A British military report authoritatively discounted the possibility of a Russian attack on Kashgar."¹

This clearly shows that the British concern for the security of India against a Russian invasion from Kashgar and the danger of "coterminity of a powerful European state like Russia with a semi-inaccessible native Kingdom of dubious loyalty like Kashmir", was a sham excuse. It is unfortunate that these traditional motives of British historiography are still credulously accepted by some eminent Indian writers on the subject. B. Prasad writes:

"Yet it must be emphasised that in this period intimate relationship between the integrity and independence of the border states and India's own security, rather the identity of the two, was fully unfolded. Aden, the Persian Gulf, Kalat, Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma, all these were bulwarks of her safety and in their protection from alien encroachment lay the security of India also. . . . The foundations of India's foreign policy were then laid and a system of alliances and interests developed which provided for her security".²

¹ G. J. Alder, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

² Bisheshwar Prasad, *The Foundations of India's Foreign Policy*, Vol. I, 1955, p. 263. Very recently another Indian author has also attributed the British interest "in the northern region" to the "fear of Russian advance into Central Asia and Persia". But it goes to his credit that he admits the British policy to have been "formulated" "for a long-term domination of Central Asia". He, however, believes that the Russian danger "galvanised" the British "to frantic activity". P. N. K. Bamzai, *Kashmir from Lake Success to Tashkent*, Delhi, 1966, pp. 28, 33, 40, 46. According to R. C. Majumdar "the principal objective" of the foreign policy of India under the British "from the beginning to end was the security of the natural frontiers of India, by territorial expansions or other means, on the north-west and the north-east (*British Paramountcy*)

Similarly, D. P. Singhal also argues:

"Indian interest formed an important part of British Imperial considerations, and the problem of strengthening Indian frontiers against the influence of European powers became in the later nineteenth century a dominant factor in Imperial policy."¹

Such a view ignores the basically imperialistic aims of the British rule in India which K. M. Panikkar has correctly assessed:

"Undoubtedly it was the India-based strength of Britain as a great Asiatic power, that enabled it to force open the doors of China, establish European predominance in the Yangtze valley, reduce the power of the Great Manchus, and help to convert the rest of Asia into a European dependency."²

British expansion in Asia followed directly from the logic of British imperialism and not from a professed concern for India's security. The ruling classes of Britain desired a maximum colonial expansion in the period of transition from pre-monopoly capitalism to imperialism. The "Russian menace" to the security of India as already stated was invented by them to justify their own aggression in Central Asia. It is really regrettable that Indian authors, upholding the British policy towards states bordering on India in the north and north-west as motivated by interests of Indian security, have not taken pains to examine the extent to which this "Russian menace" was real from the viewpoint of the military and political position of Russia as well as her economic and transport possibilities.³

Relations with Central Asia

On the eve of the Russian conquest of Central Asia a flourishing trade existed between India and this region. Tsarist Russia's relations with India (though of a casual and irregular nature) were also conducted through the Central

and Indian Renaissance. The History and Culture of the Indian People, Part I, 1963, pp. 1039-1044).

¹ D. P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907*, Melbourne, 1963, p. xi.

² K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and the Western Dominance*, London, 1954, p. 95.

³ K. S. Menon, *The "Russian Bogy" and British Aggression in India and Beyond*, Calcutta, 1957; it is perhaps the first attempt in India at a critical study of the British policies.

Asian Khanates. After the Russian conquest of Central Asia, Bukhara which was not completely annexed continued to serve as a link of commerce and trade with India. In the late sixties of the 19th century Indian merchants played an important role in supplying the local population with Indian goods. They brought to Central Asia tea, indigo, muslin, spices and a wide variety of Indian and British manufactured goods. Indian merchants sold their goods not only in Bukhara but also in Samarkand and Tashkent. Indian goods worth 5,475,000 rubles and weighing 100,000 poods were exported to Bukhara annually. In turn Bukhara exported to India goods weighing 2,100 poods.¹ From Bukhara Indian goods were sent to Russian Turkestan and other trade centres of the Russian Empire.

The Tsarist government took a number of measures to restrict the import of goods of Anglo-Indian origin into Russian Turkestan. In 1885 a Russian Political Agency was established in Bukhara and the entry of Anglo-Indian goods into Turkestan with the exception of tea, muslin and indigo was prohibited. A tariff of 50 per cent was levied on the import of Indian tea. In view of these higher duties on imports, Indian merchants began to search for ways and means to lower the cost of transport. At first, they began to bring their goods to Central Asia through Persia, discarding the dangerous Afghanistan route. In the beginning of the nineties, they began to favour the Bombay-Batum sea route counting upon the Trans-Caspian railway recently opened. From Batum Indian goods were brought to the Caspian by the Caucasian railway and then across the Caspian to Krasnovodsk. As the transport of goods from India by this route was profitable to the Tsarist treasury, transit was allowed along this route in 1895. The opening of this cheap trade route to Central Asia had a favourable effect on Indian trade with this region in spite of high protective tariffs. Even the extension of Russian tariff regulations to Bukhara in 1894 did not restrict the volume of Indian trade.²

The main articles of export from India to Central Asia were tea, muslin, indigo, Kashmir shawls and British products. Every year up to 700 thousand poods of Indian tea, 18

¹ P. N. Rasulzade, *Iz istorii sredneaziatsko-indiiskikh svyazei posle prisoyedineniya kraia k Rossii*, Theses, Tashkent, 1964, p. 13.

² G. L. Dmitriyev, *Iz istorii sredneaziatsko-indiiskikh otnosheniy vtoroi poloviny XIX-nachala XX v. (Indiiskie vykhodtsy v Srednei Azii)*, Theses, Tashkent, 1965, p. 9.

thousand poods of indigo, 1,400 bales of muslin, about 500 Kashmir shawls and 300 pieces of brocade were imported by Central Asia.¹ In Bukhara, there were six Indian caravanserais engaged in tea trade. The serai of Abdur Rashid received 3,000 camels every year laden with Indian tea, the serai of Mirzagulia, 1,500 camels and that of Badriddin, 1,200 camels.² There were caravanserais for Indian trade in other towns of Central Asia as well.

In the latter half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th between 6 and 8 thousand Indian emigrants lived in Central Asia.³ A great majority of them came from western and north-western regions of India, mostly from Sind and the Punjab. A major section of Indians was concentrated in the Emirate of Bukhara, the Ferghana valley, Samarkand and the Syr-Darya region of Turkestan. They were followers of Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam. The Muslims constituted a majority of the Indian community in Central Asia, whereas non-Muslims settled largely in Turkestan. Most of the Indians living in Central Asia were money-lenders and traders, though some peasants, craftsmen and other representatives of working people were also to be found.

In Bukhara conditions were somewhat difficult for Hindu settlers as they were governed by Muslim religious laws. Hindus and Sikhs had to pay double the *jaziya* tax and tariff dues of Muslims. They also suffered various other inequities, being forced to live only in localities specially reserved for them. Additionally, they were also forbidden to marry Muslim women and were denied the right to worship in public according to their religion. No such restrictions, however, existed in Turkestan. Some restrictions were, nevertheless, imposed on them in the nineties to prevent their being used for espionage by the British. In 1877 a law prohibiting the purchase of immovable property by Indians was introduced for the purpose of curbing their money-lending activities. Later on, in 1886 this law became applicable to all foreigners residing in Turkestan.

Although trade between India and Central Asia suffered some setbacks as a result of Anglo-Russian colonial rivalry, cultural contacts did not cease. An important step in this

¹ P. N. Rasolzade, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

² "Chainaya trgovlya v Bukhare", *Turkestanskiye Uedomosti*, 1877, No. 16.

³ G. L. Dmitriyev, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

direction was taken with the establishment in Tashkent on April 14, 1901 of a branch of the Russian Society for Oriental Studies. The initiative came from such celebrated orientologists as A. G. Serebrenikov, A. E. Snesev, M. V. Grulev, Polovtsev, Losev and others.¹ Indian language text books and the Russian-Hindustani dictionary appeared. Considerable interest was taken in Indian affairs by two important papers of Tashkent, the *Turkestanskiye Uedomosti* in Russian and *Turkestan Viloyatining* in the Uzbek language. The latter published valuable information about the visits of the Uzbek poet Furgat and traveller Sa'id Ali Khoja to India.² Along with Russian orientologists, Uzbek scholars also took keen interest in the study of Indian languages and culture. In this connection the names of Sa'id Rasul Khoja, Sa'id Aziz Khojayev, Tahirbek Kiashbekov and Khaliluddin Ahmed are worth mentioning. Some Uzbek specialists were also sent to India for practical training in Indian languages.

Many Indians mastered the local languages of Central Asia during their long stay there. A few of them even learnt Russian. The study of Indian languages in Russia was facilitated by the presence of Indian emigrants in Central Asia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Indian traders brought with them to Central Asia a large number of lithograph books published in India. In Kokand alone 2,000 different books published in Delhi, Bombay, Lucknow, Lahore, Kanpur and other towns of India, were received in 1913.³

The Indian national liberation movement felt the impact of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. As Engels wrote:

"... when a first class European military power asserts itself in Turkestan, endeavours by a combination of force and cajolery to make Persia and Afghanistan into its vassals, and moves slowly but doggedly towards the Hindu Kush and the Sulayman range—there you have a very different state of affairs. British dominion ceases to be ineluctable fate, and a new perspective opens before the native population. What force has created, force can also break asunder..."⁴

On the eve of the Russian annexation of Central Asia many deserters from the British-Indian army had taken shelter in Bukhara and Kokand after the failure of the 1857 uprising.

¹ P. N. Rasolzade, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

² *Turkestan Viloyatining*, 1893, No. 20, also No. 33.

³ State Archives of the Uzbek SSR, Files 1-19.

⁴ Marx and Engels, *Works*, Vol. 22, p. 45 (in Russian).

The Russian advance in Central Asia stirred the hopes of the Indian people to throw off the yoke of British colonial oppression. Of course, this hope was at first confined to a few rulers of princely states who had no popular aspirations and who merely sought to utilise the contradictions between the two colonial powers to their advantage. Soon after the Russian occupation of Tashkent, Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir sent a mission of four persons. Two of the emissaries including the leader were murdered on the way and the letter from the Maharaja to the Russian authorities in Tashkent vanished with them. The survivors, Abdur Rahman Khan and Sarfaraz Khan, reached Tashkent in November 1865. They were received by General Chernayev to whom they conveyed a declaration of friendship and enquired what might be expected of the Russians. The mission did not meet with any success. The Tsarist government was not interested in promoting the cause of the national liberation of India. It was interested in its colonial expansion only, though, for want of adequate material resources, it did not at the moment feel inclined to involve itself in troubles with the mighty British Empire.

In 1866 the ruler of Indore also sent a mission to Tashkent with a similar objective. The emissary identified himself as the son of the Chief Minister of Indore. He sought help in the name of a number of princely states such as Hyderabad, Bikaner, Jodhpur and Jaipur. However, it seems quite likely that the envoy simply mentioned so many names to boost his authority, for there is no evidence of these Indian states ever having formed an alliance to drive out the British. This mission met a fate similar to the one preceding it.¹

A second mission from Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir reached Tashkent in June 1870. It was headed by Baba Karam Prakash. But again no political or military help was rendered by Tsarist Russia. It was only natural for the Indian princes and the people to seek support from any quarter, but it is doubtful that the aid of colonial Tsarist Russia, if given at all, would have led to the real liberation of the country. Tsarist Russia was the "gendarme of European reaction" and the "prison of nations", and she could hardly be expected to act altruistically.

¹ For a detailed account of these missions see N. A. Khalin's *Indian Missions in Russia in the Second Half of the 19th Century*. XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, Papers Presented by the USSR Delegation, Moscow, 1963.

Much more important than these missions sent by the feudal princes of India was the mission of Guru Charan Singh which reached Tashkent in 1879. This mission may be described as a popular mission. It had no association with the feudal powers of India. It was sent by the Namdhari Sikhs of the Punjab who wanted to liberate the province from British colonial rule. Guru Charan Singh undertook this hazardous journey in his seventies and tried to impress the Russian authorities of the need to help the Indian people in their struggle for national liberation. He carried a letter from Baba Ram Singh written on the basis of prophecies of Guru Govind Singh to the effect that India would get rid of the British yoke with the coming of the Russians. Writing about Guru Charan Singh's mission, N. A. Ivanov, head of the Zeravshan district, stressed "the importance of the fact that a part of the population of British India appealed to us to help liberate them from foreign yoke". He further noted "that in the speeches of Guru Charan Singh we find such confidence in Russia's power, such belief in our destiny to liberate the Indian people from the hateful domination of Britain that it is impossible to doubt our great moral impact on the population of British India".¹ The Tsarist government, however, again turned a deaf ear to the request of the Indian patriots. The Tsarist Governor-General of Turkestan, General Kaufman, gave a non-committal reply couched in friendly terms.

In 1887 Maharaja Duleep Singh, the grandson of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, also wrote a personal letter to Tsar Alexander III seeking Russian aid for liberating India from the British.² In 1890, one Ghulam Haydar Khan, who described himself as the envoy of the Rajah of Nepal, turned up in Ashkhabad. However, the Russian Governor believed him to be either a British spy or an adventurer. In 1891 the envoys of the Hunza ruler Safdar Ali were received at Uch-Kurgan by Vrevsky as Governor-General of Turkestan. But again a non-committal message amounting to an exchange of courtesies and no more was given by the Russians. Thus the despatch of these missions proved no gain to the national liberation movement in India. Nevertheless, they showed that the

¹ State Archives of the Uzbek SSR, File 1. For an account of the mission see P. C. Roy's article in *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, 1959, No. 4, pp. 77-81.

² State Archives of the Uzbek SSR, File 677.

Indian people had placed high hopes on Russian aid in their struggle against the British. The visit of Russian warships to Bombay in 1879 saw an upsurge of the liberation movement. People rushed to the city to convince themselves of the presence of the Russian ships. *The Times of India* of May 19, 1879 thus reported the event: "The people began to talk of a quick downfall of the British yoke which would be cast off by Russia and Nana Sahib."¹

Another significant indication of the hopes pinned on Russian aid by Indian patriots is provided by Tilak's overtures to the Russian consuls, Cherkin and Klemm, in Bombay. Tilak sought Russian help in sending Indian youths abroad for military training.² Tilak also approached the Russian consul in Bombay, seeking introductions to Russian firms in order to purchase machinery for the establishment of Indian factories.³

Although this appeal to the Russians for economic and technical aid received no response it is significant that Indian extremists such as Tilak felt sufficiently confident of a sympathetic response from Russia. The disinclination of the Tsarist Russian government to render aid to the Indian people explodes the myth of the "Russian menace to India". It clearly shows that it was an invention of the British to cover up their own intended aggression against Central Asia.

Just as missions from India went to Central Asia to seek Russian help, so did missions from Central Asia come to India to seek British help against the Russians. In the National Archives of India we find information concerning three such missions in the same period. A mission from the Khan of Kokand led by Khaja Beg Ishack Ghasee reached India in 1864. Sir John Lawrence was then the Viceroy of India. The Kokand mission apprised the Viceroy of the difficulties of the Khan with the Emir of Bukhara and Russia. The British Viceroy regretted his inability to render any help on account of the "distance" and the "situation".⁴ The second mission from the Khan of Kokand reached India in 1865. The

¹ Cited by A. A. Benediktov, *Indiiskoye krestyanstvo v 70-kh godakh XIX-go veka*, Stalinabad, 1953, p. 127.

² A. V. Raikov, "Anglo-indiiskaya armiya i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoye dvizheniye v Indii v 1905-1907 godakh", *Problemy Vostokovedeniya* No. 2, Moscow, 1959, p. 129.

³ *Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India*, II, pp. 215-16.

⁴ National Archives, Pol. A., Nos. 238/240, Dec. 1864.

Khan requested the British India government to make available to him some experienced artillerymen and military instructors. But the British Viceroy refused to comply with the request.¹ In November 1866 an envoy from Bukhara arrived in India to seek British aid against Russia.² Like the two previous missions, this mission also failed.

It is somewhat strange that Soviet historians who write so enthusiastically about the despatch of political missions to Russia from India maintain a silence about such missions from Central Asia to India. The failure of the Indian missions is used by them only to prove the fallacy of the theory of a "Russian menace to India". Their comments, e.g., "The Russian ruling classes did not choose to use this opportunity of interfering in the affairs of India"³ (as if Tsarist Russia was averse to interference in the affairs of other countries) and "that their realisation [the realisation of the plans of Indian patriots to seek Russian aid—D.K.] was obstructed by the cautious policy of Russia, the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the formation of the Entente and eventually by the First World War of 1914-18 in which Tsarist Russia was an ally of Britain",⁴ hardly explain the real cause of the failure of Indian missions. Not the "cautious policy" of Tsarist Russia but its colonial and imperialist character prevented her giving aid to the Indian national liberation movement. While it is true that Tsarist Russia for want of adequate resources, conceived no serious plan of invasion of India, no noble motives can be attributed to her for refraining from doing so. She cannot be said to be free from any aggressive designs against a large portion of Asia. Tsarist Russia, to quote Lenin, desired to plunder Germany, Austria and Turkey in Europe, to beat England in Asia (to snatch away the whole of Persia, Mongolia and Tibet, etc.).⁵

The Central Asian missions and the Indian missions, though there were certain similarities in their objectives and nature, cannot be given equal importance. Whereas the Indian missions were backed by a popular upsurge against the British the same was not true as regards the Central

¹ National Archives, Pol. A., Nos. 151/154, Feb. 1865.

² *Ibid.*, Pol. Progs. 1869, No. 65.

³ N. A. Khalifa, *Indian Missions in Russia in the Second Half of the 19th Century*, Moscow, 1963, p. 6.

⁴ P. N. Rasulzade, *Iz istorii sredneaziatsko-indiiskikh svyazei*, Tashkent, 1964, pp. 11-12.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 126.

Asian missions. The missions from Central Asia were exclusively and singularly of feudal origin, while even the Indian missions despatched by feudal princes were more broad-based in character and enjoyed a wider measure of popular support than their Central Asian counterparts. The Kokand mission, it may be pointed out, sought British help not only against Russia but also against a neighbourly Central Asian Khanate. Nor did a popular mission like that of Guru Charan Singh from India ever come from Central Asia to India. We should also not be oblivious of the vast difference in the extent and size of the national liberation movement in India and Central Asia. A major national uprising in Central Asia against Tsarist Russia did not take place until 1916, whereas India had uprisings against British colonial rule as early as 1857.

India and Central Asia had a long history of contact but once they became subject to colonial domination their relations no longer developed as freely. Except for some trade in the early latter half of the 19th century, the political missions enumerated above as well as some revived interest in the study of the language and literature of the two regions, the intercourse between the two peoples remained largely inhibited. It was only after the liberation of Central Asia by the great October Revolution in 1917 that this region became a centre of attraction for many Indian freedom fighters who made Tashkent a nucleus of their revolutionary activities. After 1947, when India attained freedom a new glorious chapter in the mutual intercourse between the two peoples was opened.

The activities of Indian revolutionaries who chose to work for the cause of an independent Indian Republic from abroad form a brilliant chapter of the history of the freedom movement in India. While the work of Indian revolutionaries in London, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, San Francisco, New York, and California in the West and Tokyo in the East is fairly well-known, little is known about their activities nearer home in Soviet Asia in the period immediately following the great October Revolution. Apart from the information available in the memoirs of such Indian revolutionaries as Raja Mahendra Pratap, M. N. Roy and Rafiq Ahmed, intermittent references to Indian revolutionaries in Soviet sources have to be pieced together to make a coherent story.

During the First World War many revolutionaries left India to seek the assistance of foreign powers arrayed against Britain. As Tsarist Russia was an ally of Britain, there was

no question of Indian revolutionaries approaching her for help. Raja Mahendra Pratap, however, did try to seek aid from this quarter, too. This he did while he was at Kabul as head of a "Provisional Government of India" formed in Berlin with the Kaiser's blessings. The Raja's German adviser, Von Henting, tried to dissuade him but he persisted in his naive project. He wished to add Russia—the missing link—to the chain of anti-British powers extending from Germany in Europe to Turkey and Afghanistan. He was hopeful because of old Anglo-Russian antagonism in this region. But Raja Mahendra Pratap was soon disillusioned. The Russian authorities at Tashkent did not respond to his "Gold Plate Letter" to the Tsar and the two envoys he sent to Tashkent for the second time were arrested and handed over to the British in Iran who executed them.

But if Tsarist Russia had snubbed all efforts of Indian revolutionaries to forge a link with it, the Soviet power readily welcomed such Indian revolutionaries as wished to work for the liberation of India. It openly espoused the cause of all oppressed peoples of the East. The Montague-Chelmsford Report on Indian constitutional reforms (1918) frankly admitted that the Revolution in Russia "has given impetus to Indian political aspirations".

There were about eight thousand Indian settlers in Soviet Asia during those days. They were settled in such far off places as Baku and Astrakhan, besides Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara and Andijan in Central Asia. These settlers provided a good base for anti-British activities from a region which was in close proximity to India. Moreover, escape to this region through mountain passes was relatively safer than escape to Europe by sea. Hence, a steady stream of Indian patriots began to flow into Soviet Asia in the wake of the October Socialist Revolution.

Raja Mahendra Pratap had been waiting for several months at Mazare-Sherif, an Afghan frontier post, in the hope of being permitted to visit Russia when the October Revolution occurred. Obviously, he was not aware of the tragic fate that had befallen his emissaries to Tsarist Russia. The Soviet government permitted him to go to Moscow via Tashkent and he was given a warm welcome by Red Guards at Termez. Mahendra Pratap's stay at Tashkent was brief. From here he proceeded to Moscow en route to Berlin. It appears that Mahendra Pratap himself did not then attach much importance to his mission to Soviet Russia. He was more

intimate with Imperial Germany and relied mostly on its support. However, on his return from Berlin he was again dropped on Soviet territory from a German plane and this time he had a meeting with Lenin.

Mahendra Pratap was followed to Tashkent by a number of other Indian revolutionaries who came from Kabul. Prominent among them were Barkatullah, Abdur Rab and Mohammed Shafiq. A group of Indian revolutionaries appeared in Tashkent in March 1919. Col. Bailey, an officer of the British intelligence in Tashkent, writes in his book *Mission to Tashkent* that this group was headed by Barkatullah. Reports about the arrival of this group in the Soviet press, however, give the impression that Abdur Rab was the leader. Abdur Rab spoke at the reception held in honour of Indian revolutionaries in the old town of Tashkent and thanked the Soviet authorities and the Uzbek people on their behalf. It is again Abdur Rab who in the Soviet press is referred to as President of the Association of Indian Revolutionaries in Tashkent.

Abdur Rab came from the urban intelligentsia in the north-west of India; he is believed to have worked for some time as an interpreter with a British mission in Iran. He was a popular orator whose speeches at various functions organised in Tashkent in 1919-20 were widely reported and commented upon in such Soviet papers as *Izvestia Turk Tsika* in Russian and *Ishtrakiun* in the Uzbek language. His speech at a reception held in a mosque in Tashkent, as reported in the *Izvestia Turk Tsika* of July 4, 1920, is particularly interesting and brief mention of it here may be appropriate. Abdur Rab began his speech by narrating how the British rulers of India were trying to misinform the people about the Bolsheviks. "We are told," said Abdur Rab, "that the Bolsheviks eat human flesh and that they especially relish the flesh of the Mensheviks." The paper drew attention to the concluding remarks of the Indian speaker. Abdur Rab had said: "While we hate the British government and fight against it, we do not hate British people because we know that the British government exploits and oppresses the British working class too as it oppresses and exploits us." "This shows," wrote the commentator of *Izvestia Turk Tsika*, "that Indian revolutionaries have already reached the mature understanding of the unity of the proletariat of the world and its solidarity in struggle. Herein lies the guarantee of the success of the revolutionary movement in India." The Tashkent meeting

which Abdur Rab addressed was attended by such architects of Soviet power in Central Asia as Frunze and Kuibyshev.

Abdur Rab met Lenin at Moscow. Lenin requested him to furnish a list of authoritative books on the Indian national movement. The list supplied by Abdur Rab was very comprehensive and it shows that though in exile he constantly kept in touch with important writings on the subject. It contained the titles of the works of Tagore, Lajpat Rai, Aurobindo, Gandhi, Tilak and Pal among many others. Lenin tried to get these works from London through the delegation which had gone there to negotiate a trade pact with Britain. From Abdur Rab's own words as reported in the Soviet press, we get the impression of an intelligent, educated man of mature political understanding. In his political views Abdur Rab was very close to the Communist position. Why he never joined the émigré Communist Party of India formed in the Soviet Union is not clear.

Barkatullah was a resident of Bhopal State. He was teaching Hindustani at Tokyo University. Expelled by the Japanese, he went to America. He acquired a German passport in East Africa and became Foreign Minister in Raja Mahendra Pratap's "Provisional Government". He called himself Professor Barkatullah and seems to have played an important role in rallying the Muslims of Soviet Asia in support of the Soviets during the crucial period of civil war and foreign intervention. He wrote an appeal in Persian to his "Muslim Brethren" to rise against Western imperialism in defence of the newly established Soviet power. In this appeal Barkatullah described the British as the enslavers and oppressors of the entire Muslim community throughout the world. This appeal was translated into several languages of Soviet Asia and widely distributed among the Muslims of this region.

Barkatullah's thinking was dominated by Islam. Even from distant Moscow he continued to pull strings and try to influence the course of politics of Turkestan. He aligned himself with the Muslim "bourgeois-nationalists" who had found their way into the Communist Party of Turkestan. He wrote a letter to Lenin requesting him to procure a better deal for the Muslims in Soviet Asia (this letter is contained in the Soviet archives in Moscow) and backed his request with a series of reports containing exaggerated accusations of discrimination by the local Bolsheviks against the Central Asian Muslims. It may be recalled that Turkestan was for a time cut off from the Centre on account of Dutov's blockade of

Orenburg and the central leadership had no first-hand information about the state of affairs there. Tobolin, a Turkestan Bolshevik leader, sent a message from Moscow to his colleagues at Tashkent concerning false propaganda against the Turkestan Bolsheviks. There are reasons to believe that Barkatullah was also behind the famous radio message to Muslims on proportional representation in party and government posts. This message was sent to Tashkent as a directive from the Centre and set off an acute internal struggle in the Communist Party of Turkestan. Barkatullah died in 1927 (perhaps in Turkey).

Mohammed Shafiq was an educated young man from the North West Frontier Province. He became the Secretary of the Indian Communist group in Tashkent which included M. N. Roy,¹ Abani Mukerji, Mohammed Ali (alias Ahmed Hasan) and M. P. B. Acharya. He, it seems, also edited the weekly paper *Zemindar* issued in Tashkent by the Association of Indian Revolutionaries in the Urdu and Persian languages. There his name appears as Mohammed Shafiq "Hindustani".

Abani Mukerji, M. N. Roy and M. P. B. Acharya came to Tashkent from Moscow, but Mohammed Shafiq and Barkatullah went there from Kabul. There were also some Hindu revolutionaries in the group which reached Tashkent from Kabul. A reference to an Indian revolutionary named Patel is found in the *Izvestia Turk Tsika* of July 22, 1920. He is reported to have addressed a women's conference in Tashkent, exhorting Uzbek women to cast off the veil. In the Soviet press at that time we also read a report of a meeting of Indian settlers in Bukhara at which it was decided to establish a branch of the Indian Revolutionaries' Association. Some Bengalis were also reported to be present at this meeting. Branches of the Association were likewise established in Samarkand and Baku. The Baku branch is mentioned in an obscure fortnightly paper of Indian revolutionaries called *Azad Hindustan Akhbar* which was published in Baku.

Indian revolutionaries addressed several congresses and conferences of the Communist Party of Turkestan. On June 9, 1919 Zakaria² addressed the Third Congress of the Com-

¹ Manabendranath Roy (Narendranath Bhattacharya, 1889-1954), a prominent figure in the communist movement in India, was a Comintern member and sat on its Executive until 1929. He supported Trotsky in his opposition to Lenin's New Economic Policy. Roy opposed also Lenin's ideas on the national liberation and the communist movements.—Ed.

² Zakaria is still alive and presently living in Paris.

munist Party of Turkestan held in Tashkent. His address was greeted with slogans of "Long Live India". In February 1921 four Indian revolutionaries (Mohammed Ibrahim Hindi, Abdullāh, Abdul Aziz and Ghulam Haider) sent a letter of greetings to the first congress of Bukhara Communists on behalf of the progressive section of the Indian settlers in Turkestan. They wrote: "Far away, from our Motherland, in the young Bukhara Republic, we have dedicated our life to the struggle for the victory of the Revolution and we shall be fighting against the oppressors, imperialists and capitalists along with the revolutionaries of Bukhara." It is learnt from the issue of *Azad Hindustan Akhbar* of October 1, 1920 that seven delegates from India participated in the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East. Some of them, the paper writes, were Punjabis from the Frontier Province. The issue of September 15 carries sketches of three Indians—Mohammed Fariq *Khajanchi* (Treasurer), Fazil Al Qadir (Secretary) of the Indian Revolutionaries' Association, Baku, and Ghulam Fariq. From the sketches it appears they came from among the deserters of the British Indian army. They have typical faces of Indian frontier soldiers with high turbans and long pointed soldierly moustaches. The August 22 issue of *Azad Hindustan Akhbar* issued a direct call to the men of the British Indian army for an armed revolt against their colonial masters. It offers the jawans "two times better jobs" in the Red Army.

The Indian revolutionaries conducted a school for political training of Indian émigrés at Tashkent. M. N. Roy, Abani Mukerji and M. P. B. Acharya executed their responsibilities from "India House", a building situated in a new section of Tashkent on Lermontov Street. A group of more than 50 Indians consisting mostly of the Muhajirins (Muslim Khilafat émigrés) arrived in Tashkent towards the end of 1920. The Indian revolutionaries were impatient to wage an armed struggle against the British for the liberation of their country and requested the Soviet authorities for arms and military training. The Soviet power extended them all possible support without, however, being involved in their plan.

But it was not long before the whole plan of the Indian revolutionaries to organise the Indian Liberation Army at Tashkent had to be abandoned as the Afghan government refused them permission to cross Afghanistan on the way to India. Roy's approach to the Afghan Consulate in Tashkent led to no results. In the spring of 1921 military training was stopped and 22 Indians left Tashkent for Moscow to study at

the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Some of these Tashkent Indians were arrested by the British on their arrival in India. They were tried in the Peshawar Conspiracy Cases and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.¹

British Intrigues in Sinkiang

Britain's attempts to bring Kashgar into the orbit of its political influence may be traced back to the early years of the 19th century. William Moorcroft, the Superintendent of the East India Company's Stud, visited Leh in 1821 where he concluded an agreement for the passage of Chinese and Uzbek Turk merchants through Ladakh. He also sought permission from the Chinese authorities to enter Kashgar, which was refused. Moorcroft raised the bogey of Russian invasion through Kashgar at a time when Russia had not even annexed the Kazakh steppe. He believed the rumours spread about Agha Mehdi, an agent of the Russian government, journeying to visit the ruler of Ladakh and Ranjit Singh. In Ladakh he participated in intrigues against Ranjit Singh.²

After Moorcroft, a number of other European "explorers" like the Gerard brother, Henderson, Falconer and Vigne were busy in Ladakh, Kashmir and Baltistan.³ It was with British assent that Gulab Singh, a feudatory of Ranjit Singh, conquered Ladakh in 1834. After the defeat of the Sikhs, the British made Gulab Singh the Maharaja of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh in 1846. He was required to obtain British permission before making frontier alterations and to submit all disputes with neighbours to the British for arbitration. In 1849, with the disappearance of the remnants of the Sikh state, British Indian territory became coterminous with that of Gulab Singh and indirectly with Sinkiang itself.

The British interest in Sinkiang now began to increase. In

¹ For a detailed account of the activities of the Indian revolutionaries in Tashkent see my article "Indian Revolutionaries in Soviet Asia", *Link*, January 26, 1966; also I. Andronov's article "Awakening East", *New Times* Nos. 9, 10 and 14, 1967.

² See G. J. Alder, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³ For an account of these explorations see S. A. Hedin, *Southern Tibet*, Chapter VII, "History of Exploration in the Kara-Koran Mountains", Stockholm, 1922. Ishwari Prasad calls these "explorers" "the pioneers of imperialism" (*History of Modern India*, 1951, p. 167).

June 1861 a printed questionnaire seeking information on the state of trade with Sinkiang was sent to Punjab officials by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. On the basis of this questionnaire the Secretary to the Punjab government, R. H. Davies, submitted a comprehensive report. Davies came to the conclusion that Indian trade had a fair chance of competing with Russian trade in the markets of Central Asia.¹

To the enthusiastic Punjab officials the physical difficulties of the caravan routes between India and Sinkiang were not as great a factor in restricting trade as the raids by Hunza tribesmen, political instability and the indifference of Chinese authorities. They also put part of the blame upon the restrictive commercial policy of Kashmir officials. Sir Robert Montgomery, the Lt. Governor of the Punjab, took keen interest in the development of trans-Himalayan trade. In 1864 the Maharaja of Kashmir was persuaded to accept a reduction in import and transit duties.

The political situation in Sinkiang changed completely with the advent to power in 1866 of Yaqub Beg, from Kokand. Yaqub Beg reciprocated the enthusiasm of the Punjab officials for forging commercial relations by sending a mission to Kashmir in the first year of his rule.² He promised to prevent the Kirghiz and Hunza bandits from plundering the tea caravans and to provide for the security of Leh trade routes. The expulsion of the Chinese from Sinkiang offered Indian tea a golden opportunity. The new tea plantations of Kangra on the Kulu route were particularly well-placed to profit from this.

Dr. Cayley, the British Commissioner at Leh, made serious efforts to improve the routes to Kashgar and encourage the merchants from Yarkand to trade with India. He is credited with discovering the Chang-chenmo route which Shaw and Hayward followed later on. Dr. Cayley proposed that an envoy be despatched to Kashgar to conclude an alliance with Yaqub Beg. The Lt. Governor of the Punjab supported his proposal.³ Dr. Cayley gathered the impression that the Emir desired to be friendly with the British from information reaching him at Leh through traders. This was further confirmed by the report of R. B. Shaw who visited Yarkand in 1868 in a private capacity. Friendly relations with Yaqub Beg's kingdom were officially initiated when the Lt. Gover-

¹ National Archives, F.D.S.P., Aug. 1874, Nos. 205-07.

² *Letters from India and Madras*, Vol. I, p. 845.

³ National Archives, F.D.S.P., Aug. 1874, Nos. 205-07.

nor of the Punjab received his envoy Mahomed Nazar in the early summer of 1868. Shaw mentioned to this envoy his desire to visit Kashgar and the envoy welcomed the idea. In December 1868 Shaw proceeded to Kashgar where he was received with marked cordiality. Lt. Hayward, who followed him, was also allowed to enter the country. Shaw spoke to the Emir of the "friendship of England towards the Sultan of Turkey, the Chief of the Mussulman religion".¹ He wrote a "Memorandum" on routes to Yarkand in which he suggested negotiations with Kashmir for a free trade route to regions of Central Asia. He favoured the Chang-chenmo route over the rival Karakorum route from the point of view of its negotiability with fewer passes and rivers to cross, and also of easy availability of grass, fuel, provisions, etc. For Ladakh he preferred the Kangra, Kulu Lahoul route as against the Kashmir route.² A controversy over rival trade routes continued through the next decade when in 1874 Capt. E. Molloy, British Joint Commissioner at Leh, showed his preference for the Kashmir route over the Kulu route, "because the former was 35 miles shorter and practicable for at least 9 months in the year; while the Kulu route was closed for 6 months." Molloy recommended the use of camels as against horses as the Russians were doing likewise and cutting transportation costs. He also complained that British goods were not made to suit the taste of the Turkish, while the Russian goods were more acceptable with their "gaudy patterns and fast colours, adapted to hard wear and tear".³ Molloy favoured the Kugiyar route to Kashgar while Forsyth, the Commissioner of the Jullundur division, that of Chang-chenmo. Shaw gave a rosy picture of trade between India and Sinkiang. To promote it the Yarkand Trading Company was founded.

This wave of enthusiasm for trade with Sinkiang was the result of a series of "explorations" which began in 1855. During six years the surveyors of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India had extended their work into Ladakh and Kashmir. New maps of this area were completed in 1868. Too much has been made of the cautious policy of "non-interference" in Kashgar pursued by Lawrence. In this connection

¹ *Ibid.*, Pol. A., July 1870, Nos. 73-76; D. C. Boulger, *The Life of Yakoob Beg*, London, 1878, pp. 214-15.

² National Archives. Memorandum by Shaw. Foreign Department, Sec., July 1876, No. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, Pol. A., May 1874, Nos. 37-39, E. Molloy to the Secretary, Punjab Government.

it is noteworthy that British knowledge of lands north of the Karakorum was still vague. The only European known to have crossed the Karakorum was Alexander Gardner who entered Ladakh from across this mountain. The three Schlagentweit brothers explored this region on behalf of the Company between 1854 and 1858. The murder of Adolph Schlagentweit at Yarkand put an effective damper on European enthusiasm for penetration into this region. But the work was not entirely given up and was entrusted to native agents. The use of native agents was nothing new. Moorcroft had sent his servant Mir Izzut Oollah to Kashgar in 1812.¹ In 1852 Ahmed Shah Nakshabandi, and in 1858 Mahomed Amin had been sent there. Captain Montgomerie, while engaged on a Kashmir survey, had used trained natives to obtain information about this region. Alder writes:

"From 1863, a series of remarkable men, using false or abbreviated names, in disguise, and employing such ingenious devices as hollow prayer wheels and decimated rosaries to help with the counting of paces, penetrated all over the northern frontier."²

The mass of information which they brought back was given to the government. Lawrence's opposition to British "exploration" of these dangerous areas had a political motive. "If they lose their lives we cannot avenge their deaths, and so lose credit." He, therefore, decreed that in the future no British official was to cross the frontier without prior permission from the Foreign Department. Before this prohibition came into force, W. H. Johnson had, however, reconnoitred an area of 21 thousand square miles beyond the frontier. While a ban on government officials visiting Sinkiang became operative, nothing prevented private individuals like Shaw and Hayward from going to Kashgar. Thus we notice that the period of Lawrence's rule was one of active preparations for later intrusions.

Lord Mayo, the successor to Lord Lawrence, was the first to renew British penetration into Kashgar. Before him even Lawrence was veering to the same policy. In the autumn of 1868 Lawrence had approved the proposal of Punjab authorities to appoint a native agent at Kashgar.³

¹ *Calcutta Quarterly Oriental Magazine and Register*, III and IV (1825).

² G. J. Alder, *op. cit.*, p. 31. For an account of native "explorers" see K. Mason, *Abode of Snow*, London, 1955.

³ *Parliamentary Papers XLVIII*, 384, pp. 49 and 55, 1868-69.

Forsyth had been making efforts to draw attention to the strategic importance of the relations with Kashgar. His note of October 7, 1868 to the Governor-General was a detailed study of this so-called "strategic" aspect. He wrote:

"But I would endeavour to show that, whilst we are so eagerly watching the front, it is just as well to see whether our rear is so perfectly secure from all approach as we suppose."

He quoted from Vambery a Turkish proverb that "one nail can save a horse-shoe, the horse-shoe a horse, one horse a man, one man a government", and concluded that "the much-wanted nail is easily to be found beyond the range of the Kuen-Luen mountains".¹

Forsyth, Shaw and Hayward raised the scare of a Russian invasion from Kashgar. Forsyth had to change his view when he found it difficult to maintain even a few hundred horsemen over high desert plains. But Shaw and Hayward continued to indulge in "scare-mongering".

Lord Mayo regarded Kashgar as a part of the legitimate British sphere of influence. He wanted to achieve his objective through the creation of a "buffer" state under the political hegemony of Britain. He used the development of commerce as an instrument for his own political ends. Mayo took a firm attitude towards Kashmir. Capt. Grey, a special envoy, was sent there to negotiate an agreement with the Maharaja. Forsyth later concluded (in 1870) a treaty along the lines laid down by Grey. The treaty provided for the surveying of all routes after which one of them was to be specified as "a free highway in perpetuity" for all travellers and traders. There were to be two joint commissioners, one from each side, to supervise that route and settle disputes. The Maharaja agreed to levy no transit duties on goods passing through Kashmir. Dr. Cayley was appointed the first British joint commissioner at Leh.

As a result of Shaw's first unofficial visit to Kashgar, Yaqub Beg despatched his envoy Mirza Shadi to India in the winter of 1869-70. Forsyth and party went to Kashgar with this envoy.² Mayo did not include any soldiers in the party and disavowed any political objectives. But Forsyth was instructed to collect information concerning political and economic con-

ditions in the neighbouring country. He was also urged to advise the Emir to refrain from aggressive acts on his northern borders. The British knew that this would lead to the destruction of Kashgar by the Russians, and with it of their hope of subjecting it to their rule one day. Forsyth's first mission was a failure and he returned without seeing the Ataliq, as Yaqub Beg was called. Two hundred animals that were part of his party perished on the way.¹

The Forsyth mission of 1870 caused alarm among the Russians who occupied the Muz-Art Pass. Anticipating the conquest of Ili valley by Yaqub Beg, Russia annexed it in 1871 to prevent it from being reduced to a vassal state of the British.

In the winter of 1871-72 another Kashgar envoy, Ahrar Khan Tiura came to India with letters not only for the Viceroy but also for the Queen. In 1872 Kaulbars, a Russian diplomat, visited Kashgar and negotiated a highly favourable commercial treaty. In 1873 Syed Yaqub Khan visited India on his way to Constantinople. In the meantime Lord Mayo had been assassinated and his place was taken by Lord Northbrook who arranged for a British mission to accompany Syed Yaqub Khan on his return from Turkey. At Constantinople the Kashgar envoy placed the new kingdom of Kashgaria under the suzerainty of the Porte. The British made clever use of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism against their Russian rivals. They encouraged Emir Yaqub Beg to forge intimate links with the Sultan of Turkey. Later on, during the period of Lord Lytton, when a clash between Britain and Russia appeared to be imminent in the Near East, British diplomacy showed its readiness to exploit this "Muslim League" against Russia in Central Asia. But in 1875 when the Kashgar envoy in his interview with Forsyth and the Foreign Secretary broached the question of an alliance with Afghanistan, he was cautioned against such a course on the ground that it was likely to offend Russia.² In doing so, the British were in fact apprehensive of the implications of an international front of Islam, for their own empire included a very large number of Muslim subjects.

A mission led by Forsyth was sent to Kashgar in 1873 with instructions to negotiate a commercial treaty analogous to the Russian treaty of 1872. As usual the overt object of the

¹ National Archives. Foreign Department, Nov. 1868, Pol. A., Nos. 1-3.

² *Ibid.*, Sec., July 1876, No. 30.

¹ National Archives. Foreign Department, July 1876, No. 30.

² *Ibid.*, Sec., May 1875, No. 119.

second Forsyth mission was commerce, in reality, however, its aim was broader. Yaqub Beg's Kingdom was to be incorporated in the orbit of British policy and converted into a base for British aggression against China and Russia. The British knew about the chaotic conditions of Kokand and they were eager to exploit the Kokand origin of Yaqub Beg to extend their control of that region, using him as a puppet. The composition of the mission had no relevance to its declared object of promoting commercial relations. It consisted of intelligence officials and undercover agents of the topographical department. The mission had among its members Capt. Biddulph, Capt. Chapman, Capt. Trotter and Lt.-Col. Gordon from the army, Dr. Stoliczka, a scientist, and Dr. Bellew, a medical doctor, besides many native officials and attendants—in all 300 men and 400 animals. It looked like a small army. The members of the British mission were honourably received by the Emir of Kashgar and hospitably entertained for more than three months. On February 2, 1874 a treaty as favourable as that of 1872 with Russia was concluded with the Emir. It gave extra-territorial rights to British subjects and recognised the British right to appoint a permanent representative to reside at the Emir's court. Much valuable information regarding the conditions, resources, history, geography and trade of Sinkiang and neighbouring countries was collected by this mission. The Tien-Shan plateau was visited by Lt.-Col. Gordon; Capt. Trotter and Dr. Stoliczka surveyed the route to the Takle Rebat Pass and the Ghadur-Kul Lake in Russian territory. Kaufman wrote to the Russian War Minister Milyutin concerning the real aims of the Forsyth mission. There is evidence to suggest that the Russian annexation of Kokand in 1876 was caused by their fear of Kashgar-based British intrigues. The Russian annexation of Kokand placed Kashgar militarily at the mercy of Russia.

The information brought back by Forsyth's party cast doubts on the commercial significance of Sinkiang. The mission pointed out the danger of a Russian advance across the Pamirs and through easier passes into Hunza, Yasin and Chitral. Gordon's report on the Pamirs presented Kashgar in a new strategic light as "a rich supply base on the flank of a more westerly advance".

Forsyth was instructed "to ascertain the political boundaries of the Kingdom of Kashgar" with India, which he found "no easy matter", because the Emir himself was not aware of their limits. Forsyth in his report judged them as follows:

"Commencing from the south-east corner there is no question that the Kuen-Luen range is and always has been in Yarkand territory; and as the jade quarries in the lower Karakash valley have been worked by the Chinese for the last 150 years, we may assume that the valley forms a boundary. . . . So far as I could ascertain, from the Yarkandis themselves, no claim is asserted to any tract of country south of the Karakash river; and on the Yarkand river they do not come higher up the Kufelong; but for convenience sake I would put the boundary at Ak Tagh; and in laying our supplies I practically made that point the limit. The line then would run from the eastern corner of the Kuen-Luen Long. 81 down to Karakash river Long. 78.5 (approx.), Lat. 35.59; thence down the Yarkand river to Kunjut. Kunjut is beyond Yarkand territory."¹

In 1876 Lord Lytton replaced Lord Northbrook as Viceroy. Northbrook's reign was "a high water-mark of British influence in Kashgar" as evidenced by the 1874 treaty. But Lytton was not content with it. In September 1876 he outlined his new policy for Kashgar. When Syed Yaqub Khan arrived in India for the second time, Lytton was negotiating with Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir at Madhopore an agreement by which the latter was to extend his territory into Yasin and agree to the appointment of a British agent at Gilgit. Lytton went ahead with his plans to extend British control to the three passes considered to be "easy" by members of the Forsyth mission, in spite of the fact that Capt. Biddulph had changed his earlier opinion of easy approach to these passes. When Lytton received the information that one of the allegedly easy passes was closed by a glacier, he confessed "disappointment". "A strange reaction," remarks Alder, "... if the extension of Kashmir and therefore of British influence up to the passes which he was proposing had been defensive only."² Early in 1877 Lytton privately proposed that Russia should be asked "not to interfere, or compete with us in Baluchistan and Kashgar as well as Afghanistan".

The decision in favour of sending a British representative was not formally sanctioned until April 1877. The choice naturally fell on Shaw, who was preparing to leave for India in July. The reluctance to give sanction to such a decision

¹ National Archives. Confidential Report, Yarkand Mission, Aug. 1875, Sec., No. 68.

² G. J. Alder, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

was, in some measure, a result of Shaw's failure to obtain ratification of the 1874 Treaty. Yaqub Beg tried to evade action on Article 6 of the Treaty of 1874 regarding permanent representation until the Sultan of Turkey's sanction had been obtained. He was not willing to offend Russia and feared a similar demand from that side. When Shaw was instructed to return in July 1875, he carried with him a communication bearing the Emir's seal. The document which Shaw mistook for the instrument of ratification turned out to be a mere complimentary letter to the Viceroy.

The British were rather confident of the continuation of Yaqub Beg's rule in Kashgar. They believed that the Chinese were not in a position to reconquer Sinkiang. It was not until 1876 that the British Minister at Peking was convinced that the Chinese were really serious about bringing Sinkiang under their control. Lord Augustus Loftus, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, favoured a joint Anglo-Russian effort for mediation. But Thomas Wade at Peking opposed the idea. He took the initiative single-handed. The British, despite their loans to the Manchus, were still interested in preserving the power of Yaqub Beg who was extremely friendly to them. Hence they tried to mediate between him and the Manchus.

In 1876 Forsyth visited Peking and participated in the mediation between Kashgar and China. Thomas Wade at Peking was already taking up the matter with the Chinese. Through his efforts a meeting was arranged between Li-Hung Chang and Forsyth and Mayers. Li-Hung Chang insisted on Yaqub Beg's unconditional surrender and his acceptance of Chinese vassalage. On being asked how an envoy sent from Kashgar would be received at Peking, Li-Hung Chang replied that the entire management of Kashgar affairs has been delegated to General Tso-Tsung t'ang just as all Indian affairs were delegated to the Viceroy, and Yaqub Beg should approach General Tso.¹

However, hopes of a successful reconciliation between Yaqub Beg and the Chinese again rose high as the British chargé d'affaires at Peking reported differences of opinion in debates in the Grand Council regarding military operations against Kashgaria.² Throughout 1877 the British chargé d'affaires at Peking continued to write about Chinese reverses against Kashgar. The Memorandum of Sir Brooke Robertson's

conversation with the Viceroy of Canton indicated that the demand of vassalage from Yaqub Beg made by Li-Hung Chang in his talks with Forsyth had now been modified. The new proposal was that Kashgar's relation with China should be the same as of Nepal and Burma.¹ On hearing this Viceroy Lord Lytton wrote to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, on July 16, 1877:

"If the views expressed to Sir B. Robertson by the Canton Governor in regard to Kashgaria are in any way a reflection of those held by the Chinese Government we are of the opinion that they are very favourable to British interests in the East, and we trust that the presence of the Yarkand envoy in England may afford an opportunity to Her Majesty's Government for encouraging the alliance with Yarkand apparently contemplated by the Chinese Government."²

Lord Salisbury had an interview with Syed Yaqub Khan who was then in London. The scene of activity now shifted from Peking to London and efforts were made by Lord Derby, Lord Salisbury and Thomas Wade to secure the good offices of the Chinese ambassador. They succeeded in this task and a meeting was arranged between the Chinese ambassador and the Emir's special envoy in July 1877 at Thomas Wade's residence. But news of the death of Yaqub Beg, Emir of Kashgar, arrived the same day, and nothing developed from these efforts for peace between Kashgar and China.³ The Chinese occupied Kashgar in December 1877.

The confusion prevailing in Kashgar after the death of Yaqub Beg compelled the Indian government to postpone Shaw's trip. In the meantime, the new ruler Beg Kuli Beg expressed a wish for a British representative. Ney Elias, the British Joint-Commissioner at Leh, suggested that a British representative be sent to Kashgar to enable the new ruler backed by British moral support to negotiate an "honourable peace" with the Chinese.

Lord Lytton urged acceptance of this suggestion. He permitted Elias to leave for Kashgar pending London's approval to send a permanent representative. Elias started for Kashgar, but he never reached there as Beg Kuli Beg fled the kingdom.

The balance of power still remained in Britain's favour for some time after the return of the Chinese. There had arisen

¹ National Archives. Foreign Department, Sec., Jan. 1877, No. 120.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 1877, No. 193.

¹ National Archives. Foreign Department, Oct. 1877, Nos. 195, 197.

² *Ibid.*, No. 197.

³ *Ibid.*, Nos. 219-225.

the issue of restoration of the Ili Valley which the Russians had occupied in 1871 on the understanding that it would be restored after the return of normalcy in this area. The treaty signed at Livadia after 8 months' hard bargaining was repudiated by the Chinese foreign office, and Sino-Russian relations, already strained, assumed critical proportions. A war which appeared to be imminent was, however, averted and the crisis ended with the Treaty of St. Petersburg in February 1881.

The period of 1878-81 during which Sino-Russian relations had remained strained was exploited by the British to increase their influence in Sinkiang. Their trade with Sinkiang steadily revived during 1879-80 and by 1881 it had almost reached the previous high of 1876.¹ The Chinese prohibition on Indian tea remained largely ineffective. In 1881 Andrew Dalgeish, a British trader, made a handsome profit. Sino-Russian trade was, on the contrary, adversely affected by the tension that existed in the relations between the two powers. Elias, who was sent back to Yarkand in 1880, met the Governor of Yarkand and insisted on "a system whereby intelligence of Russian activity could be exchanged between the British and the Chinese".² The Chinese foreign office at Peking refused the British request for a consulate in Kashgar and a convention to regulate trade. It, however, allowed British agents to travel in Sinkiang. Taking advantage of these travel facilities, Dalgeish started on his extensive journey through Sinkiang. However, he encountered many obstructions from local Chinese officials. With the Treaty of St. Petersburg, Indian trade which had been flourishing for some time, after 1881 received a major setback. Russia as a result of this treaty secured many commercial advantages which the British did not enjoy, and thus emerged in a favourable position. The Chinese could not forget that the British in India had treated one of their provinces as a sovereign kingdom and entered into full-fledged diplomatic relations with it.

Before long Indian trade with Sinkiang began to feel the adverse effects of favourable concessions enjoyed by the Russians in their trade with that region. From 1883 Russian merchandise began to penetrate even into Chitral and Leh.³ With the increase in trade, Russia's political influence also

¹ G. J. Alder, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

increased. According to Alder, Lord Ripon allowed Russia to increase its influence over Kashgar "unchallenged". Wade in Peking raised the question of a permanent British representative at Kashgar and the Chinese at long last agreed. But Ripon decided not to send any. It is difficult to agree with Alder's characterisation of Ripon's frontier policy as "one of complete disengagement, backed by military safeguards at home and diplomatic insurance at St. Petersburg".¹ Ripon's aversion to "entanglement" in Kashgar was not due to any conscientious scruples against an aggressive policy. In fact, British imperialists were then preparing for a new phase of aggression in Central Asia in a different direction. Their agents in Herat and Persian Khorasan were actively carrying on subversion in Turkmenia.² The MacGregor plan of "defence" of India, prepared in 1884, provided for the despatch of emissaries to create disturbances in the khanates of Central Asia and among the Turkmens. It is interesting to note that this plan called for "immediate reconciliation with China".³ To absolve Ripon of any aggressive frontier policy is to slur over facts. The settlement effected by him in Afghanistan was a "conservative settlement" inasmuch as it was in "close approximation" to the Gandamak treaty.⁴ It was also in Ripon's period that the Afghan government under pressure from the British annexed Roshan and Shugnan in 1883 in violation of the 1873 agreement between Britain and Russia concerning the northern borders of Afghanistan.

Lord Dufferin (1884-88) resolved to achieve a trade convention and consulate in Sinkiang. He decided to send a mission to Kashgar. The Chinese foreign office refused to send their representative to negotiate with Elias on the ground that British Indian trade was too small to justify a special trade convention. Elias received unfriendly treatment at the hands of the Chinese and he blamed O'Connor, the British chargé d'affaires at Peking, for his failure. A draft trade convention was sent to O'Connor from India. However, no

¹ G. J. Alder, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

² For a detailed account of the aggressive British activities in South Turkmenia, see N. A. Khalfin's *Prisoyedineniye Srednei Azii k Rossii (60-90ye gody XIX v.)*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 329-70.

³ MacGregor, *Oborona Indii*, Part I, Issue 43, p. 207; Khalfin, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

⁴ D. K. Ghosh, *England and Afghanistan: a Phase in Their Relations*, Calcutta, 1960. Bisheshwar Prasad's opinion is similar to Alder's. "Lord Ripon," he holds, "followed the pattern of Lord Lawrence's policy." See B. Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

progress was made towards its acceptance by the Chinese authorities in Peking and relations with China were plagued by other complications such as Tibet trade, the Burma dispute, Sikkim negotiations, etc. O'Connor demanded consular rights for the British in Sinkiang towns on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause of the Treaty of Tientsin. But the Chinese, who already had a bitter experience with the Russian consul at Kashgar (Petrovsky, the Russian consul, had acquired greater political influence than the Chinese were willing to grant), were reluctant to have another. The British demand for a consular representative changed into a demand for political agency owing to the British Indian trade having dwindled to insignificant volume. The British India government continued to prod Walsham at Peking to press the matter with the Chinese foreign office, but nothing came out of it in the face of Chinese intransigence.

In 1891, the British India government decided to retain Macartney in Sinkiang indefinitely even without any official recognition by the Chinese. He served them well both as their "contact" man with the Chinese and also as an intelligence agent watching the Russians. The British occupation of Hunza in 1891 embittered the Chinese who claimed some obscure suzerain rights over it on the basis of tributes often paid by its rulers.

In the period 1893-95 London was anxious to retain Chinese friendship in order to carry out its aggressive designs on the Pamirs. Under the usual pretext of a Russian "menace" to India the British had been pursuing a policy of active intrusion into this region. Therefore they were now reluctant to press for the Kashgar consulate. In the interests of broader imperialist policy, the British practised some appeasement of China in 1893. This was done for the purpose of consolidating their position on the China sea coast as well as in some areas of the mainland which they had reduced to a state of semi-colonial dependence by their unequal treaties with the Manchu rulers of China. In January 1893 the Government of India reported to the Home Government that the Chinese authorities had erected boundary marks on the Karakorum pass.¹ O'Connor in Peking opposed any objection to the Chinese attitude in this matter. The Home Government

¹ National Archives. Foreign Department, K. W. Sec. F, April 1888, Nos. 282-283.

agreed with him. Lord Kimberley, the Foreign Secretary, suggested:

"The Chinese Government at Peking should be informed of the purport of the reports which have been received by Her Majesty's Government and it should be intimated to them that the Indian authorities acting on behalf of the Kashmir state would gladly co-operate with the Chinese authorities in Kashgaria in determining the frontier on the road from Leh to Kashgar. Her Majesty's Government would, however, demur to any attempt being made by the Kashgarian officials to fix the boundary of the Ladakh state on this road without their previous concurrence being obtained."¹

O'Connor discovered "soreness" in official quarters at Peking over the "aggressive policy of Russia in the Pamirs", and he advised against any opposition to the erection of marks by the Chinese on the Karakorum.

Although the present Peking rulers never tire of accusing India of an attempt to inherit the frontiers unilaterally established by British imperialists, facts, however, prove that the British did not always take an attitude consistent with Indian interests. The British bungling over Aksai Chin is an example. Macartney, the British representative at Kashgar, presented some books and mathematical instruments to the Chinese provincial Governor in December 1895. The Governor asked the Tao-Tai of Kashgar to thankfully acknowledge the same on his behalf. The books contained an atlas of the world which showed Aksai Chin as a part of Ladakh. The Chinese, probably under instigation from the Russian Consul Petrovsky, drew Macartney's attention to it and lodged a protest. Instead of rejecting this absurd protest, Macartney preferred to give an equivocal reply to the Tao-Tai which was completely in tune with the policy of appeasement of the Chinese then followed by the British. Macartney replied:

"Aksai Chin was apparently a general name for an ill-defined and very elevated table land at the north-east of Ladakh and it was as likely as not that the region known by that name was partly in Chinese and partly in British territory."²

Macartney's position in Kashgar continued to be unsatisfactory in contrast to Petrovsky's officially recognised posi-

¹ National Archives. Foreign Department, Enclosures to 1894, Aug., Sec. F, Nos. 26-33.

² National Archives. Kashgar Diaries 1896.

tion. In 1898 he was made "Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs"—a long meaningless title. Eleven years later he was unilaterally promoted to the status of a consul, though the Chinese never officially recognised him in that capacity. The rivalry between the British and Russian representatives at Kashgar continued up to 1907 when the Anglo-Russian Convention put an end to it. The Chinese were thereafter quick to recognise Macartney as consul.¹ Indian trade remained handicapped after 1881, though it was able to maintain itself at a steady level between 20 and 30 lakhs of rupees right up to the Second World War. It experienced a sharp rise for some time after the 1917 October Revolution, when Russian competition was eliminated. The reasons for Russian ascendancy in trade lay mainly in "geopolitical" factors favouring them. Their possession of Kokand and Kulja gave them access to routes "much easier and shorter" than those on the Indian side. Moreover, railways afforded them the advantage of better transport facilities.

The idea of archaeological work in Sinkiang was first suggested by Macartney to Sir Aurel Stein in 1897, who was given a grant of Rs. 9,000 and a leave from his job in the Punjab to take up exploration in Sinkiang. His discoveries made history. Many other westerners followed him and there began an international race for antiquities from Chinese Turkestan. The Germans set out on four expeditions between 1902 and 1914. The Russians, Japanese and French also sent expeditions. By 1914 this rich mine of ancient art was stripped of its treasures.

While this international looting of art relics was continuing, Sinkiang lay helpless, dominated by an old-fashioned Chinese bureaucracy. Prior to the October Revolution of 1917, the Russians were very strongly entrenched at Kashgar. Their Consul-General was generally a high-ranking diplomat with an escort of hundreds of Cossacks. During the 28-year-stay of George Macartney at Kashgar, British influence also increased tremendously. Between 100 and 150 Hindu traders, most of them representing firms in Amritsar and Hoshiarpur lived in Yarkand. In several other towns Sindhi money-lenders plied their trade. In addition there were British Muslim subjects, too, some of them purely peasant immigrants

¹ Lady C. T. Macartney, *An English Lady in Chinese Turkestan*, London, 1931, pp. 61-62.



The triumph of the popular uprising in Bukham, September 1920. The insurgent people in front of the Emir's fortress

Presentation of a legal document granting land and livestock to a poor peasant, 1925



A meeting called to discuss implementation of land and water reform. The speaker is Y. Akhunbabayev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek SSR, 1926



Collective farmers participating in the construction of the Farkhad Hydroelectric Power Station, 1942

The Farkhad Hydroelectric Power Station dam, 1958



Chilonzar District, Tashkent, the capital of the Uzbek SSR

Abai Prospekt, Alma Ata, capital of the Kazakh SSR

Lenin Square, Dushanbe, capital of the Tajik SSR



Ashkhabad, capital of the Turkmen SSR



Sovetskaya Square, Frunze, capital of the Kirghiz SSR



Equipment being made for the chemical industry,
Chirchik, the Uzbek SSR



Assembly line at a plant in Frunze,
the Kirghiz SSR

from Kashmir and Chitral. All these people looked to the Consular court for protection of their rights. They enjoyed privileges of extra-territoriality in matters relating to law.¹ But the trade between Sinkiang and India as was natural remained strictly limited by the great length and difficulty of the Leh route, and the British efforts of bringing Sinkiang and Central Asia under their political influence in the guise of promoting trade and commerce came to naught.

¹ C. P. Skrine, *Chinese Central Asia*, London, 1926, pp. 61-63.

CHAPTER VI
ESTABLISHMENT
OF SOVIET POWER

The Early Soviet Decrees

The right to national self-determination as one of the basic principles of its foreign policy was proclaimed by the Soviet Union in one of its first decrees—the Decree on Peace. Subsequently, this principle also found expression in a series of other decrees of the Russian Federation and other Soviet republics (the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, the Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East, numerous diplomatic notes, statements, etc.).

The Decree on Peace, written by Lenin, is a unique document of great international significance. It demanded the establishment of a just and democratic peace on the basis of equality of rights for all peoples and nations. It condemned all annexations of foreign lands. The Decree not only formulated the right of nations to self-determination, but contained a detailed definition of annexation. "In accordance with the sense of justice of democrats in general, and of the working people in particular," says the Decree, "the government conceives the annexation or seizure of foreign lands to mean every incorporation of a small or weak nation into a large or powerful state without the precisely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent and wish of that nation, irrespective of the time when such forcible incorporation took place, irrespective also of the degree of development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed to the given state, or forcibly retained within its borders, and irrespective, finally, of whether this nation is in Europe or in distant, overseas countries."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 250.

This part of the Decree elaborated on the essence, content and sphere of action of the principle of self-determination. The Decree declared that this principle accorded not with the sense of justice of the working people but with the "justice of democrats in general". The slogan of self-determination was, in fact, a part of the bourgeois-democratic programme. It also followed from the Decree that the degree of a nation's political, economic and cultural development cannot be used as a pretext to deny it the right to manage its own affairs. The Decree thus dealt a decisive blow to colonialist allegations that they held other nations in bondage because they were incapable of governing themselves.

While the Decree on Peace proclaimed the principle of national self-determination primarily as a principle of international law, it was included in the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People as a principle of national development in the Soviet state. The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia said that the Soviet government, implementing the resolutions of the First and Second Congresses of Soviets on the right of nations to self-determination, decided to make the following principles the basis of its national policy:

1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. Right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination up to secession and establishment of independent states.
3. Annulment of all national and religious privileges and restrictions.
4. Free development of the national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.¹

These principles guaranteed the formerly oppressed nations not only the freedom of secession, but also their free development in the event they did not want to secede. This explains why the absolute majority of nations decided to remain within the boundaries of Soviet Russia. But, while agreeing to be a part of the single multinational state, the nations which had for centuries lived in an atmosphere of mutual animosity and distrust through the fault of the exploiting classes, raised the question of greater guarantees for their rights. Hence, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, always attentive to the peoples' national feelings, suggested the establishment of a federation.

It may be pointed out here that prior to 1917 Lenin and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, pp. 14-15.

the Party adhered to the views of Marx and Engels on the question of federation. Marx and Engels had opposed federation in general and all the more in a socialist republic ("... the proletariat accepts only the form of integral and undivided republic").¹ Lenin and the Communist Party stood for the principle of democratic centralism. He preferred a unitary state, though never excluding local self-rule and regional autonomy where it was called for by the peculiarities of the way of life of a people and its national composition. He set before the Party the task of building a multinational socialist state on new foundations—not forcibly but by voluntary and free consent. His preference for a unitary state did not, however, mean an absolute rejection of federation under any historical situation. He favoured a thorough study of the question taking into full consideration the local peculiarities and in exceptional cases even anticipated the formation of a socialist federation.² What Lenin was opposed to was putting the concept of federation against the right to national self-determination.³ He was an advocate of a unitary form of state as long as it did not obstruct a just solution of the national question.

But by the time of the October Revolution conditions had changed. As a result of the Great Power policy followed by the Provisional Government a number of nationalities seceded from Russia, while those which had agreed to become a part of an integral state demanded firm guarantees for their rights. In these circumstances, the Party reconsidered its old position *vis-à-vis* federation and suggested a state structure on the basis of a federation of a new socialist type. Proceeding from the new conditions obtaining in the country, Lenin outlined a new approach to federation in his work *The State and Revolution* which he wrote in August-September 1917.

The question of establishing federal relations between the Russian Soviet Republic and the other republics which had seceded from the former Russian Empire was first raised in practice in the Manifesto to the Ukrainian people with an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada, written by Lenin on December 3, 1917. It recognised the right of the Ukrainian People's Republic to secede completely from Russia or to

¹ F. Engels. "Criticism of the Draft Social Democratic Programme of 1891", Marx and Engels, *Works*, Vol. XVI, Part II, p. 110.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 454.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, p. 500.

enter into agreement with the Russian Republic on federal or any other similar relations between them.

The idea of setting up a Soviet state on a federative basis was legally secured in the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People.¹ "The Russian Soviet Republic," it said, "is established on the principle of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics." The Declaration further recognised the independence of Finland and Armenia, thus re-affirming the principle of self-determination up to secession and establishment of independent states. But the Declaration did not outline the nature of federal relations, "leaving it to the workers and peasants of each nation to decide independently at their authoritative congress of Soviets if they wish to participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions, and on what terms". This declaration was endorsed by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets and made a component part of the constitution of the RSFSR adopted in 1918. In the new historic situation, it was decided that federation was the best form of state structure for the world's first socialist state.

The Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East (November 20, 1917) was also an important document for the oppressed peoples of the East. The national and cultural institutions of the formerly oppressed peoples were declared to be free and inviolable and they were given the right to develop their life as they chose.

In its first decrees the Soviet government not only proclaimed the principle of right of nations to self-determination, but also showed how this principle should be implemented. A complete liquidation of national colonial oppression, establishment of equality of rights for all peoples of the former Russian Empire and other genuinely revolutionary practical measures of the Soviet state pointed out to the oppressed peoples of the world the real path of their true liberation and roused their revolutionary consciousness. As the message of the Indian people delivered to President Sverdlov by an Indian delegation on November 25, 1918 put it: "In spite of all efforts of Britain to check it, the slogan of self-determination of peoples has penetrated India."² Lenin, in

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 423.

² *Izvestia Turk TsIKa*, April 13, 1919.

his reply to the message of greetings sent by Indian revolutionaries from Kabul, noted with great joy the lively response which the proclamation of the principle of self-determination by the republic of workers and peasants found among conscious Indians heroically fighting for their freedom.¹

The Formation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

The formation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the first step towards the founding of national states by the peoples of Central Asia and, as such, it was an event of great political significance in their national development. Obviously, in 1917 creation of national republics for the peoples of Central Asia was out of the question, as they were divided between three state units, viz., Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva. Even in these political units administrative divisions were not nationally homogeneous. Administrative rearrangement was therefore essential in order to pave the way for their national unity. All this needed time. In 1917 it could not be given top priority as the more vital task of defending and securing the Revolution from enemies—internal as well as external took precedence.

In an extraordinary complicated situation of sharp class struggle the Third Territorial Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies met in Tashkent on November 15, 1917. It continued its deliberations up to November 22, 1917.

As there was a large number of Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary deputies in this Congress, an acute struggle ensued between them and the Bolsheviks on the question of power in the territory of Turkestan. The Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries endeavoured to preserve the power of the bourgeoisie and pleaded for a coalition government with representatives of petty-bourgeois parties, organs of self-rule and bourgeois nationalists. Consistently defending the interests of the working people of Turkestan, the Bolsheviks firmly opposed any such coalition and suggested the transfer of all power to the workers, soldiers and peasants. The Bolsheviks strongly objected to the participation of the reactionary representatives of "town self-rule" and bourgeois-nationalists in the organs of power.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 138.

At the time of the Third Congress of Soviets there was also taking place in Tashkent the so-called Congress of Muslims, entirely composed of the representatives of bourgeois nationalists and reactionary clericals. On November 17, this Congress totally rejected the idea of a transfer of all power to the Soviets and proposed the formation of a regional organ of power from among the bourgeoisie—local and Russian. This was conveyed to the Third Territorial Congress of Soviets by Sher Ali Lapin, a leader of the *ulemas*, who addressed the Congress and read the resolution passed by the "Muslim" Congress on the organisation of power. Lapin declared in the name of the Muslim Congress that "local power must be organised from the representatives of Mussulmen" and only those Russians "should be included who stand nearer to the Mussulmen".¹

Lapin proposed the establishment of a Turkestan Executive Committee as a high organ of government with a total of 12 members: 3 from the Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, 3 from town self-rule institutions—the city Duma, etc., and 6 from the Territorial Congress of "Muslims". This Executive Committee was to be responsible to another higher organ called the Council consisting of 20 members: 5 from the Congress of Soviets, 5 from the town self-rule institutions and 10 from the "Muslim" Congress.² Lapin declared that "in any other organisation of power Mussulmen would not take any part". In other words the resolution adopted by the so-called Congress of Muslims was in the nature of an ultimatum to the Soviet power which had established itself through revolution to dissolve and surrender power to the Muslim bourgeois nationalists and the reactionary clergy.

This counter-revolutionary proposal of the reactionary "Muslim" Congress was met with stiff opposition from the representatives of Muslim working masses. Rahimbayev, a Muslim workers' delegate to the Third Congress of Soviets from Khojent, declared that the "Muslim" Congress in whose name Lapin had addressed the Congress of Soviets was the Congress of *ulemas* which had no right to speak for the

¹ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 133, November 23, 1917, also *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti*, November 21, 1917.

² *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti* of November 21, 1917 gives the total strength of the Council as 24: 5 from Congress of Soviets, 5 from town self-rule institutions and 14 from "Muslim" Congress.

Muslim toilers.¹ Rahimbayev declared that Muslim workers would join with Russian workers.

After a long debate lasting several days the Third Congress of Soviets rejected the proposal of the Menshevik and Right SR group for sharing power with the bourgeoisie and bourgeois nationalists. A declaration proposed by the Bolsheviks and the "Maximalists" proclaimed the victory of Soviet power in Turkestan and recognised the existing Central power and its forms of organisation. It categorically rejected the idea of sharing power with "Mussulmen" (meaning thereby bourgeois nationalists and reactionary clergy) and compromising Russian groups which defended the Provisional Government, fought against the Revolution and betrayed revolutionary democracy.²

The Third Territorial Congress of Soviets thus solved the important question of the organisation of power in Turkestan in a revolutionary way. It has often been criticised for having ignored the question of autonomy, and also for taking a negative approach to the participation by Muslims in the higher organs of power. Such a criticism, however, cannot be maintained if a more thorough examination of the proceedings of the Congress is made.

When the Congress met on November 15-22, 1917 only a very small portion of Turkestan territory was under Soviet control. It was confined in addition to Tashkent, to only major towns in the Ferghana and Samarkand regions. The Semirechye and most of the Trans-Caspian region were still in the hands of the organs of the Provisional Government and bourgeois nationalist committees. Under such circumstances the victory of a socialist revolution and a revolutionary organisation of power naturally preceded the question of autonomy on the agenda of the Congress.

The Declaration of the Bolsheviks and "Maximalists" in the Third Congress has been sharply criticised for having excluded the Muslims from the highest organs of revolutionary power. The reference to the exclusion of Muslims and to indecisiveness of their attitude towards Soviet power is certainly somewhat confusing. To say the least, this part of the Declaration is not at all properly worded and is replete with drafting mistakes. But if the Declaration is taken in its

¹ *Nasha Gazeta*, November 23, 1917, also *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti*, November 21, 1917.

² *Nasha Gazeta* No. 133, November 23, 1917.

entirety and read in the context of the bourgeois nationalist demand for surrender of power won by the workers after great sacrifice, it appears that the word "Mussulmen" was used in a class sense. The Declaration excluded from organs of power not only "Mussulmen" but also other representatives of Russian groups which fought against the Revolution. If the Declaration is read in full, the intention of its authors becomes clear. It stressed that the "broad masses were not to be excluded from participation in active public work, and congresses of Soviets with local representatives not excluding Mussulmen" would be convened to deliberate upon questions of economy and state structure.¹ It concluded with the following words:

"In this way neither the local native population, nor the local intelligentsia are denied an opportunity to work actively for improvement in the life of the territory. On the contrary they are most welcome to do this work."²

The Third Congress of Soviets created the Council of People's Commissars consisting of 18 members as the high organ of government in Turkestan. What has not been given due attention even in most Soviet works is that the Congress reserved three places in the Council of People's Commissars for representatives of Muslim workers. The above quoted issue of *Nasha Gazeta* from November 23, 1917 clearly mentions such reservation for representatives of Muslim workers on the Council of People's Commissars.³ We again find its confirmation by Tobolin, leader of the Bolshevik group, in his speech in the Fourth Territorial Congress of Soviets on January 25, 1918.⁴ Tobolin stated that the Council of People's Commissars was to consist of 18 members. Fifteen members, he said, were elected by the Third Congress of Soviets and 3 places were left vacant to be filled by representatives of Muslim workers. The Fourth Territorial Congress of Soviets supported this proposal at the instance of the Bolsheviks.

The *Nakaz* (instruction) adopted by the Third Congress

¹ This portion unfortunately was not published in the *Pobeda velikoi Otkryabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii v Turkestane. Sbornik dokumentov*, Tashkent, 1947, pp. 92-93. For a complete text of the Declaration see *Nasha Gazeta*, November 23, 1917.

² *Ibid.*

³ Also confirmed by such an anti-Bolshevik paper as *Svobodny Samarkand* No. 127, November 29, 1917.

⁴ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 22, January 27, 1918.

of Soviets for guidance of the Council of People's Commissars leaves no doubt whatsoever as to the complete absence of antagonism against Muslims as regards their participation in high organs of Soviet power. Point 3 of the *Nakaz* assured Muslims that in the composition of the Council of People's Commissars representatives of the organised Muslim proletariat and working masses shall be included and they shall be given "(proportionally) proper number of places".¹

Point 4 of the *Nakaz* made the Council of People's Commissars responsible not only to the Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of Turkestan but also to the Soviets of Muslim proletarian and toiling mass organisations.

The above clearly establishes that the early Bolsheviks of Turkestan had no intention of excluding the representatives of Muslim masses from participating in administration. The Declaration did contain several draft errors. But for this its authors cannot be accused of harbouring hostile feelings towards local Muslims. The petty-bourgeois press ridiculed the Bolsheviks of Turkestan for their ineptitude in drafting summons for meetings, etc. The paper *Svobodny Samarkand* contemptuously mentioned that the Council of People's Commissars of Turkestan consisted of clerks, time-keepers, composers and lubricator-workers. It also reproduced a notice drafted by the Commissar for Finance as a proof of the low level of literacy.²

The Third Congress of Soviets passed a resolution on local organisation of power. All power at local places was to rest with the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. The local Soviets were asked to organise Soviets of Muslim Workers' Deputies where such Soviets did not exist. Where such Soviets existed, they were to be left autonomous.³

The bourgeois nationalists came out openly against Soviet power towards the close of November 1917. The firm refusal of the Third Congress to surrender political power to them led to the convening of the so-called Regional Muslim Con-

¹ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 133, November 23, 1917. The word "proportionally" has been somehow omitted in the text of the *Nakaz* as published in *Pobeda velikoi Oktyabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii v Turkestane. Sbornik dokumentov*, Tashkent, 1947, pp. 93-95, and also in a later collection of documents *Pobeda Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii v Uzbekistane*, Tashkent, 1963, pp. 572-73.

² *Svobodny Samarkand* No. 127, November 29, 1917.

³ *Pobeda velikoi Oktyabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii v Turkestane*, p. 95.

gress in Kokand on November 27. The Kokand Congress consisted of Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik and Kirghiz bourgeois nationalists organised into such political parties as the *Shuro-i-Islamia Ulema* and *Alash Orda*. Very few representatives of Muslim toilers attended it. The Congress discussed two questions, viz., the entry of Turkestan into a "South-Eastern Union" headed by the counter-revolutionary leader Dutov and the autonomy of Turkestan. It entrusted the first question to the future government of Turkestan and proclaimed the latter's territorial autonomy. It elected a Provisional Council of Turkestan consisting of 54 members, of whom one-third were representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie. The so-called autonomous government of Kokand was at first headed by the Kazakh Pan-Turkist, Mohammed Jan Tinisbayev, who was soon replaced by Shuro-Islamist Mustafa Chokayev. The post of Defence Minister was filled by a Whiteguard Russian general. The Kokand autonomists maintained intimate connections with Dutov, the British Consul in Kashgar, and Menshevik-SR organisations. They raised the slogan of autonomy only as a cover for their counter-revolutionary aims.

The Kokand autonomy was not a national movement of Muslims against Russians as it is made out to be by some writers. It was in fact a class struggle between the Muslim propertied classes in alliance with the Russian bourgeoisie and foreign imperialists, and the Russian proletariat supported by the Muslim working masses. It was essentially a struggle between the counter-revolutionary and revolutionary forces in Turkestan. O. Lattimore is correct when he sums up, "As the revolution deepened from a political struggle into a class war, the lines of cleavage more and more grouped together the possessors, Russian and non-Russian, fighting to preserve at least something of the old order, and the dispossessed, Russian and non-Russian, trying to take complete possession of the new order."¹

An attempt has been made by some writers to represent the Bolsheviks as irreconcilable enemies of autonomy, and bourgeois nationalists as its avowed champions. This is contrary to all facts. The bourgeois nationalist elements which became so vociferous in their support of the cause of autonomy after the establishment of Soviet power had vied with one another in their profession of unflinching loyalty to

¹ O. Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, Boston, 1950, p. 204.

the Provisional Government and its Turkestan Committee notwithstanding its known opposition to the idea of autonomy. The Provisional Government wanted Turkestan to develop towards self-rule on the lines of British and French colonies and did not favour autonomy.

The bourgeois nationalists had hardly any coherent programme on the national question. Their concept of autonomy was awfully confused, self-contradictory and largely religion-oriented. The attempts of some writers to attribute to them a scientifically worked-out concept of "national territorial autonomy" are misleading.¹ There were various shades of opinion among the bourgeois nationalists. First, there were the Pan-Islamists who thought that all Muslims of Russia were a united single nation and they should act as such. They denied any class differences among the Muslims and considered their interests as identical and common. The Pan-Turkists, ignoring national differences of Muslims in Russia, sought to create artificially a Turkish nation composed of Tatars, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens and Kirghizs. They represented the interests of the Tatar bourgeoisie which desired to establish its class hegemony over all Muslims of Russia belonging to the Turkish linguistic group.

A cross-section of heterogeneous groups, the *Djadidists* of Central Asia swayed sometimes towards Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism and sometimes towards their own bourgeois nationalism. The so-called All-Russia Muslim Congresses reflect this confusion and inconsistency in the ranks of the bourgeois nationalists. The First All-Russia Muslim Congress held in Moscow in May 1917 adopted a motion on "National territorial autonomy" within a "democratic republic organised on a federative basis".² But the Second All-Russia Muslim Congress held in Kazan in July 1917 had on its agenda "national cultural autonomy".³ Along with the Second All-Russia Muslim Congress, the congresses of Muslim priests and soldiers also met at Kazan. In a joint session of all the three congresses it was decided to implement "national cultural autonomy of all Turko-Tatar peoples of Russia."⁴

In the light of this self-contradictory stand of the bour-

¹ See S. A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 147-49.

² *Ulug Turkestan* No. 5, May 13, 1917 and *Nasha Gazeta* No. 18, May 16, 1917.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 20, August 4, 1917.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 18, July 27, 1917.

geois nationalists, no significance can be attached to the mention of "national territorial autonomy" in the resolution of the First All-Russia Muslim Congress. To infer from this the existence of a clear-cut demand for national territorial autonomy in the programme of the bourgeois nationalists would be to carry things too far. In this context, it may be pointed out that the First All-Russia Muslim Congress had also passed an ultra-revolutionary resolution on land reforms. It had demanded that all types of land should be converted into the "property of the entire people" and "every type of private property in land should be fully abolished". The peasants were to be given the right to use land without hiring any labour. The resolution adopted by the Muslim Congress had also demanded immediate land reforms without waiting for the solution of the problem by the Constituent Assembly.¹ As may be seen the First All-Russia Muslim Congress was but echoing the Bolshevik programme on land. It even anticipated the Leninist decree on nationalisation of land! But can one on this basis venture to suggest that the bourgeois nationalists really wished a revolutionary settlement of the land question? Obviously, many things were said demagogically. They knew that the idea of national territorial autonomy and nationalisation of land as advocated by the Bolsheviks were becoming increasingly popular with the Muslim working masses. Hence, they also hastened to proclaim their adherence to these principles.

It is true that at times the bourgeois nationalists did show a tendency to break away from the hold of religion and give expression to their separate national aspirations. Nevertheless, they could not completely free themselves from its influence. To them Islam and nation remained basically one and the same thing. The Second Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress meeting in September 1917 proposed that an autonomous Turkestan Republic should have a bicameral Parliament, the upper house, being a senate of the clergy, was to ensure that all laws framed by Parliament conformed to the *shariat*. This senate composed of the clergy was also to serve as the highest judicial tribunal.² All this shows that their concept of autonomy was religious and cultural rather than national territorial. The *Djadidists* (even Zenkovsky admits) hardly took any measures to implement in practice the

¹ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 20, May 18, 1917.

² *Turkestan'sky Kur'er* No. 243, November 11, 1917.

autonomy of Central Asia.¹ They were very much afraid of the authority of the *Ulemists* to whom they gradually capitulated. The *Ulemists* were not interested in either autonomy or independence. They were interested only in preserving the influence of the priesthood over the Muslims in Central Asia.

The early Bolsheviks of Turkestan have been depicted by a host of Western authors as inveterate enemies of autonomy.² Some Soviet writers have also blamed them for a negative approach towards autonomy prior to the Fifth Territorial Congress of Soviets in April 1918. It is, however, difficult to agree with such a view. The local Bolsheviks cannot with proper justification be accused of a negative attitude towards autonomy of Turkestan.

In a meeting held in the old town of Tashkent in connection with preparations for a demonstration in support of the demand for autonomy on December 13, 1917, a representative of the Tashkent Soviet was present.³ The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Kolesov, and other Commissars were present at this demonstration. Kolesov even addressed the demonstrators and acclaimed the autonomy of Turkestan.⁴ The Muslim demonstrators listened to him patiently as reactionary Russians tried to heckle him. The demonstration would have continued quite peacefully had not some reactionary Russians incited Muslims to indulge in violence and free such counter-revolutionaries as Dorrer from prison. Thus it was the provocation by some counter-revolutionary Russians which resulted in the demonstration being fired upon, and some innocent bloodshed.

Nasha Gazeta, the organ of the Tashkent Soviet, wrote in its editorial of December 13, that the Bolsheviks were not opposed to "autonomy in principle", but they were certainly opposed to the "endeavours of a small group of people to further exploit and enslave the backward Muslim masses in the name of autonomy". In contrast to such a sham autonomy they favoured a genuinely real autonomy to be proclaimed by a popularly elected Constituent assembly (meaning the Congress of Soviets) specially convened for this purpose.

¹ S. A. Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-29.

² Sec. R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Camb., Mass., 1954, p. 179; A. G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan*, New York, 1957, pp. 14-21.

³ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 146, December 9, 1917.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 152, December 15, 1917.

The Fourth Congress of Soviets which met at Tashkent between January 19 and January 26, 1918 noted the progress made in the construction of Soviet power and the revolutionary transformation of the social and political structure during the first few months of the Revolution. The question of autonomy also came up for discussion. In this connection the speech of the Bolshevik leader, Tobolin, who is often charged with denying the right of Turkestan to autonomy, is worth quoting at length. Tobolin declared at the Fourth Congress:

"The real master of the country about whose autonomy we speak is, according to us, the people of this country. We do not merely speak about self-determination, but also implement the idea in practice in every way . . . we fight with arms in hand against counter-revolution from whatever source it might come, from native or Russian bourgeoisie. At the same time we concede to the people of the territory not only the right of autonomy, but also defend for them even the right to complete separation if they so desire. . . . We say that the territory of Turkestan was conquered by force and was held by force and if the will of the people expressed by referendum favoured separation from Russia we would defend their right to secession."¹

Tobolin, however, felt that the implementation of autonomy at once and immediately was not possible in view of the danger to the gains of the revolution from counter-revolutionaries and the existence of war conditions in the country. But a beginning in the preparatory work for autonomy or even for self-determination had already been made in Tobolin's opinion. He assured:

"We will formulate our demand precisely and by organising Soviets of Workers' Deputies among the Muslims we are creating that source of power which will be necessary for the future independent country of Turkestan."²

In marked contrast to the speech of Tobolin was the speech delivered by Menshevik-internationalist Pavlyuchenko who objected to the natives being called "masters" of the country by the Bolsheviks. He declared:

"We look upon ourselves as the advanced vanguard of revolution and consider it our duty to lead the politically immature Muslim masses of working people along the right

¹ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 20, January 25, 1918.

² *Ibid.*

path. We are not going to give to the Muslims anything else except leading them along the right path.¹

The Mensheviks suggested establishment of town and local self-rule of the Duma and Zemstvo type as a preparatory stage for establishment of autonomy which was to be proclaimed by the Constituent Assembly.

The Bolshevik group in its resolution before the Fourth Congress, which was carried by a big majority, declared that the question of autonomy was linked in general with the national question which had been put forward in the present period by the Russian Revolution and which ought to be considered only from a revolutionary point of view. It further declared that the principle of self-determination should be subordinated to the goal of socialism and should be understood as self-determination of toiling classes. All power according to the Bolshevik resolution must lie with the Soviets. It recognised only the power of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Muslim Workers' Deputies and rejected all suggestions for a coalition of power. The resolution concluded with a declaration of relentless struggle against bourgeois autonomy proclaimed by a handful of Russian and Muslim reactionaries and stated that the party of Social-Democrats would strive for the establishment of proletarian autonomy for the territory.²

From the above-quoted resolution it is clear that the Bolsheviks objected not to autonomy as such but to bourgeois autonomy only. They rightly put forth proletarian autonomy in contradistinction to bourgeois autonomy. They could not with any justification be charged with harbouring any hostile feeling towards the native Muslim masses. They rather welcomed the participation of the representatives of working Muslim masses in Soviet administration and left three places vacant for them in the *Sovnarkom* (the Council of People's Commissars).

But notwithstanding all this the early Bolsheviks nonetheless failed to create an autonomy national in form. While their insistence on proletarian autonomy as against bourgeois autonomy was perfectly correct, their omission in the beginning to give their proletarian autonomy a national form had many unfortunate repercussions. The situation was fully exploited by bourgeois nationalists who tried to sell their

bourgeois autonomy to the people in a national form. But the Bolsheviks can take only partial blame for the omission of representatives of working Muslims in the *Sovnarkom* at the time of the Third and Fourth Territorial Congresses of Soviets, for they held only 5 places out of 15 in it (the "Maximalists" holding 2 and Left SRs 8).

Towards the end of January 1918 the Soviet power began a military action against the counter-revolutionary forces of Zaitsev and the Cossacks who had risen against it. The Kokand autonomists and Dutov were also in league with Zaitsev. The Tashkent Red Guards defeated Zaitsev near Samarkand on February 18, 1918. After the annihilation of the White Cossacks near Samarkand, the Bolsheviks intensified their campaign of public agitation against Kokand autonomists.

Already in January, meetings of the town and village poor were organised which passed resolutions supporting the Soviet power. In these meetings the Bolsheviks explained to the people the real designs of the Kokand autonomists. At a large public meeting held in the old part of Tashkent the local working people declared themselves against the self-styled autonomists of Kokand. The working people of the Ferghana and Samarkand regions organised numerous meetings and greeted the Council of People's Commissars of Turkestan. The working people of Andijan *uyezd* (district) in a meeting attended by 15 thousand workers adopted a resolution on January 5, 1918 expressing their confidence in the Soviet government.¹

On the night of January 30-31, 1918 the Kokand autonomists began their military action against the city organ of Soviet power. They laid siege to the Kokand fort. This compelled the Soviet government to take strong military measures against them. After the defeat of the White Cossacks near Samarkand, Red Guards were directed to Kokand. The Red Guards from Ferghana and Andijan also moved towards Kokand. In their ranks there were many natives. Military action began on February 19, 1918 and continued up to February 22, 1918. In the fight against the Kokand bourgeois autonomists the local *dehkans* and the poor took a leading part. They declined to join the mobilisation called for by the Kokand government. On February 22, 1918 the Kokand government was suppressed. A part of the counter-revolu-

¹ *Nasha Gazeta* No. 20, January 25, 1918.

² *Ibid.*

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, Tashkent, 1957, p. 61.

tionary autonomists fled to Bukhara where they continued to conspire with the Emir against the Soviet power. After the dissolution of the Kokand government, bourgeois nationalists began to organise the *basmachi* bands in the Ferghana Valley.

In March 1918, Kobozev, the extraordinary Commissar of the Soviet government and representative of the Central Committee of the RCP(B), reached Tashkent. He was sent to render practical help to the local organs of the Party and Soviet power in the task of strengthening Soviet power and establishing the Turkestan Autonomous SSR. In April 1918 the Fifth Territorial Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Soldiers' and Muslim *Dehkans'* Deputies of Turkestan was convened. A considerably large part of the deputies of the Fifth Congress consisted of representatives of the native population. The speeches of the deputies were translated into the Uzbek language. On April 22, the Congress received a telegram from Lenin and Stalin in which it was assured that the *Sovnarkom* would support the autonomy of the region on a Soviet basis. On April 30, 1918 the Fifth Congress confirmed the "Statute on Turkestan Soviet Republic of Russian Federation". Points 1 and 2 of this Statute established the state structure of the Republic, its territorial limits and mutual juridical relations with the RSFSR. The Turkestan Soviet Federative Republic was declared to be autonomously self-administrating. But it recognised the Central authority and co-ordinated its activities with it. A commission appointed by the Congress was sent to Moscow to define the mutual relations with the Centre.

The Declaration of autonomy by the Fifth Congress signified the victory of the basic principles of the Leninist nationality policy of the Communist Party. It created the necessary conditions for the consolidation of Soviet power in Turkestan. The Congress elected the high organs of the Turkestan Soviet Republic—the *TsIK* (the Central Executive Committee) and the *Sovnarkom* (The Council of People's Commissars). Representatives of the local people were elected to these highest organs of state. In the new Council of People's Commissars there were four representatives from the native population. The Fifth Congress by declaring the autonomy of the Turkestan region fulfilled a great historic task. The Soviet autonomy of Turkestan was an important step towards the creation of national Soviet republics in Central Asia.

In 1918 another significant event took place. In June the

First Congress of Bolshevik organisations of Turkestan which had united themselves into the Communist Party of Turkestan as an inseparable part of the RCP(B) was held. The resolutions adopted by the Congress pointed out the necessity for a broad participation of local working people in the administration of the state, strengthening Party agitation, formation of Commissariats for nationality affairs in all *oblasts*, *uyezds* and local Soviets, publication of Congress materials in native languages, etc.¹

The working people of all nationalities in Turkestan began to be drawn into the task of Soviet construction on an extensive scale. By a decision of the Turk *TsIK* taken on July 11, 1918 the languages of the peoples of Central Asia were declared to be state languages on par with the Russian.²

In Tashkent the Turkestan People's University was opened on April 21, 1918.³ In July 1918 the publication in the Uzbek language of the paper *Ishtrakium* (*Communist*) commenced.

In October 1918 the Sixth Congress of Soviets confirmed the first Constitution of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. With the declaration of Soviet autonomy for Turkestan and the adoption of a Constitution, the first stage of the struggle of the Party for implementation of its Leninist nationality policy ended. Autonomous Turkestan was a multinational republic guaranteeing equality of rights to all nationalities within it. Equality of political rights having been secured, the task was now to prepare for socialist development and for creation of Soviet national republics.

The establishment of the Turkestan ASSR took place in atmosphere of complete co-operation from the Centre. At no stage was there any clash between the Central and the regional authorities over their respective powers. Some Western writers have sought to discover a rift between the two on this subject. They write as if Turkestan authorities wanted more powers and the Centre was reluctant to concede them. As evidence they point to the "extraordinary" delay from the Centre in issuing a decree on the formation of the Turkestan ASSR. Such a decree, they point out, was issued only on April 11, 1921 by the All-Russia *TsIK*. This was done, they allege, only when Tashkent ceased to be

¹ *Resolyutsii i postanovleniya KPT*, Tashkent, 1958.

² *Nasha Gazeta* No. 144, July 17, 1918. For recognition of local languages as state languages along with the Russian by the Party in its First Congress in June 1918 see *Nasha Gazeta*, June 29, 1918.

³ *Nasha Gazeta*, April 23, 1918.

"defiant" and became sufficiently "subservient" to Moscow by adopting a new Constitution in the Territorial Congress of Soviets held in September 1920 "which corresponded in all details to Moscow's concept of autonomy".¹

Such a view, however, has not an iota of truth in it. The fact, on the contrary, is that by October 1918 the question of relations between Moscow and Tashkent had been smoothly settled and the Turkestan ASSR duly recognised by the Centre. If a decree to this effect was not issued, it was because no such decree was called for to confirm the constitution of the Turkestan ASSR. The new Soviet state, RSFSR, was a voluntary union formed through negotiations with the autonomous republics joining it. The Constitution of the RSFSR as adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in July 1918 did not provide for confirmation by the Centre of the constitution of the autonomous republic joining the RSFSR. Nor did the Constitution confer any such power upon the *TsIK*.²

We also know that a delegation of the Turkestan *TsIK* consisting of 5 persons, Troitsky, Yusupov, Teodorovich and two others, proceeded to Moscow to negotiate the question of mutual relations. The delegation met Lenin and Sverdlov and its members participated in the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets as representatives of the Turkestan ASSR. To examine the question of mutual relations President Sverdlov appointed a commission consisting of Rozengolts, Yenukidze, Khmel'nitsky and two others. In the course of several meetings which were held between the Central Commission and the Turkestan delegation in July 1918 great progress was achieved and questions of territorial limits of the Turkestan ASSR, its organs of power and control of local authorities on certain matters relating to defence and foreign affairs, etc., were satisfactorily resolved. The proceedings of the third meeting between the representatives of the Centre and Turkestan as reported in the *Nasha Gazeta* of October 4, 1918 may give an initial impression that the talks did not run smoothly. It is indicated that the name *Sovnarkom* for the executive organ of Turkestan was not adopted unanimously and that the question of organising the *TsIK* was referred to

¹ See A. G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan*, New York, 1957, pp. 65-70.

² *Syezdy Sovetov v dokumentakh 1917-36*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, pp. 77-79.

the All-Russia *TsIK*. It is also reported that the fourth meeting adjourned in view of the "extraordinary events" in Turkestan and that the work of the Commission was suspended until the return of normal conditions there. It also added that the Turkestan delegation was going back.

But the delegation did not return to Turkestan. This is gathered from the same issue of *Nasha Gazeta*. In October it was still in Moscow and Troitsky and Yusupov did send a communication from the Centre on October 2, 1918 concerning the progress achieved on the question of settling mutual relations between the Centre and Turkestan. They signed this communication as the plenipotentiaries of Turkestan. It appears that the disagreement in the earlier meetings held in July 1918 was due to certain technical points. The Constitution of the RSFSR adopted in January 1918 had not envisaged the creation of autonomous republics. It had provided only for "autonomous *oblast* unions".¹ But as life had given rise to the autonomous republic of Turkestan, Lenin and Sverdlov welcomed its emergence. The representatives of Turkestan indicated that they found "full confidence" in the Turkestan Republic on the part of Lenin, Sverdlov and other People's Commissars. They expressed the hope that everything concerning the powers and organisation of the Turkestan *TsIK* and *Sovnarkom* would be fully settled when the Commission resumed its work. They also wrote that "according to their private talks with Lenin the Turk *TsIK* had the right to change some points in the decrees which were in sharp contradiction to the conditions of life of the people of the territory".²

Thus there can be no doubt that the Constitution of the Turkestan ASSR which the Sixth Territorial Congress of Soviets adopted in October 1918 had the full approval of the Centre and contained nothing objectionable. In fact, both, this constitution as well as the one later adopted by the Ninth Territorial Congress of Soviets of Turkestan in September 1920, delegated foreign relations, defence, finance, railways and post and telegraph to the jurisdiction of the federal government.³ However, the 1918 constitution had made certain jurisdictional reservations regarding these matters which the 1920 constitution did away with. Such reservations

¹ *Syezdy Sovetov v dokumentakh*, p. 73.

² *Nasha Gazeta* No. 206, October 4, 1918.

³ *Syezdy Sovetov v dokumentakh*, pp. 279, 450.

were called for because of the extraordinary situation prevailing in Turkestan in 1918 when there was no permanent contact with the Centre. But this situation had changed in 1920.

The Turkestan Republic became a socialist state at its very inception in 1918. Village Soviets and people's courts, composed of people of local nationalities who knew the native languages, customs and traditions, were set up almost everywhere in the period 1918 to 1924. Representatives of the local population now constituted the majority in the administrative bodies. Soviet power thus became genuinely popular.

In setting up Soviet administrative bodies and courts, the Soviet government took local peculiarities into account and in certain cases made concessions to old customs. For instance, alongside Soviet courts which administered justice in accordance with the new laws, there were the old Muslim courts to which the people were accustomed and in which the *kazi* administered justice according to *Sheriat*. If a person was dissatisfied with the *kazi*'s ruling, he could go to a Soviet court. The people were soon convinced, through experience of the advantages of Soviet laws, which gave protection to the exploited and the *kazi* courts gradually first turned into courts of arbitration and then disappeared completely.

Founding of the Soviet Republics in Khiva and Bukhara

During the period of the First World War the economic conditions of the people in Khiva began to deteriorate rapidly. The import of food grains from Russia dwindled by more than half and that of other manufactured goods was also seriously affected. This caused great hardships to the people who suffered acute food shortages. The peasant masses groaned under the heavy burden of taxation which further increased between 1918 and 1920—the years of Djunaid Khan's domination of Khiva. The officials of the Khan as well as bandits openly looted the helpless people. In the Khanate, there lived people of several nationalities, for example, the Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs. They were seldom at peace with one another. The national question had become acute during the decade preceding the October Revolution. The Uzbek nobility, in addition to exploiting the

Uzbek working people, also oppressed the Turkmens and the Kara-Kalpaks.

The bourgeois Provisional Government which came to power in Russia as a result of the February Revolution supported the despotic regime of the Khan with its armed forces against the uprisings of the Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kara-Kalpak *dehkans* and the urban poor. The peasants and artisans of the Khanate rose spontaneously against the arbitrary rule of the officials of the Khan and against exploitation by the *bais* and mullahs. They burnt the property of feudal *bais* and *beks* and seized their cattle and food grains. On May 22, 1917 the impoverished people in the city of Khiva, the capital of the Khanate, seized flour and rice. This "hunger riot" was severely put down by the Cossack garrison stationed in Khiva.

In May-June 1917 the *dehkans* began an armed rebellion in the Kunia-Urgench area. The movement became so strong that the Khan was obliged to seek help from the Provisional government which sent Cossack forces under the command of Zaitsev. He also helped in organising *kulak-bai* forces under Djunaid Khan. On September 20, 1917 an agreement was reached between Zaitsev and Djunaid Khan to wage a joint struggle against the revolutionary movement in the oasis of Khwarezm.

The victory of the October Revolution in Russia and Turkestan had a great significance for the further development of the revolutionary struggle of the masses against the Khan in Khiva. The Khanate ceased to be a colony and the people could now rest assured of the full sympathy and support of the new regime in the task of liberation from the despotic rule of the Khan. Despite the terror of Djunaid Khan's hordes and the Cossacks, the working masses in towns and *kishlaks* rose against arbitrariness and oppression. Under such conditions of mass struggle arose the nucleus of the Communist Party of Khiva which began to organise and lead the people against the despotism of the Khan.

The Soviet government had, at the very outset, declared that it recognised the independence and sovereignty of Khiva. The RSFSR and TASSR on their part indicated a desire to develop good-neighbourly relations with Khiva. But the reactionary ruling circles of Khiva, blind in their hatred of Soviet power and fearful of its increasing influence on the people of Khiva, crossed over to the imperialist camp.

From the very beginning Khiva became an anti-Soviet

counter-revolutionary centre in Central Asia where White Guards, Mensheviks, SRs, bourgeois-nationalists and other counter-revolutionary elements began to flock from all sides. Here they were joined by agents of British imperialism who in collaboration with them prepared an attack on Soviet Central Asia. Zaitsev was assigned an important role in their anti-Soviet plans. Zaitsev agreed to join with Djunaid Khan in a proposed offensive against Soviet power after he had met with representatives of the Kokand autonomists and with the Orenburg Cossack leader Dutov. Their plan envisaged capture of Chardjui, and then, moving along the railway line after seizure of Kagan, Samarkand and Jizhak, they were to proceed to Tashkent where they were to be joined by the forces of the Kokand autonomists. Djunaid Khan was also entrusted the task of overthrowing Soviet power in the Amu-Darya region of present-day Kara-Kalpak ASSR. The Khivan counter-revolutionaries were in constant contact with the underground anti-Soviet organisation in Tashkent called the Turkestan military organisation which was founded through the active participation of the American Consul, the French agent Castagne and the British Col. Bailey. Djunaid Khan's forces took an active part in organising the counter-revolutionary coup in Ashkhabad.¹ On November 25, 1918 Djunaid Khan crossed into Soviet territory in the Amu-Darya region and began a marauding campaign. He captured Kypchak and Chimbai and laid siege to Turtkul (then Petro-Alexandrovsk). The heroic defenders of Turtkul inflicted heavy casualties on Djunaid Khan who was forced to retreat after an 11 days' unsuccessful siege. In January 1919, Djunaid Khan again invaded Soviet territory, but was once more beaten back. In April 1919 he approached the Soviet government for peace. An agreement was signed between representatives of the RSFSR and Khiva on April 9, 1919 in Takhta fort which was ratified by the *TsIK* of TASSR and Khan Said Abdullah in May 1919. According to this agreement Djunaid Khan was not to indulge in any armed action against RSFSR. The agreement also provided for freedom and security of trade along land and water routes and for exchange of diplomatic missions.²

This agreement, however, was never observed by Khiva. Several requests by the Soviet government for conclusion of

a trade pact were rejected by Khiva. Nor did Djunaid Khan ever stop anti-Soviet activities. In June 1919, he ordered a new mobilisation and established contact with Kolchak. In the same month, an exchange of delegations between Khiva and Bukhara took place. In August the Ural Cossacks rose against the Soviet government and with the support of the *bais* and *kulaks* captured Chimbai and Nukus. An Amu-Darya government was formed, headed by a *kulak*, Felichev, which was promptly recognised by Djunaid Khan. After liquidation of the White Guards in the Trans-Caspian area towards the end of 1919, all SRs and Mensheviks from Ashkhabad fled to Khiva where they became advisers to Djunaid Khan.

While Djunaid Khan was thus conspiring against Soviet power, the *dehkan* revolutionary movement continued to grow in Khiva. Guerilla groups from *batraks* and *dehkans* made Turtkul their centre. The Turk Commission led by Frunze and Kuibyshev helped the Khivan Communists Rahman Primbetov, Ahmejan Ibragimov, Kurban Bekniyazov, Abdullayev, N. Salapov and others to organise the Khiva revolutionary movement. They exposed the Right wing of the Young Khivans which began to aid Djunaid Khan. The Left Young Khivans like Palvan-Niaz Yusupov, Nazir Shalikarov and others associated with the local intelligentsia and the middle strata of the bourgeoisie fought against feudal oppression and tyranny. Young Khivans of peasant and artisan origin withdrew from this movement and joined the Communist Party of Khiva.

The Communists of Khiva became active in organising armed revolutionary volunteers. Under their guidance, armed uprisings occurred in November 1919 at such places as Kungrad, Khojeili, Ilialinsk and Kunia-Urgench bekdoms. The Soviet government on the request of the people of Khiva decided to aid the struggle against the White Guards. The Soviet army entered the territory of Khiva on December 22, 1919. The Revolution in Khiva was victorious on February 2, 1920. The regime of Said Abdulla Khan, a puppet of Djunaid Khan, was overthrown. A large public meeting organised by the Communist Party of Khiva on February 2, 1920 greeted the overthrow of the tyranny of the Khan and the establishment of people's power. The meeting also expressed its deep gratitude for the help rendered by the Red Army in the liberation of the people of Khiva from the yoke of the Khan and foreign imperialists. The Provisional Revolutionary

¹ See *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 141.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 143-44.

government prepared for convening the *Kurultai* (the congress of the people's representatives).

The First All-Khwarezm *Kurultai* of the people's representatives met in April 1920 and declared the former Khanate of Khiva, the Khwarezm Soviet People's Republic. The Congress elected the Central Executive Committee and formed the government called the Council of People's *Nazirs*. The First *Kurultai* of the people's representatives confirmed the first constitution of the Khwarezm Soviet People's Republic which transferred all power in the centre as well as in local places to the Soviets of working people. The highest organ of power was to be the *Kurultai*. The constitution guaranteed to the people of Khiva the freedom of speech, press and assembly, etc. The property of the Khan and his high officials confiscated at the time of the Revolution was declared to be public property. All people 18 years of age and over were given the right to vote with the exception of counter-revolutionaries, khans and their relations, former high officers of the Khan's administration and big landowners. The constitution of the Khwarezm Soviet People's Republic proclaimed equality of rights for all nationalities.

The Revolution in Khiva had its own peculiar features. The industrial proletariat was numerically insignificant and a great majority of people were *dehkans*. Hence, in the first stage, the Revolution was a popular democratic revolution and not socialist. It established the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the working masses. In the first stage the Revolution was to prepare for transition to the second socialist stage. This task of a bourgeois democratic revolution was to be fulfilled by the revolutionary dictatorship of the masses and not the bourgeoisie. This was done by the peasant masses through their organs of Soviet power.

The first government formed in Khiva after the Revolution under the leadership of Yusupov was tainted with former young Khivan elements hostile to the tasks of the Soviet government. There were many bourgeois nationalists in it who tried to keep Khwarezm away from Soviet Russia and turn it into a colony of the British. They obstructed land reforms. Lands seized from khans were given mostly to *bais* and money-lenders. The *wakf* lands were kept intact, and when the *dehkans* began to seize them, they were punished. The new government also stirred up national antagonism between the Uzbeks and Turkmens.

The Communist Party of Khiva was thus faced with a

serious task which called for a revolutionary solution of the land and water problem as well as the problem of national relations. It could not tackle these problems without first ridding itself of alien elements. With the help of the Turk Bureau of RCP(B) and the Turk Commission efforts were started in this direction. More and more poor people were attracted to the Party and a struggle was waged against bourgeois nationalists. On March 6, 1921, a meeting of the working people was held in Khiva which demanded expulsion of hostile elements from the government. A new provisional revolutionary government was formed pending the meeting of the Second *Kurultai*.

In May 1921, the Second *Kurultai* met. Out of the 340 delegates, an overwhelming majority were poor and middle *dehkans*. It separated *wakf* land from the state, and limited possession of land to the working limit of the person. Fourteen thousand *tanaps* of land was distributed among *dehkans*. The Second *Kurultai* ratified with great enthusiasm the military and political agreement with RSFSR. The RSFSR rendered great help to the working people of Khiva in liquidating their economic, political and cultural backwardness. The RSFSR recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Khivan Republic and renounced all colonial rights and concessions enjoyed by previous Russian governments on the territory of the former Khanate. It also transferred all its property, factories, lands and ships, etc., situated in Khiva to the new government of the Republic. The Soviet government greatly assisted the Khwarezm Soviet People's Republic in raising the economic and cultural standard of its people. It received a lump sum subsidy of 500 million rubles from the Soviet government. A large number of instructors, engineers, doctors and teachers, etc., were also sent there from Russia.¹

Like Khiva, Bukhara was also ruled by feudal despotism and was under the protectorate of Tsarist Russia. It was the second biggest source of cotton for Tsarist Russia, the first being Ferghana. Cotton constituted forty per cent of its exports to Russia. It exported ninety per cent of the cotton produced to Russia. There were no big manufacturing industries of the capitalist type in Bukhara. Out of 52 factories, twenty-six were engaged in cotton cleaning. The vast majority of the population were peasants whose conditions were continually deteriorating. The Muslim priesthood was

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 159.

very influential in Bukhara. Some 20,000 students studied in its *maktabs* and *madrasahs*.

Under the impact of the ideas of the first Russian Revolution, a famous bourgeois nationalist movement developed in Bukhara under the name of *Djadidism*. The *Djadidists*, however, limited their activities to cultural and educational spheres only. They never set before themselves the task of fighting against the existing system and placed much faith in the sense of justice and fair play of the Emir and his god-fearing vizirs. It was under the influence of the February Revolution in Russia that the *Djadidists* who had now begun to call themselves Young Bukharans after the model of Young Turks, started demanding partial reforms. They demanded a precise fixation of taxes and an organisation of *Majlis* (Parliament). The Manifesto issued by the Emir on April 7, 1917 promising a few reforms was never implemented. The *Djadidists* advocated a reform platform and not revolution.

The victory of the October Revolution freed the people of Bukhara from Russian colonial exploitation. In November 1917 in all the Russian settlements in Bukhara—New Bukhara, Chardjui, Kerki and Termez—power came into the hands of the Soviets. The establishment of this ring of Soviets on the territory of Bukhara proved to be a vital factor in the future development of the revolutionary movement in Bukhara.

From the very beginning the Emir took a hostile attitude towards Soviet power. Between November 1917 and March 1918, he ordered three army mobilisations. He maintained contacts with Dutov, leader of the Orenburg Cossacks, and also with the Kokand bourgeois-nationalist autonomists. He was also in communication with Malleson, the commander of the British forces in Iran. Some 2,000 Afghan mercenaries commanded by British officers served in the Emir's army. At the beginning of 1918, the Emir mobilised an army of 30 thousand along the railway line posing a grave threat to Soviet power in Turkestan. The Soviet government made all possible efforts to establish normal relations with the Emir and in December 1917 sent a diplomatic mission to Bukhara for this purpose which, however, the Emir did not receive.

On December 6, 1917, a delegation of Young Bukharans came to Tashkent and informed the Soviet authorities about preparations in Bukhara for a revolution in which about 30,000 armed people were expected to participate. Misled by such exaggerated accounts of preparations for revolutionary

action by the masses of Bukhara, the Council of People's Commissars of Turkestan made a wrong decision of rendering untimely help to the people of Bukhara. On February 28, 1918, Kolesov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Turkestan, proceeded to Bukhara at the head of some 500-600 Red Guards. He demanded a recognition of Soviet power in Russian settlements and democratisation of administration through the formation of an Executive Committee selected from representatives of the Young Bukharans. The Emir declined to accept this demand, whereupon Kolesov began his military action on March 2, 1918. He had under his command a total of 2,000 persons. The Emir asked for a truce to gain time and utilised this for war preparations. He succeeded in cutting the railway line from Samarkand and declared a "holy war" against Kolesov. Kolesov was forced to retreat towards Samarkand and was saved from being annihilated by timely reinforcements from Turkestan. The Emir was forced to sign an agreement at Kizil-Tepe on March 25, 1918. He agreed to cancel the army mobilisation, to expel all Russian counter-revolutionaries from the territory of Bukhara, to restore the destroyed railway line and receive a Soviet Commissar in Bukhara. The first attempt to overthrow the Emir's rule thus ended in failure. The masses did not side with the Young Bukharans. They were still largely under the influence of the mullahs. Lenin spoke about this at the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B) held in March 1919 and stressed the need for caution in carrying out revolutionary changes in backward regions.¹

The Kizil-Tepe agreement however did not give Turkestan the necessary security as the Emir moved still closer to the British imperialists after the March events. In April and May 1919 several hundred camels loaded with British arms reached Bukhara through Afghanistan. In April the Emir received 20 thousand rifles, and in May, 8 thousand more.² The number of British instructors in the Emir's army reached 600 by the spring of 1919.³ In the summer of 1919 the Emir in alliance with the Trans-Caspian White Guards and with the direct participation of the British, sent an armed expedition against Kerki.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 195.

² *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 166.

³ B. I. Iskandarov, *Podgotovka Angliyei bukharskogo platsdarma dlya interventsii v Sovetsky Turkestan*, Papers of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, 1951, p. 43.

The unsuccessful expedition was led by Osipov, the former Bolshevik War Minister of Turkestan and the British Colonel Lomcart. In October 1919, Col. Bailey reached Bukhara from Tashkent and began to hatch a plan of action against Soviet Turkestan. The Emir himself, in a memorandum to the League of Nations, dated April 15, 1929 admitted he was in collusion with Afghanistan, Khiva and the British.¹

In contrast with the aggressive designs of the Emir, the Bolsheviks of Turkestan adhered to a peaceful policy towards him. The Soviet government always endeavoured to establish good neighbourly relations with Bukhara of the Emir. The Fifth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan proclaimed the independence of Bukhara, and later Bukhara was also given considerable material aid. The Soviet government, even in its most difficult days, saved Bukhara from financial catastrophe by advancing it a loan of 15 million rubles in the autumn of 1918.² But the Emir, as before, continued his hostile attitude towards the Soviet government. He encouraged the purchase of Tsarist currency at a higher rate and used it in the Indian market. As a result of this the value of Soviet currency fell and this led to complications in the financial relations between Bukhara and Soviet Turkestan. The inimical posture adopted by the Emir led to an end of trade between Bukhara and Soviet Turkestan. The Soviet government offered Bukhara cotton oil and rice in exchange for cotton, but the Bukharan ruling circles rejected this offer. To help Britain and other imperialist powers in enforcing an economic blockade, they refused to trade with Soviet Turkestan and sold their goods, mainly cotton and wool, in return for arms from Britain and Afghanistan. The officials of the Emir hindered the normal functioning of Soviet representatives in Bukhara. They furnished the White Guards in the Trans-Caspian region with all necessary supplies and obstructed Soviet operations against them by uprooting railway and telegraph lines and by prohibiting *dehkans* to come near the railway stations to sell foodstuffs to Soviet troops.

On its arrival in Tashkent the Turk Commission gave special attention to the affairs in Bukhara. On January 7, 1920 members of the Commission visited Bukhara and met the Emir, Sai'd Olim Khan. They tried to impress upon him the

¹ B. I. Iskandarov, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

need for closer relations with Soviet Russia which alone could guarantee Bukhara's full independence, and normal conditions for economic and cultural development. Again, on March 14, 1920, Frunze together with other members of the Turk Commission came to Bukhara and met with the Emir. But these efforts to bring the Emir of Bukhara to a sensible path failed and all peaceful Soviet proposals were turned down. A free hand was given to the Muslim clergy in fanning feelings of religious fanaticism against the Bolsheviks. The Emir increased his contacts with the British at Meshed and signed a military pact with Afghanistan. He mobilised an army of 50 thousand in August 1920 and gave a *fatwa* for a holy war against the Bolsheviks.

In such circumstances it became quite clear to the popular masses of Bukhara that the Emir and his officials were keen to collaborate with the British imperialists to preserve their power and to wage an aggressive war against Soviet Turkestan.

The people of Bukhara further understood that the only way for their liberation lay through revolution and armed struggle against the despotic government of the Emir and that in this struggle they could fully rely upon the help and support of the working masses of Soviet Turkestan.

In preparing the revolutionary uprising of the people, the Communist Party of Bukhara played a vital role. The decision to form the Party was taken in a meeting held in Tashkent on September 25, 1918. The meeting elected a Central Committee with Azimjan Yakubov as chairman. By December 1918 branches of the Party had been organised in Kagan, New Bukhara, Old Bukhara, Samarkand, Katta Kurgan, Kerki and Termez. In August 1919 a Party branch was established in Chardjui. The programme of the Party called for liquidation of the Emirate and establishment of a People's Republic in its place.

Under the impact of the October Revolution a revolutionary movement developed in Bukhara. The economic conditions of the people were very difficult. They were confronted with a sharp cut in the export of cotton and wool to Russia. The tax burden grew unbearable as the Emir continued to impose new taxes to finance his war preparations against Soviet power. *Dehkans* and city artisans participated in the armed popular uprisings in Shahrishubz (February 1919), Karakul and Wabkent (March 1919), and in Old Bukhara (June 1919). These revolts were organised by the Communist

Party of Bukhara and were ruthlessly suppressed by the Emir's forces. Five hundred persons were arrested and 69 were hanged at the time of the June uprising in Old Bukhara.

In leading these revolutionary mass struggles the Communist Party of Bukhara acquired great popularity among the working people—the *dehkans* and city artisans. The Second Congress of the Party was held in Tashkent on June 26-27, 1919. It called on the Party to take more energetic measures to strengthen its agitation among the masses and to draw to its fold the various sections of the people. N. Husainov was elected the new chairman of the Central Committee. At the time of the Third Party Congress held in Tashkent between December 26-31, 1919, thirty-seven branches of the Party were functioning, twenty-four among *dehkans* and artisans and thirteen in the army.¹ The Third Party Congress stressed the need to increase Party propaganda and agitation and for this purpose in 1920 journals like *Tong (Dawn)* and *Kutulush (Liberation)* were published in Tashkent and New Bukhara. By the summer of 1920 the revolutionary crisis had ripened in Bukhara. The workers, peasants and artisans of Bukhara were ready to overthrow the hated and oppressive rule of the Emir. By this time there were 43 Party units in operation with a membership of 5,000, and the number of Party sympathisers was about 20,000. In Old Bukhara itself there were 21 cells having a membership of 1,500.² Bukharan Communists were active in the ranks of the Emir's army also. Irgash Musabayev very ably led Party agitation in the army. In Samarkand an armed force was organised from the deserters of the Emir's army. The Fourth Congress of the Party was held in Chardjui between August 16 and 19, 1920. It decided upon armed revolutionary action against the Emir's power.

So far nothing has been said about the relations of the Communist Party of Bukhara with the Young Bukharans. After the March 1918 fiasco the Party of Young Bukharans went into eclipse for some time. It, however, reappeared in January 1920 on the territory of Turkestan. The Council of International Propaganda in the East approved its activity on February 6, 1920, and the Turkestan Commission confirmed this approval. In the meeting of the Council of International Propaganda in the East held on March 25, 1920 the question

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

of relations between the Communist Party of Bukhara and the Young Bukharan Party came up for discussion. The Council made it obligatory for the Bukharan Communists to conduct their struggle with the Emir in agreement with Young Bukharans. The Communist Party of Bukhara, however, was not happy with this decision. In its opinion the Young Bukharan Party was a party of bourgeois nationalists which systematically conducted a struggle against the Communists of Bukhara and which was anti-Soviet and Pan-Islamist in orientation. A joint session of the Council for International Propaganda in the East and the foreign affairs section of the Turk Commission held on June 19, 1920 agreed with this appraisal of the Young Bukharan Party by the C.P. of Bukhara. It favoured dissolution of the former and the joining of the Communist Party by its more advanced members. It allowed financial assistance to Young Bukharans only for agitational work under control of the Council for International Propaganda. In the meeting of the Turk Commission held on June 30, 1920, the Commission decided to prepare for the overthrow of the Emir's tyranny. It called for breaking off all relations with Young Bukharans and directed the Council for International Propaganda to support only the Communist Party of Bukhara. The Commission called the Young Bukharans the Party of the February Revolution and the Communists of Bukhara, the Party of the October Revolution.¹

The Council for International Propaganda, however, was inclined to favour a broad front of all progressive and democratic forces. It considered it harmful to the cause of the Bukharan revolution to write off the entire Party of Young Bukharans. The Central Bureau of the Young Bukharan Party also wrote a letter to Lenin requesting him to examine the Party's programme. The Organisational Bureau of the RCP(B) reached the conclusion that it was impossible to include the Young Bukharans into the Communist Party on the basis of their present programme, but it recommended co-operation with them in the revolutionary struggle against the Emir's power.

In the light of this recommendation a joint meeting of the Turkestan Commission, the Council for International Propaganda and the representatives of Young Bukharans and the Communist Party of Bukhara discussed the question of a

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 175.

merger of the two parties. The representative of the Young Bukharan Party explained at this meeting that the existing differences in the programme of the Party with the Communist Party were only tactical, to enable it to draw such sections of the people as were not in agreement with the Communist programme into a common revolutionary struggle against the Emir's despotism, contending that after the victory of the revolution in Bukhara, the Young Bukharans would adopt the name and programme of the Communist Party. It was on this understanding that the Turk Commission decided to lend support to the Young Bukharans. They were asked to form a united bloc with the Bukharan Communists, desist from struggle against them and prepare in every way for a future merger of the two parties. They were also called upon to give a declaration to this effect in writing which they did on August 6, 1920.¹ The Fourth Party Congress of Bukharan Communists also thereupon recognised the possibility of a temporary alliance with the Young Bukharans. It may, however, be added that the misgivings of the Bukharan Communists concerning the Young Bukharans were never completely allayed.

On August 1, 1920 Frunze sent a telegram to Lenin seeking a directive on the Bukharan question. Frunze had envisaged only two courses of action, viz., either to hope for the development of an internal revolutionary process and wait for it, or to organise revolution with outside help. The first course was very slow in his opinion and so he favoured the second while doing everything to promote the first. The Political Bureau discussed this telegram and recommended the following course of action:

"To take all measures essential for the protection of Russian people in Bukhara and on the borders of Bukhara; never to take initiative in attacking Bukharan territory and Bukharan armed forces; to conduct a wide agitation among Muslims against the counter-revolutionary work of Bukhara in alliance with British agents and Russian counter-revolutionaries; to create in the process of such an agitation a native army, Bukharan Communists also joining it; and to convert these defensive measures into an offensive only if a popular revolutionary centre exists in Bukhara and asks for help."²

It may be pointed out that responsible sections in the

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. 2, pp. 176-77.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79.

Soviet government and the Party were always opposed to the idea of exporting revolution to Khiva or Bukhara. Such a course was, however, advocated by the Young Khivans and Young Bukharans whom the Soviet press once described as the "Decembrists of Central Asia refusing to learn their lesson from history". For them the path of revolutionising the masses was very long. Hence, the oppressed people of Khiva and Bukhara must be "liberated" from outside with the force of bayonets of the proletarian Red Army of Turkestan. The Soviet press reprimanded these "Asiatic Decembrists" for not recognising that the "exploited masses in their ignorance might mistake their 'liberators' for foreign conquerors".¹

The Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan, it may be recalled, had also expressed itself against the idea of imposing a revolution from the outside on the people of Khiva and Bukhara. The resolution on the current situation said, "We must wait for that natural moment, for the occurrence of a revolutionary upheaval inside the population of Khiva and Bukhara itself, not however allowing them to become bases for action by British military might against Turkestan Soviet Republic."²

The Communist Party of Bukhara began the revolution in Bukhara on August 28, 1920 by capturing Chardjui. On its appeal the Soviet forces under Frunze came to assist in the people's liberation. After heavy fighting, Bukhara, the citadel of despotism, was taken by Soviet forces on September 6, 1920. On October 5, 1920, the First *Kurultai* (the Congress of People's Representatives) met in Bukhara. It proclaimed Bukhara a Soviet People's Republic.³ On November 3, 1920

¹ See *Izvestia Turk Tsika*, August 5, 1919.

² See *Turkestansky Kommunist*, Sept. 20, 1919.

³ There was some correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy of India over a proposal of recognition of Khiva and Bukhara put forth by the Afghan Emir. The Secretary of State for India in his telegram P. No. 1784, dated May 6, 1922 took the line of non-recognition. "Till they have stable internal government, His Majesty's Government could not in any case recognise the independence of Bukhara and Khiva and also till they have a definitely independent position *vis-à-vis* Russia." The Emir of Bukhara won the case over money obtained from the sale of Karakul in London, which was deposited in a Bombay Bank, an amount of Rs. 16 lakhs. There were at that time many rumours about the Emir's intention to come and stay in India. Some Young Bukharan emissaries came to India in 1923 to plead the Emir's cause. But as the Soviet power in the Emirate had become stable by then, the British did not deem it politic to intervene.

a military and political agreement was signed between the RSFSR and the Bukharan Republic. An economic agreement was signed by the Soviet People's Republic of Bukhara with the RSFSR according to which both states undertook to co-ordinate their economic policies and plans. The RSFSR granted a 5 billion ruble non-payable loan to the Republic of Bukhara. Co-operation with the RSFSR made possible the rapid economic and cultural development of Bukhara.

CHAPTER VII

CIVIL WAR

The Struggle Against Counter-Revolution and Foreign Intervention

The summer of 1918 saw the beginning of the Civil War and foreign military intervention in Turkestan. Soon after the dissolution of the Kokand "Autonomous" Government there arose in Ferghana the *basmachi* movement and Turkestan became a beleaguered fortress encircled by a chain of fronts. The Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara were converted into spring-boards for attacking Soviet Turkestan. A *coup* against Soviet power was organised in the Trans-Caspian region by White Guards in conspiracy with the Social-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks; a counter-revolutionary Provisional Trans-Caspian government was formed. The British armed intervention followed this *coup*. Orenburg was seized by the forces of the White general Dutov and Turkestan was cut off from the central regions of Russia. In the Semirechye the counter-revolutionary *kulaks* and the White Cossacks rose against Soviet power. In Tashkent a counter-revolutionary agency, called the Turkestan Military Organisation, was set up under the patronage of Tsarist generals. It concluded an agreement with the British who promised to supply it with arms and money. It also established contacts with Ergash, the *basmachi* Chieftain, the Emir of Bukhara and the Djunaid Khan of Khiva.

The people of Soviet Turkestan faced this difficult situation with great courage and waged a heroic struggle in defence of Soviet power and against all its enemies—internal as well as external. On October 5, 1918 the *TsIK* of Turkestan, the *Sovnarkom* and the Executive Committee of Railway Workers decided in a joint meeting to form an Extraordinary Investigation Commission to watch the political situation and conduct struggle against the counter-revolutionaries. It was this Commission which discovered the existence of the Turke-

stan Military Organisation and exposed its connections with the British. A part of this organisation was liquidated but the rest managed to survive mainly with the help of the Left SRs who shared power with the Bolsheviks, and traitors such as Osipov, the War Commissar. On the night of January 18-19, 1919 Osipov organised a counter-revolutionary *coup* against Soviet power. All important Bolshevik members of the government and leaders of the Communist Party of Turkestan were arrested and killed. But the workers and soldiers of Tashkent stood firm in their support of Soviet power and spontaneously demonstrated in its defence. Uzbek volunteers also participated in the armed struggle against Osipov who fled to join the *basmachi*. His bid to seize power was foiled by the people.

The imperialists had placed high hopes on the *basmachi* movement in Ferghana. It was an anti-popular movement directed towards the establishment of the rule of clericals, feudals and bourgeois nationalist elements in Turkestan. As it had no broad base among the working masses, it depended largely on support from foreign imperialists. Its followers were in the main drawn from such ex-officials of the Tsarist administration as the *aksakals*, *mirabs* and *volost* administrators and from the Muslim clergy. Almost conspicuous by their absence in the ranks of the *basmachi* were the poor peasants and artisans with the exception of some who, either on account of their extreme backwardness, or through fear, remained with them temporarily. Such criminals as lived under the protection of the *bais* and the rich and did all sorts of misdeeds at their instance readily joined the movement which offered them a great opportunity. In the areas controlled by the *basmachi* things differed but little from the old regime of the khans.

The *basmachi* declared a holy war against Soviet rule. They had some initial successes because a majority of peasants in Ferghana were at first to a great extent neutral in the struggle against the *basmachi*. This passive attitude of the Ferghana peasants is explained by a marked deterioration in their economic conditions which began during the period of the First World War when prices of manufactured goods and food grains rose sharply with the prices for cotton, the main crop of Ferghana, remaining more or less fixed.

This situation further deteriorated due to the Orenburg blockade. Moreover, little propaganda work was done by the Party among the *dehkans* before the arrival of the Turkestan

Commission and some of their vital interests had been neglected. The *bazars* were completely closed down and a differential class approach was frequently absent as regards procurement of food supplies. The distortion of the Party's nationality policy by some individual local Bolsheviks also played into the hands of the *basmachi* and bourgeois nationalists who fully exploited the economic discontent prevailing in Ferghana.

All this resulted in the *basmachi* movement assuming a serious proportion in Ferghana between 1918-20. But it never became a mass movement and could not succeed in arousing a feeling of hostility among the local peasants towards Soviet power. Among Ferghana's population of two million, ten thousand *basmachi* certainly constituted a microscopic minority. The early successes of the *basmachi* were due not to any sizable popular support but rather to a weak and largely unorganised struggle against them. It was, therefore, not surprising that as the peasants became acquainted with the ideas and goals of Soviet power they grew more active in their struggle against the *basmachi*.

After the fall of the Kokand government, its military commander Ergash became head of the *basmachi*. He attacked towns and villages from Bachkir which he had made his centre. Soon after, another *basmachi* band appeared under Madamin Bek whom the bourgeois nationalists had appointed chief of the militia for the town of Margelan. Russian *kulaks* and immigrants whose interests clashed with Soviet power also joined hands with the *basmachi*. The so-called peasants' army led by a Russian *kulak* Monstrov captured Osh and crossed over to the side of the *basmachi*. Madamin Bek united all these heterogeneous groups and proclaimed the formation of a provisional government of Ferghana. This government was composed of Tsarist generals, representatives of Russian *kulaks* and cotton firms, the local *bais* and mullahs. From March-April 1918 up to the autumn of 1919 the *basmachi* played havoc on the Ferghana valley. They looted, destroyed factories and mines and perpetrated acts of savagery against those whom they suspected of sympathising with Soviet power.

This continued until a Turkestan front was created under the command of Frunze after the defeat of Kolchak. At the initiative of Lenin the Turkestan Commission consisting of Frunze, Kuibyshev and others was despatched to Tashkent to help the working people of Turkestan consolidate their

revolutionary power. The Commission besides undertaking a renovation of the Party and Soviet organs also took an active part in organising the struggle of the masses against the *basmachi* in Ferghana and against the White Guards and White Cossacks in the Trans-Caspian region and the Semirechye. A reorganisation of the Red Army took place under its guidance. It was thoroughly purged of the declassed adventurer and shady elements. The Turkestan Commission also successfully organised an army of more than 30,000 from among the people of local nationalities on the basis of voluntary mobilisation. Some ten thousand local people joined the Red Army in the Ferghana valley alone. By February-March 1920 considerable success was achieved in the campaign against the *basmachi* and by the summer their bands in central Ferghana had been liquidated. A few, however, still continued their bandit raids up to 1923, getting a new lease of life when Enver Pasha took up their leadership. But after 1920 the *basmachi* ceased to be a serious threat to the Soviet power.

Similarly, by 1920 counter-revolutionary plans in the Trans-Caspian region and the Semirechye had been completely foiled with the defeat of the White Guards and White Cossacks and the retreat of the British interventionists. But off from the centre for a long time and surrounded by a whole chain of fronts, the people of Turkestan had mostly to fight with their own resources. In spite of great difficulties such as the shortage of food supplies and munitions, etc., they fought courageously under the leadership of the Communist Party. They won the Civil War for it was a just war of liberation fought for the noble aim of a free and better life for the people against colonial slavery and feudal oppression. The lofty aims for which the people fought in the Civil War produced among them a high feeling of Soviet patriotism.

One of the important factors of the triumph of Soviet power in the Civil War was the sincere implementation of the Leninist nationality policy in pursuance of which the Soviet autonomy of Turkestan was created, a broad participation of the local working people in all organs of power was ensured and a struggle for the liquidation of all remnants of the colonial and feudal past was unleashed. The proletarian internationalism and friendship of the peoples was also strengthened during the course of the Civil War. Besides the working people of local nationalities who showed a high sense of patriotism in defending their socialist fatherland,

the peasants and workers of several European countries who were in Turkestan as war prisoners in the First World War, as well as revolutionary representatives of the peoples of neighbouring Asian countries including a few from India, also contributed to the victory of Soviet power.

The Economic and Cultural Changes

The period of the Civil War was also remarkable for the economic and cultural changes in the life of the peoples of Turkestan. Notwithstanding the many difficulties which it had to face, Soviet power laid the foundations for a new socialist economic structure during the Civil War itself and brought about great changes in the cultural life of the people.

First steps towards socialist transformation of industries were taken immediately after the October Revolution. The workers' control over all industries was established in the period beginning with the close of 1917 up to the middle of 1918 and the nationalisation of the banks, transport and foreign trade, etc., was carried through. The nationalisation of land was also declared. A state monopoly in food grains was created and committees of the poor were established in villages to carry out land reforms. The realisation of workers' control over industries and the nationalisation of key industries and railways created an economic basis for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The institution of workers' control arose somewhat spontaneously towards the close of 1917 and was utilised by the Soviet power as a form of class struggle against sabotage by capitalists who tried to reduce production and disorganise industries. Soviet power attached great importance to the institution of workers' control as a form of class struggle of the workers as well as for their training in industrial management. It proved to be an important stage in the establishment of planned socialist production.

In March 1918 the Third Extraordinary Congress of Bank Employees was held at Tashkent. The Congress discussed the question of nationalisation of banks and expressed its readiness to come to the help of the Soviet government with all its experience and knowledge. By the end of May 1918 the nationalisation of banks was complete and the entire credit system was now concentrated in the hands of the Soviet state. Through the nationalisation of banks the Soviet power de-

prived the bourgeoisie of its most important instrument for economic domination.

The nationalisation of transport also played an important role in the organisation of a socialist economy. On March 1, 1918 the Semirechye Railway was nationalised, followed by the Ferghana Railway on March 31, and the Bukhara Railway in April 1918.

In March-April 1918 not only individual enterprises but entire branches of important industries were nationalised. On March 5, 1918 all cotton industries and its ancillary industries like soap, oil, etc., were nationalised by a decree of the *Sovnarkom*. The private sale and purchase of cotton was banned and all big cotton stocks were seized. Coal and oil industries were also nationalised the same month. By the end of March and beginning of April the Aral fishing industry, printing presses, flour, sugar and rice industries, too, were nationalised.

In June 1918 the number of nationalised industrial units in the entire region reached 205, in July 245 and in September 283.¹ In the latter half of the year many small and medium size enterprises were also nationalised. This was, however, a mistake resulting from excessive ideological zeal. There was little proper understanding of the essence of nationalisation in the beginning and management of the nationalised concern was effected through the factory or plant committee of workers which under the influence of SR ideas often considered it the property of a given collective. This led to some disorganisation of production. But this was soon rectified by a decision of the *Sovnarkom* in March 1918 to create a Regional Council for People's Economy (*Sovnarkhoz*). In April 1918, a Regional Council for Production was formed which was entrusted with the task of organising production, working out norms and plans to regulate the economic life of the region. Later this organ was reorganised into a Higher Council for People's Economy with similar functions. In every *oblast* a Council for People's Economy was established to guide the industrial enterprises. At the time of the First Congress of Councils for People's Economy in August-September 1919 there were 18 such Councils (*Sovnarkhozes*). By the end of 1919 their number rose to 40 but was later reduced as a result of the abolition of some and merger of others. The

¹ V. Y. Nepomnin, *Istorichesky opyt stroitelstva sotsializma v Uzbekistane, 1917-37*, Tashkent, 1960, p. 99.

Second Congress of the *Sovnarkhozes* held in July 1920 discussed the question of economic reconstruction and results of the activities of the *Sovnarkhozes*. By the end of 1920 their number was reduced from 40 to 17. In 1921 there were some 869 factory-plant type industrial concerns employing 32,533 workers. Out of these 869 some 405 were not in operation due to economic dislocation caused by the Civil War.¹

The Trade Union Congress held in the summer of 1918 debated the question of work discipline and made several recommendations to this effect. The Turkestan *TsIK* issued orders establishing a compulsory work norm and trial by comrades in the plant and the factory. In April 1919, a decision was adopted fixing responsibility for the efficient running of plants and factories. In August 1919 nationalisation of handicraft industries mistakenly carried out during the first months of the Civil War was specifically prohibited. Artisans were called upon to unite in artels which were to be provided with raw materials and instruments by the state. They were in turn to sell their produce to state trading organisations only.

The question of the rehabilitation of the economy was discussed at length in the Fifth Regional Party Conference held in January 1920. The Conference suggested a plan of production to be achieved by strengthening and consolidating the existing enterprises and development of the handicraft industries. M. V. Frunze directed part of the army to various construction works. Voluntary mobilisations of people were organised to clear railway lines, repair bridges, roads and dilapidated buildings. Labour was made compulsory for all up to the age of 50. All these measures made possible a partial restoration of the economy that suffered heavily during the Civil War.

In agriculture, too, the period of Civil War saw some important changes. As compared to the central regions of Russia where the socialist transformation of villages began as early as the middle of 1918, the development of the socialist revolution in agriculture took place more slowly in Turkestan and could not be completed until a much later period. Nevertheless certain important steps were taken in the very first months following the October Revolution. Implementing Lenin's decree on nationalisation of land as

¹ V. Y. Nepomnin, *Istorichesky opyt stroitelstva sotsializma v Uzbekistane, 1917-37*, pp. 101-102.

adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the Turkestan Commissariat for Land Management issued regulations prohibiting all future deals in land. Renting of land was allowed only in exceptional cases with the permission of the local land committee for a period not exceeding one year and with the confirmation of the local Soviet. The statute of the Provisional government relating to the organisation of land committees was changed.¹ In December 1917 the *Sovnarkom* stopped the Immigration Administration from continuing the distribution of lands to immigrants.² Later, several big landed estates were nationalised. By a decree of the *Sovnarkom* issued on March 13, 1918 all irrigation canals and channels were transferred to the Land Commissariat. These basic principles of the land policy of Soviet power in Turkestan were confirmed by the statute of November 17, 1920 passed by the *TsIK* and *Sovnarkom*. The first articles of this statute declared that all land and water situated within the territory of the Turkestan Republic was the state property of the people.³

Great difficulties, however, had to be faced in the practical implementation of the land reforms. The process of liquidation of landlordism and feudal land tenure proceeded very slowly and could be completed only between 1925-28. The cause of this delay lay in the specific conditions of Turkestan, in the greater backwardness of the socio-economic relations here, the relatively slower growth of consciousness of the *dehkans* and their organisation as compared to central regions of Russia, in the influence of the feudals and the clergy over the peasants under patriarchal tribal conditions and in the prolonged struggle against the *basmachi*.

But notwithstanding the above enumerated difficulties, some initial steps were taken towards socialist reorganisation of agriculture in this period. There appeared in Turkestan in 1918-19 400 agricultural communes and artels. Forty thousand peasants joined them and they had an area of 35,000 *dessiatines* of land. These early communes, however, worked on a subsistence level and had no sound economic and technical basis. Their object was to obtain self-sufficiency in food

¹ *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti* No. 190, Dec. 9, 1917.

² *Podgotovka i provedeniye Velikoi oktyabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii v Turkestane. Sbornik dokumentov*, Tashkent, 1947, p. 241.

³ *Sbornik dekretov, rasporyazhenii TsIKa Turkestanskoi Respubliki, 9 sessiya*, Tashkent, 1921, pp. 125-26.

for a large mass of village *batraks* (landless labourers) and the poor in the early difficult days of the war. These communes were absolutely voluntary in character and the individual *dehkan* economy was not suppressed. With the restoration of food supplies from the centre the communes lost whatever urgency they had possessed earlier and they were disbanded. But they exposed the hollowness of the *kulak-bai* propaganda about the unreality of collective agriculture. Besides these communes 17 *sovkhozes* (state farms) were also organised in Turkestan with a total area of 28,500 *dessiatines* of land. These farms also faced great difficulties in the beginning. There was an acute shortage of cattle and hence land had to be given to peasants on a share-crop basis, the share being more fair, from 4/5 to 7/8 of the crop.

Soviet power gave urgent attention to the task of land reforms in the Semirechye where the native Kirghiz had suffered as a result of the immigration of Russian settlers and the eviction of Kirghiz nomads from their best lands. This seizure of land by Russian settlers assumed a still greater proportion when it was employed as a punitive measure against the Kirghiz for their part in the 1916 uprising. During the first two years of Soviet rule in Turkestan the problem of land reforms in the Semirechye could not be pursued for various reasons. Additionally, the Soviet and Party organs in the Semirechye were also tainted with *kulak* elements and this hindered the implementation of land reforms there.

But the Turkestan Commission brought energy and determination to the solution of the problem of land reform in the Semirechye. It first purged the Party and the Soviet set up of alien class elements. Measures were taken to facilitate the return of Kirghiz émigrés from China. On March 4, 1920 a decree on the return of the confiscated lands to the native working peasants was issued. In April 1920 the *TsIK* of Turkestan made a provisional land settlement. A sum of 44.5 million rubles was spent on rehabilitation of Kirghiz émigrés returning from China. The Ninth Regional Congress of Soviets also directed the return of all lands seized by Russian settlers from the native peasants and nomads during the period 1916-18. It also prohibited every type of immigration into Turkestan and seizure of the lands of natives.¹ Thus the first land reform measures were taken in such areas where

¹ *Syezdy Sovetov v dokumentakh, 1917-86*, Moscow, 1959, p. 435.

Russian *kulak* immigration had given the problem a national colour. This was quite natural for the native *bais* and *manaps* were exploiting the situation in their class interest by arousing national feelings.

The Soviet government during the Civil War period did considerable work towards the restoration of the agricultural economy to its pre-war level. Lenin signed a decree on May 17, 1920 assigning 50 million rubles to construction of irrigation works in Turkestan. On November 2, he signed the decision of the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz* on the reinstallation of cotton cultivation in Turkestan and Azerbaijan. In April 1918 the RSFSR *Sovnarkhoz* invested 502 million rubles for the renovation of cotton cultivation and the cotton industry in Turkestan.¹ Shortly afterwards it was decided to transfer two textile factories to Turkestan. As a result of these early efforts the area under cotton cultivation increased by 300 thousand *dessiatines* in comparison to 1918. The Soviet power helped the *dehkāns* with implements and cattle. Liberal money advances were given to peasants who grew cotton and they were also supplied with seeds and fertilisers. Due to these material incentives the area under cotton cultivation in 1920 alone registered an increase of 21,000 *dessiatines* over the previous year. Yet notwithstanding all these efforts the total sown area in Turkestan in 1920 was still 35 per cent of the 1915 level.²

The food problem became very acute during the Civil War period. Turkestan had long been an area of food deficit, depending on food supplies from Central Russia where from 12 to 15 million *poods* of food grains were imported every year. The fact that the three years preceding the October Revolution had been years of crop failure further aggravated this problem. In 1918-19 the Turkestan *Sovnarkom* assigned a sum of 20 million rubles for the purchase of food-grain stock. But as the price in the open market increased daily, no one was willing to sell to the state at a fixed price. The government then had to levy a tax in kind on the peasants—4 per cent of the crop. But only 4.5 million *poods* of food grains could thus be collected as against the planned 20 million. Under such circumstances the *TsIK* was obliged to issue a decree on state monopoly of food grains. Food rationing was introduced in towns providing from 1/4 to 1 pound of bread

¹ S. Muraveisky, *Ocherki po istorii revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Srednei Azii*, Tashkent, 1926, p. 22.

² M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

per person per day, depending on his social productivity.¹ On the whole the Soviet administration was able to implement its food policy successfully without distortion, though some occasional cases of national discrimination by individual officials and excesses in procurement from villages did occur. Such errors and excesses were strongly condemned at the Party Congresses and Congresses of Soviets. The *TsIK* of Turkestan unanimously adopted a resolution on July 11, 1918 on the equal distribution of food and other manufactured articles "without national distinction".²

The Soviet government paid much attention to the organisation of the village poor. The work of organising the committees of the poor which were to help in the introduction of land reforms began in the spring of 1918. The Sixth Regional Congress of Soviets decided to draw these committees into the struggle against hunger, and some of them really did a good job in this field. But these committees could not become widespread. The bourgeois nationalists of the local nationalities tried to hold up their organisation in the villages. Led by Ryskulov they tried to delay agrarian reforms in non-Russian areas. They were for arousing the national consciousness of the Muslim poor rather than his class consciousness. The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan and Ninth Regional Congress of Soviets in 1920 took a decision to organise *Koshchi*—the union of the village poor on a wide scale.

In the cultural sphere, too, great work was done in Turkestan during the difficult years of the Civil War. Beginning with 1918 Soviet schools began educating children in their own language. These new schools met the tough opposition of the clergy whose domination over education had been complete and unchallenged. The absence of a national cadre of teachers and scientific terminology were other difficulties faced by Soviet schools. Yet despite these difficulties much progress was achieved in the field of education in the early years of Soviet power. By 1920 there were 2,022 primary schools in Turkestan with 165,122 children on their rolls, among them 97,000 children of local nationalities.³ The budget expenditure on education rose from 2 million 350 thousand rubles in 1917 to 6.5 million rubles in 1920.⁴ Short term

¹ M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-96.

² *Nasha Gazeta* No. 144, July 17, 1918.

³ M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-98.

⁴ *Izvestia Turk TsIKa*, November 7, 1920.

courses were introduced for the training of teachers. By 1920, 1,049 persons had finished 11 such courses. Eleven reorientation courses were organised the same year in which 1,062 persons participated. Evening schools were opened in all towns in a campaign for the liquidation of illiteracy among adults. There were 31 vocational and technical schools functioning in 1920 imparting education to 5,500 persons.

On April 21, 1918 the Turkestan People's University was opened at Tashkent. There had been no institution of higher learning in Turkestan before the Revolution. The University had five faculties with an enrolment of 1,200 students in 1918-19. This number increased to 1,470 in 1919-20. The Turkestan People's University was reorganised into the Turkestan State University by a decree signed by Lenin on September 7, 1920. Moscow and Petrograd sent their best professors to promote the cultural advance of this backward region of Central Asia. By the end of 1920 there were 2,641 students at the University in Tashkent.

The Civil War period also saw the birth of a Soviet intelligentsia in Turkestan. The transition of Hamza and Zavki from enlightened democrats to active supporters of the Bolsheviks and their struggle against bourgeois nationalists marks the beginning of a new phase in the evolution of the Soviet intelligentsia in Central Asia. It was in the fire of struggle for Soviet power that the Uzbek Soviet theatre was born in Ferghana. Its founder was Hamza. The same year the Tashkent Conservatory was established to undertake a systematic study of Uzbek and Tajik music. Soviet national press and book publication also appeared at about the same time. Between 1918-20, eleven newspapers were published in the Uzbek language besides several others in the Kazakh and Tajik languages. The period also witnessed the early attempts at the reform of the Uzbek alphabet. Many signs not needed in the Uzbek language were dropped and several new ones were introduced to make the phoneme correspond to life more closely.

Thus the period of Civil War was not merely one of wanton waste and destruction. It was also a period of remarkable changes in the economic and cultural spheres of life of the people in Turkestan. The Civil War witnessed the growth of mass political activity which rallied around Soviet power. All efforts were directed to the defeat of the armed counter-revolution aided by foreign military intervention.

The Struggle of the Party Against Chauvinism and Nationalism

The success of Soviet power in Central Asia is due in great measure to its correct policy in the sphere of national relations. The struggle of the Communist Party of Turkestan against both chauvinist and nationalist deviations has been a subject of great controversy and misunderstanding in foreign as well as Soviet historical literature. A tendency to overstress and magnify the chauvinist deviation can be noticed in some early works of Soviet writers. Thus we find some of them harping on the theme of local Bolsheviks inheriting "the colonial legacy" of Tsarism. Most of the early local Russian Bolsheviks were dubbed as "labour aristocracy" trying to preserve its privileged position under the guise of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The national antagonism between the "European proletariat" and the "native Asian mass of people" was, in their opinion, deeper than the class antagonism within the two national groups. Most of the writers in the West have also taken a more or less similar view, widely quoting from such Soviet writers as emphasised the chauvinistic tendencies in the ranks of the Communist Party of Turkestan.

But such a view has nothing to do with the facts of history. While the existence of some chauvinistically-inclined persons among the ranks of the Party cannot be denied, it would be grossly mistaken to say that their number at any time was so preponderantly large as to make possible a distortion of the general healthy line of the Party on the national question. The Party always had a strong core of sound Marxist-Leninist elements which waged a relentless struggle against every type of deviation—chauvinistic or nationalistic—from the Party line.

Sometimes too much credit is given to the Centre for correcting the erring local Bolsheviks and an impression is sought to be created as if before the restoration of Turkestan's communication with the Centre in September 1919 the Party and the Soviet set-up there was heavily dominated by Russian chauvinists who treated the natives with contempt and denied them their rightful place in the government, and as if the entire situation changed only with the descent of the various representatives from the Centre and the appointment of Commissions, etc. The struggle against chauvinism was, however,

not a struggle between Russian and native Communists, the latter supported by such representatives of the Centre as the extraordinary Commissar Kobozev, and Frunze, Kuibyshev and other members of the Turkestan Commission and the Turkestan Bureau of the CC of the RCP(B).

The struggle against the deviations in the Party line in fact cut across national groups in the Party. Thus a number of local Russian Communists joined hands with their Muslim comrades in waging a common struggle against the chauvinist-minded Russian Communists, just as Muslim comrades formed a joint front with Russian Communists in exposing the bourgeois nationalists. The representatives of the Centre no doubt played an important part in keeping the Party free from the chauvinistic or nationalistic bias, but an admission of this does not mean that they conducted the struggle for the purity of the Party line on the national question single-handed and all alone. They received great popular support from the ranks of the Party and the people at large in this struggle. Some Soviet works written under the influence of the personality cult unfortunately magnified the role of the various commissions and bureaus and did not take sufficient notice of the popular nature of the struggle against chauvinism and nationalism.

It can be said without the least hesitation that the Communist Party of Turkestan by and large followed a correct policy towards the people of local nationalities in the early period following the October Revolution. The national question always remained in the centre of attention of the Turkestan Bolsheviks. As early as 1905-06 the Bolsheviks had given due attention to the national question in the illegal papers which they brought out from Tashkent and Samarkand. They had urged the importance of work among the native people.¹ The First Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan (June 17-26, 1918) in its resolution on the Party work among the Muslims stressed the need to draw the broad Muslim masses into the construction of a new life. It recognised the languages of the local peoples as state languages along with the Russian. It demanded the establishment of commissariats for nationality affairs in all *oblasts*, *uyezds* and local places for propaganda among the Muslims to draw them into the Soviet organs. It expressed full confidence in the

¹ Mandzhara, *Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Srednei Azii 1905-20 gg.* (*Uospominaniya*), Tashkent, 1934, p. 19.

Muslim toilers and called for organising Red Army units drawn from the Muslim proletariat.¹

Already by the time of the Second Congress of the CPT in December 1918, the native Communists formed about half of the entire membership of the Party, and representatives of Muslim working masses served on such high organs of Soviet power as the Turkestan *TsIK* and *Sovnarkom* since April 1918. It may be recalled that the Second Congress of the Party expressed its dissatisfaction with the educative and propaganda work among the Muslim masses and demanded wider participation of working people of local nationalities in the day-to-day working of the Soviets and other social organisations by giving them administrative and other posts.² All this shows the correctness of the Party line on the national question in the period immediately following the Revolution.

The group of "Old Communists" led by Tobolin is often accused of taking a chauvinistic attitude towards native Communists.³ But this is yet to be substantiated by some precise evidence. It is true that this group had taken an impermissible position of organising itself as a faction inside the Party on purely subjective grounds of its dislike for a number of persons in the Tashkent city Party organisation and had refused to subject itself to the Party discipline for which it was reprimanded by the Second Party Congress. But no concrete charge of chauvinism can be laid at Tobolin's door beyond this. The Second Congress of the CPT found no ideological differences between the group of "Old Communists" and the Tashkent city Party unit. The latter was, moreover, also led by Russian Communists. Chauvinist deviation therefore was never an issue between them.

There is little evidence to suggest the existence of any serious threat to the Party line on the national question from the side of great-nation chauvinism until January 1919. The counter-revolutionary uprising of Osipov in that month was a severe blow to the leadership of the CPT. A number of tried and trusted local leaders of the Party were murdered through the treachery of Osipov. Earlier, in July 1918 several important Bolshevik leaders were killed in Ashkhabad and Kizyl-Arvat at the hands of the counter-revolutionary conspirators. As a result of these grievous losses which the Party

¹ *Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya syezdov KPT 1918-24 gg.*, Tashkent, 1958, pp. 11-12.

² *Materialy i dokumenty II syezda KPT*, p. 62.

³ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 91.

suffered in 1918-19, it was depleted of able leadership. Thereafter a chauvinistic deviation was able to raise its ugly head. Kazakov, the newly elected Chairman of the *TsIK* and *Sovnarkom* of Turkestan, drifted willy-nilly towards such a course of policy in the company of the Left SR Uspensky. But the Left SRs were more to blame for this deviation than the Bolsheviks and even then no wholesale digression ever took place. It remained confined to certain stray actions of individual leaders in the *Sovnarkom* and the *Kraikom* (Territorial Committee) of the Party.

From early 1919 a sharp struggle emerged in the sphere of the Party and Soviet work against great-nation chauvinism. This was very vital for the Party as the bourgeois nationalists exploited every opportunity to sow distrust of the Russian working class among the native toilers. But the fight against chauvinism was not a typically Central Asian phenomenon. At the Centre Lenin himself was waging a struggle against Bukharin and Pyatakov who opposed the inclusion of the right to national self-determination in the programme adopted by the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B).

At the Seventh Congress of Soviets of Turkestan (March 1918) and the Second Conference of the CPT the struggle against chauvinism was taken up. Healthy Marxist elements in the Party gathered round Kobozev who came to Tashkent as the extraordinary representative of the Centre in March 1919. A national section was formed in the Seventh Congress of Soviets under the leadership of Kobozev which criticised the government and Party leaders of the Kazakov-Uspensky group for their mistakes on the food front. In the Congress Ryskulov read a report critical of the policies of the food directorate. These policies were termed by the Congress as creating two sections of the proletariat, viz., Russian and native, against each other.¹

The national section of the Seventh Congress of Soviets demanded that the government arm the Muslim proletariat to fight against counter-revolution. It also criticised some members of the government for underestimating the role of the Muslim toilers in the revolutionary struggle. It called for ridding the Red Guards of all shady elements and demanded an early summoning of the Territorial Party Congress.² It also expressed dissatisfaction that only seven places had been

¹ Partarkhiv Instituta Istorii Partii, Tashkent, File 60.

² *Ibid.*, ll. 89-90.

allocated to representatives of the native population in the new government.

Kazakov, Uspensky and Solkin opposed the creation of the national section in the Seventh Congress of Soviets and brought forward a proposal to dissolve the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs. This demand was, however, rejected by the Congress. The Kazakov-Uspensky group also asserted that every law made by the government of the RSFSR required the approval of the *TsIK* of Turkestan to be valid there. Through such regional demands the chauvinist group sought to give its stand an appearance of a struggle for the sovereign rights of Turkestan and its so-called independence of the Centre.

If the Seventh Congress of Soviets had been a victory for the Kobozev group, the Second Territorial Conference of the Party swung the pendulum a little towards Kazakov's side. The Party Conference found fault with the sweeping criticism of the entire Central Committee of the Turkestan Party by Ryskulov in the Seventh Congress of Soviets. The mistakes, it pointed out, were those of individual Party leaders and not of the Party line as a whole. It expressed confidence in the *Kraikom* (Territorial Committee) of the Party and rejected the protest made by the National Section of the Seventh Congress of Soviets as unfounded. The Conference adopted a decision to establish the Muslim Bureau in the Party for propaganda work among the Muslim masses. The Musbureau was to be an auxiliary organ of the Party and was to act under its supervision and control. The Second Conference of the Party passed a resolution demanding the recall of Kobozev. He was relieved of his post and an investigation into his conduct was ordered.¹ Annoyed with Kobozev's activities some members of the *Kraikom* sent Shakirov to Moscow to appear against him before the Central Committee of the Party.

In the Third Congress of the CPT (June 1 to 15, 1919) the fight against chauvinism took the form of an academic debate on the existence of a Muslim proletariat in Turkestan. Solkin maintained that there was no Muslim proletariat as feudal relations still dominated among the Muslims and strong survivals of nomadism were to be found among them. He was supported by Konstantinopolsky who opined that there was only a semi-proletariat in Turkestan and no proletariat which moved the historical process. Konstantinopolsky expressed

¹ *Trudy III syezda KPT*, pp. 134-35.

his fears about Pan-Islamism seizing the national movement in Turkestan in the absence of a native proletariat. But Kobozev did not share such fears. He pointed out that already more than half the membership of the Party consisted of native Communists which clearly showed that the Muslim masses had been attracted to the programme of the Party.¹ Evaluating the activities of the *Kraikom* (Territorial Committee) of the Party, the Third Party Congress found its tactics of organising the National Section in the Seventh Congress of Soviets wrong. The Third Party Congress in its resolution on the Report of the *Kraikom* observed that the *Kraikom* had not fulfilled all the tasks entrusted to it by the previous Party congresses. The resolution mentioned in particular the absence of correct revolutionary work in local areas, especially among the Muslims and the lack of discipline within Party ranks. The Congress set before the Party the task of strengthening discipline and intensifying party work among the local population through the Muslim Bureau.

The Third Party Congress gave the Muslim sections functioning within the Party Committees the same status as enjoyed by the Party cells and placed them under the control of the Muslim Bureau to which every possible help was to be extended. The election of Kobozev, Ryskulov, Effendiyev, Khodzhayev and Aliyev to the *Kraikom* of the Communist Party of Turkestan somewhat curbed the chauvinist group of Kazakov. But this group was not yet broken. Kazakov was still the Chairman of the *TsIK*. A long struggle against his group soon followed.

The occasion for the renewal of this struggle was the receipt of a communication from the Central Committee of the RCP(B) on July 12, 1919 about ensuring proportional representation of the local population in the territorial administration. The Central Committee drew the attention of the Turkestan Party and government to the necessity of a "wide proportional participation of the indigenous population of Turkestan in the state activities, without obligation of belonging to the Party. It was enough if their candidatures were endorsed by Muslim workers' organisations".² The Kazakov-Uspensky group of chauvinistically-inclined persons feared a danger to their position if the directive was implemented. They began to argue that the Central Committee

of the Party did not understand the situation in Turkestan properly and that the local workers and peasants had not grown up to the level of maturity required for participation in state activities. They obstructed the publication of the communication in the press. On June 20, 1920 they sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) arguing against the possibility of implementing the directive.

Around the directive of the Central Committee on proportional representation there arose thus a sharp struggle. It was discussed in Party and public meetings at different places like Tashkent, Samarkand and Ferghana. In a public meeting held in the old town of Tashkent on July 16, 1919 in which several members of the Territorial Committee of the Party and Muslim Bureau were present, a resolution was passed demanding its immediate implementation, especially in the reorganisation of the Turkestan *TsIK* on the basis of proportional representation. The Kazakov-Uspensky group began its vilification campaign against Kobozev, accusing him of trying to pit natives against Russian workers. It demanded that Kobozev be recalled by the Centre as he was conspiring with Muslim declassed elements, former traders and interpreters, etc., for personal power. The directive of the Centre met with a great measure of popular support. Party units in Samarkand and other towns expressed their full agreement.

The Eighth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan and the Fourth Congress of the CPT which met in September 1919 once again became the arena of struggle against the chauvinistic deviation in the Party and the government. In the Eighth Congress of Soviets the Kazakov-Uspensky bloc tabled a resolution calling for abolition of the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs. As an extreme reaction to the chauvinistic disposition of the Kazakov-Uspensky group there arose a nationalist deviation in the Party which was headed by Ryskulov. Its first manifestation was the resolution abolishing the *Sovnarkom* which was carried through the Eighth Congress of Soviets at the instance of Ryskulov. The *Sovnarkom* was abolished and its place was taken by three councils within the *TsIK*. This adversely affected the efficient working of the executive organ of government.

The Fourth Territorial Party Congress passed a resolution which approved the principles underlying the directive of the Centre on proportional representation. It devised practical means for its implementation, keeping in view the conditions prevailing in Turkestan. The Fourth Congress decided that

¹ *Trudy III syezda KPT*, p. 50.

² *Turkestansky Kommunist* No. 62, July 16, 1919.

proportional representation was to be implemented in each individual case when it was officially demanded by the territorial or local Congresses of Soviets. It was to be implemented under the general guidance of the territorial and local committees of the Communist Party and the Muslim Bureau in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet Constitution.¹ It should be remembered that in Turkestan the Muslim masses were still not sufficiently well organised and hence there existed a real danger of their being misled by exploiters of their own nationality.

At the Fourth Congress of the CPT held in September 1919 the chauvinist group met a serious rebuff at the hands of the healthy elements in the Party. Not only Muslim but also many Russian delegates gave their warm support to the radiogram of the Centre on proportional representation. Thus Schwarts in his speech declared that it was impermissible not to take into account the numerical strength of a given nation. He stated that "the cultural level of a nation did not play any role so far as the participation in the administration by the people was concerned, for it was only in the very process of state activity that a nation showed whether it could cope with the task assigned to it".² Kobozev described the radiogram of the Central Committee as a new step on the way to self-determination of the peoples of Turkestan.³

The struggle against the chauvinistic deviation was continuing when the Turk Commission arrived in Tashkent in November 1919. The Commission began the work of weeding out from Party and Soviet organisations such persons as in its opinion were responsible for chauvinistic deviation. It ordered Kazakov, Uspensky, Sorokin and several others to leave Turkestan. Legal proceedings were started against a number of former Tsarist officials. The Commission took energetic measures to purge the *uyezd* and *oblast* committees of the Party in the Semirechye of chauvinistic elements. Besides the Semirechye, such steps were taken in Ferghana and Syr-Darya *oblasts* also.

Lenin's letter addressed to the Communists of Turkestan played a vital role in activating the Party's struggle for a correct national policy, free of deviation. Lenin advised Russian Communists to deal with the people of Turkestan

¹ *Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya syezdov KPT*, pp. 49-51.

² *Musbyuro RKP(B) v Turkestane*, p. 52.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

with the greatest tolerance and trust and demanded that all traces of Great Russian imperialism be eradicated. In his letter Lenin pointed out the "immense, epochal" importance of the establishment of correct relations with the people of Turkestan.¹ Lenin's letter was discussed in Party and public meetings throughout Turkestan where it was received with great satisfaction.

While the Party under the guidance of the Turk Commission diverted all its energy and attention to the task of rooting out chauvinistic deviation from the Party, the struggle against bourgeois nationalism became neglected to some extent. Consequently, nationalistic deviation soon appeared on the scene and posed a serious threat to Soviet work in the backward conditions of Turkestan.

The nationalist deviation came to the fore in January 1920 manifesting itself in the Fifth Territorial Party Conference and the Third Territorial Conference of Muslim Communists. While the Muslim Bureau for some time did good work among the Muslim masses by popularising the Soviet and Party ideals and bringing them closer to the Soviet power, it soon began to function as an independent organisation parallel to the Party, and under the nationalist ideas of Ryskulov and others, became a citadel of reactionary nationalism.

The Fifth Territorial Conference of the Party took the decision to unite all the three leading organs of the Party, viz., the *Kraikom* (Territorial Committee) of the CPT, Territorial Musbureau and the Territorial Committee of Foreign Communists in a single organ of a united Communist Party of Turkestan. This was a correct decision meant to strengthen the solidarity of the Party. However, the Conference committed a grave mistake by adopting at Ryskulov's instance a resolution calling for renaming the Party as the Communist Party of the Turkic people. In Ryskulov's opinion the Muslim masses had ceased to follow the *Kraikom* of the Party as a result of which the CPT could no longer exercise its ideological influence on them. He, therefore, suggested a change in the name of the Party.

Concurrent with the Fifth Territorial Party Conference were the proceedings of the Third Territorial Conference of Muslim Communists. In the latter Ryskulov in his report on autonomy and the constitution of Turkestan attempted to

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 138.

impose his nationalistic deviation. He proposed that the name of Turkestan Republic be changed to the Turkic Republic. He argued that Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Turkmens, Tajiks and Uzbeks were not separate peoples but only one people, viz., the Turks. The Third Territorial Conference of Muslim Communists adopted this proposal of Ryskulov. It also urged a revision of the constitution with a view to increasing the powers of Turkestan. The resolution passed by the Conference, shorn of its revolutionary verbiage which was meant to conceal the real designs of its authors, in fact amounted to a demand for separation from Russia. It was Pan-Turkic and extremely reactionary in its essence.

The adoption by the Fifth Party Conference of the proposal of Ryskulov to rename the Party as the Party of the Turkic people is explained by the absence of a single united opinion on this question among the members of the Turkestan Commission. Chairman of the Commission Eliava supported Ryskulov's proposal and Kuibyshev and Goloshchekin adopted a vacillating position. Only Rudzutak decisively opposed Ryskulov's proposal. Frunze did not take part in the Conference as he was away from Turkestan. After his arrival in Tashkent he prevailed upon the Turkestan Commission to stop the change-over of name to the Communist Party of the Turkic people pending instructions from the Central Committee of the RCP(B).¹

In March 1920 the Turkestan Commission referred the resolutions passed by the Third Territorial Conference of Muslim Communists and the Fifth Territorial Conference of the Party to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) for its opinion. The latter rejected the demand for renaming the Turkestan Republic and the CPT as contrary to the Marxist-Leninist national programme and to the principles of the Party organisation. It recognised a Communist Party of Turkestan as rightful organisation within the All-Russia Communist Party.

The nationalistic deviationists, however, did not give in so easily. They sent a delegation headed by Ryskulov to Moscow to defend their projects. In their memorandum submitted to the Central Committee of the Party, they put forth nationalist demands which ran counter to the national policy of the Communist Party. They demanded full transfer of all powers

¹ *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Turkestana*, Vol. III, Tashkent, 1964, p. 136.

to the Turkestan *TsIK* and the *Sovnarkom*, the abolition of the Turkestan Commission, withdrawal or disarming of the Russians in the Red Army in Turkestan and formation of a purely Muslim army. They also demanded transfer of railways to the Republic administration along with post and telegraph, foreign relations and finance which were to be looked after by the Turkestan *TsIK*. They denied the existence of the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens and Kirghizs as separate nationalities and joined them together as the Turkic nation. They tried to revive the nationalistic thesis put forth by them in the Third Territorial Conference of Muslim Communists according to which Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism had lost their entire base in the conditions of Soviet Turkestan.¹

The Central Committee of the RCP(B) carefully examined all the demands of the delegation and formed a special commission for this purpose. On June 13, 1920, V. I. Lenin acquainted himself with the draft prepared by the commission and made several additions. The demands of the nationalist deviationists were turned down by Lenin and he suggested "to specially work out the ways of struggle with the priesthood and Pan-Islamism and bourgeois-nationalist movement".²

The Politbureau of the RCP(B) adopted a resolution on the basic tasks of the Communist Party in Turkestan on June 29, 1920. The suggestions and ideas of Lenin were incorporated in it along with the draft prepared by a commission of the Central Committee. The resolution of the Politbureau of the Party pointed out the need to liquidate the feudal and patriarchal remnants in the economic life of the republic and the creation and strengthening of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies which could unite the working masses around the Communist Party. It called for an untiring struggle to strengthen and develop the international friendship between the working people of Turkestan and the peoples of Russia. It was stressed by the resolution that, with the brotherly help of the Russian proletariat, in the first place, all peoples and nationalities of Turkestan could freely develop along the socialist path on the basis of freedom and equality. The Politbureau considered it necessary to preserve

¹ *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Uzbekistana*, Tashkent, 1964, p. 77.

² *Leninsky sbornik*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 326.

the Turkestan Commission as a representative of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and the government of the RSFSR. The Politbureau firmly rejected the demand of the nationalist deviationists to create a special Communist Party of the Turkic people which would have resulted in a break between the local Communist organisation and the All-Russia Communist Party. It also confirmed the necessity of uniting all the three local territorial committees into a single Central Committee of the CPT.

The group of nationalists disagreed with the resolution of the Politbureau and resigned from the *Kraikom* of the CPT and the Turkestan *TsIK*. This necessitated a dissolution of the *Kraikom* on July 19, 1920 by the Turk Commission and formation of a new provisional Central Committee of the CPT. It was also decided to dissolve the *TsIK* and reorganise it anew. The new provisional Central Committee of the CPT was headed by Tiurakulov and the new *TsIK* by Rahimbayev. The dissolution of the *Kraikom* and the *TsIK* at the initiative of the Turkestan Commission was met with broad approval by the Party organisation at various levels. The bourgeois nationalists led by Ryskulov tried to sabotage land and water reforms. While they had supported the Turkestan Commission in its campaign against Russian *kulaks* and settlers, they withdrew this support when an offensive against the Muslim *bais* and *manaps* was planned. They wanted the struggle against native capital to be postponed to the indefinite future. The urgent task in their view was to arouse national consciousness and not class consciousness. The bourgeois nationalists thus completely discredited themselves before the common masses of Turkestan. Such sincere and honest Muslim Communists as Tiurakulov and Rahimbayev successfully carried on a struggle against the harmful ideas of nationalists.

The provisional Central Committee of the CPT began preparations for convening the Fifth Territorial Party Congress. The Congress met in Tashkent between September 12th and 18th, 1920 in a jubilant mood due to the great victories achieved by the Red Army in the struggle against counter-revolution and foreign intervention. It unanimously confirmed the dissolution of the *Kraikom* by a decision of the Turkestan Commission and severely criticised the conduct and policies of nationalist deviationists. The baseless allegations made by the nationalists in their speeches before the Congress of the Peoples of the East held at Baku were also repudiated by the Congress. The speeches and reports in the Congress stressed

that the basic tasks before the Party were to consolidate and widen the alliance of the toilers of Turkestan with the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia, to liquidate all remnants of national inequality, to free the poor people of Turkestan from exploitation by *kulaks*, *bais* and *manaps* and to provide the toiling nomadic people, landless labourers and poor peasants with land. The Congress recognised the urgent need of establishing the unions of poor peasants—*hashchi*—in villages to defend the interests of the poor and middle peasants.

The Fifth Congress of the CPT elected a new Central Committee headed by Tiurakulov. The Congress played a great role in the organisational and ideological consolidation of the Party in Turkestan. It marked a successful culmination of the Party's struggle to free itself from both great-nation chauvinistic and bourgeois nationalistic deviations.

The Ninth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan which met in September 1920 adopted a new constitution for the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It declared Turkestan an autonomous republic of the main peoples inhabiting its territory, viz., Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kirghizs, etc. The constitution clearly placed foreign affairs, defence, finance, post and telegraph and communications within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. The constitution of 1918 it may be recalled had also mentioned these functions as within the jurisdiction of the federal government, but it had given the Turkestan authorities powers to change the instructions and decrees of the federation to suit local conditions. The Turkestan Autonomous Republic could also raise loans and enter into limited foreign relations with neighbouring countries. It could also demand recall of such federal officials as were not acceptable to it. To a large extent these reservations by the Turkestan Autonomous Republic to the acceptance of exclusive federal jurisdiction on matters like foreign relations, railways, defence, post and telegraph and finance were dictated by the abnormal conditions then prevailing because of the Civil War and foreign intervention. In 1918 Turkestan had no stable link with the Centre. But by 1920 conditions had changed. Turkestan was now in constant direct contact with the Centre. Moreover, the experience of the previous three years showed that these functions should better remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government without any reservation regarding the concurrent powers of the Turkestan Republic. This called

for a review of the 1918 constitution which was done by the Ninth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan. The bourgeois nationalists tried to make permanent the situation as it prevailed in 1918 and to further widen and confirm it by law. Obviously this was contrary to the real interests of the working people of Turkestan which demanded a closer unity with other Soviet peoples.

By the time of the Fifth Congress of the CPT and the Ninth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan the phase of acute struggle against the chauvinistic and nationalistic deviations was over. Such tendencies, especially the nationalistic, were, however, to rise again in 1925 in the form of the group of 18. The main cause for the survival of bourgeois nationalist influence on some members of the Party was the presence in the NEP period of the trade bourgeoisie, *kulaks* and other exploiting elements who tried in every possible way to make use of nationalist survivals in their interests. The task of nativisation of administration also created problems giving rise to bourgeois nationalistic and chauvinistic deviations. The chauvinistically-inclined elements did not fully believe in the creative abilities of the natives, while the bourgeois nationalists demanded nativisation on purely national grounds, without taking into consideration the real preparations for it and the social and political character of the problem. The Party continued to exercise utmost vigilance against the recrudescence of either of the two deviations in the Party line on the national question. The Tenth, Twelfth and also the Fourteenth Congresses of the RCP(B) issued call for struggle against both deviations, in the first place against chauvinistic deviations. More recently, even the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU did not forget to mention in the new programme of the Party the task to fight against survivals of both—chauvinism and nationalism.

CHAPTER VIII

BUKHARA AND KHWAREZM: TRANSITION FROM PEOPLE'S SOVIET REPUBLICS TO SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Character of the People's Revolution in Bukhara and Khiva

The people's revolution which occurred in Bukhara and Khiva in 1920 established the power of the working people in the form of peasants' Soviets. The revolution there was made by the forces of poor peasants and artisans with the active help of the Red Army. Some historians maintain that the revolution in Bukhara and Khiva had a bourgeois-democratic character and the social structure in these republics was also bourgeois-democratic. In fact, the revolution in Khiva and Bukhara did in the first place resolve the task of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It could not be otherwise, for in the countries where the feudal order still dominated there could not have existed suitable conditions for a socialist revolution to take place, and the first and foremost task of any revolution was the abolition of the mediaeval feudal order. Hence by its very nature the revolution here ought to have been of a bourgeois-democratic character.

But the concrete historical circumstances in which the revolution took place in Bukhara and Khiva also affected its character. The victory of the Great October Revolution and establishment of the Soviet power in Russia greatly conditioned the character of the revolution in Bukhara and Khiva. The bourgeoisie there endeavoured to utilise the peasants' Soviets as organs of its class rule and finish the revolution by establishing a capitalist social order. But the popular masses of these republics under the powerful impact of the October Revolution opposed the aspirations of the bourgeoisie. From the very beginning they strove for further development of the revolution and conversion of the peasants' Soviets into a base for the people's Soviet system.

The revolution in Bukhara and Khiva was not over with the proclamation of the People's Soviet Republics. Revolutionary reorganisation of society continued further until these republics were converted into socialist republics. Greeting the formation and consolidation of the Soviet republics in Bukhara, Azerbaijan and Armenia while addressing the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920, V. I. Lenin said:

"These republics are proof and corroboration of the fact that the ideas and principles of Soviet government are understood and immediately applicable, not only in the industrially developed countries, not only in those, which have a social basis like the proletariat, but also in those which have the peasantry as their basis. The idea of peasants' Soviets has triumphed. The peasants' power has been assured: they own the land and the means of production. The friendly relations between the peasant Soviet Republics and the Russian Socialist Republic have already been consolidated by the practical results of our policy."¹

In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the peasant masses established their class alliance with the workers through their Soviets and converted their republics immediately into socialist republics. The same process took three to four years in the case of Khiva and Bukhara.

The people's revolution in Bukhara and Khiva abolished the power of all the big feudal owners and clericals. Power was now transferred to the peasants' Soviets. In Bukhara about 7,500 *tanaps* of land belonging to the Emir and his relations were confiscated. Power, from the uppermost level to the lowest, lay with the masses acting through their Soviets. All sections of masses were given the right to vote and only the relations of the Emir and the Khan and their high officials were deprived of it.

The highest organ of the state was the All-Bukharan and All-Khwarezm *Kurultai* (Congress) of people's deputies. This Congress elected the Central Executive Committee of the Republic which exercised all functions of the highest organ in the interval between the sessions of the *Kurultai*. The *Kurultai* also elected the Council of People's *Nazirs* which was a high organ of state administration.

The organs of administration at local places were

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 490-91.

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
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UNION REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA



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represented by Soviets of different levels, viz., the *oblast*, *raion* and *volost*, with their corresponding executive committees. The lowest organ of power was the general meeting of the population of a village or a town district.

The popular village assemblies elected the *aksakals* and the *starshins*. In elections all citizens of the republics without distinction of religion, sex, race or nationality took part. This state system was confirmed by the constitutions of the republics. The state and social structure of these republics was marked by a broad democracy and popular character which made them certainly higher than the usual bourgeois republics. For the time being private property remained the economic basis of the BPSR and KPSR. Their citizens enjoyed the *unrestricted* right to hold movable and immovable property acquired by them personally or in inheritance. This feature of the republics distinguished them from socialist republics.

Transition to Socialist Republics

As the bulk of the people in these two republics were poor peasants and artisans, the foremost task of the government was the amelioration of their lot. To achieve this end several important changes in the field of taxes, trade and crafts were effected. In Bukhara taxes on peasants, cattle breeders and handicraftsmen were considerably lowered. In 1913 the various taxes on a peasant came to 12½ rubles on an average. But now in 1923-24 the same worked out to about 8 rubles, i.e., 37 per cent less.¹ In Khiva also there was a similar reduction in the burden of taxes on peasants.

In both the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic and the Khwarezm People's Soviet Republic, state trading and state industrial undertakings came into existence as a result of nationalisation of such undertakings. In Bukhara there were some 32 industrial undertakings out of which 25 were cotton cleaning plants. Although many of them were not in operation, they formed that new structure on the basis of which a socialist industry could be built. In Khwarezm there were some 31 industrial undertakings out of which 5 belonged to foreign capitalists. By the treaties of alliance and economic

¹ M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

agreements concluded between the Bukhara and Khwarezm republics and the RSFSR several trade establishments and other property owned by the Tsarist Government and Russian capitalists were transferred to these republics.

The governments of the BPSR and KPSR showed great concern for the cultural and educational needs of the people. In 1921-22, 37 primary and middle schools, 3 special schools for women, 2 teachers' training institutes and 12 boarding schools for children, in all with a total strength of 3,503 were working in Bukhara.¹ Besides these, 1 craft school and 4 music schools were also opened there. In 1922 the number of persons on the rolls of various educational institutions rose to 5,604.² It may be recalled that prior to the Revolution there was not a single school for secular education in Bukhara. In Khwarezm, too, notable success was achieved in the sphere of education. In 1923, 29 schools and several other educational institutions were functioning imparting education to 1,362 persons.³

The establishment of socialist industry and the formation of their own working class would have been for the republics of Bukhara and Khwarezm the work of decades were it not for the help of the Russian working class and its state. In 1923 only 6 plants out of 32 were functioning in Bukhara. In Khiva none of the industrial establishments was in working condition. Towns in these republics were, in the main, centres of handicrafts, with trade capital dominant. The capital of 30 big trading firms alone was more than the capital of all the nationalised undertakings.

Nevertheless, even under such difficulties, conditions for transition to socialist republics ripened very rapidly. This was, in part, due to the political situation that prevailed there. The Young Bukharans and Young Khivans had penetrated into the ranks of the Communist Party of these republics on such a large scale that the membership of the Communist Party in Bukhara rose to 16,000 in 1922. The bourgeois nationalist *bais* and merchants also infiltrated into higher state organs. As Stalin pointed out in the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) with the responsible workers in national republics there was not a single *dehkan* in the Council of *Nazirs* of BPSR and all posts therein were filled

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 216.

² M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

³ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 218.

by exploiting elements of society. Similar was the situation in Khwarezm.

This could not but reflect itself in the implementation of the policies of the government. Stalin told the conference that 75 per cent of the credits given by the state bank of Bukhara had gone to private traders and only 2 per cent had come to the share of the peasants' co-operatives. The nationalists in Bukhara and Khiva fanned national discord between Uzbeks and Turkmens. The Uzbek bourgeois nationalists in the organs of power in the Bukhara Republic pursued a policy of national discrimination against Turkmens and Tajiks. In Khiva where relations between the Uzbeks and Turkmen upper sections were quite hostile, the reactionary Turkmen tribal chiefs exploited the situation to their advantage. The government of the Khwarezm Republic which was mainly composed of young Khivans continued such reactionary policies. This caused popular indignation and the people removed the government on March 6, 1921 and arrested several *Nazirs*. A revolutionary committee was established to prepare the summoning of the Second *Kurultai*.

In the Bukhara Republic also the bourgeois nationalist members of the government began to conspire against the people. Several of them were in league with the *basmachi*. Towards the end of 1921 the President of the Bukhara Republic, Usman Khoja, himself turned into an organiser of the new *basmachi* band. To lead the *basmachi* the nationalists invited the Turkish Pan-Islamist, Enver Pasha, under whom all the *basmachi* bands of Central Asia united. If, on the one hand, these events undoubtedly created difficulties in the development of the BPSR and KPSR in the direction of a socialist system, on the other, the anti-popular policy of the bourgeois nationalists increased popular discontent against them at the same time. The political activity of the working people grew as a result of it. The struggle with the *basmachi* drew the working peasants and artisans nearer to the Red Army. The *basmachi* brought so much suffering to the people that in comparison to 1913 the number of people engaged in settled cultivation in Bukhara in 1923 dropped 28.7 per cent while that of the nomads increased 75.1 per cent.¹ This explains why the poor peasants fought against the *basmachi*, joining the Red Army enthusiastically, whereas many bour-

¹ *Bukhara v gosudarstvennom khozyaistvennom plane na 1923-24*, pp. 54-55.

geois nationalist ministers crossed over to the *basmachi*, as for example, the war minister Arifov.

The government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the RCP(B) gave great help to the working people of Bukhara and Khiva in their hard days. Several experienced Party leaders and army commanders were sent to help them in their fight against the *basmachi*. Additionally, they were given other material assistance in the form of food supplies and industrial goods. Orjonikidze reached Bukhara as the representative of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) to help improve Party and Soviet work. He gave his able guidance to the work of ridding the Party and Soviet apparatus of alien class elements and nationalists.

The BPSR and KPSR could not have improved their economic conditions without the material assistance and technical guidance of the USSR. In 1923 goods worth 1,700,000 rubles were sent from the RSFSR and Turkestan to Bukhara. The Soviet Union concluded a trade agreement with the Bukhara Republic which was highly favourable to the latter. The purchase price of Bukharan cotton was fixed at 15.5 rubles per *pood* while the cost price was 10 rubles. In October-November 1924 different goods of common use and agricultural implements worth 276,515 rubles were sent to the Khiva Republic. During the same month the Khiva Republic was supplied with 25 thousand *poods* of sugar, 1,000 *poods* of skin, 25 thousand pairs of shoes and 4 thousand *poods* of tea. The USSR gave the Khiva Republic a loan of 575 thousand rubles for the rehabilitation of cotton-cleaning and oil mills.¹

The nationalist elements in Bukhara did everything to oppose the union of Bukhara with Soviet Russia, thus not fulfilling the directive of the First Congress of Soviets of the BPSR to this effect. This caused indignation among the people. In view of the rising hostility of the public the Central Executive Committee of the BPSR was forced to take the decision to drop from the cabinet (the Council of *Nazirs*) a number of ministers such as Fitrat, Nazrullah Khoja, M. Aminov, etc., who were hated by the people. The political vigilance of the people rose to a high level at the time of elections to the Fourth All-Bukhara *Kurultai*. A great majority of deputies were elected from among the *dehkans* and artisans, and representatives of all nationalities were

¹ M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-80.

elected to the *Kurultai*. In their struggle against nationalists, the Bukharan Communists were given active help by the Central Committee of the RCP(B). The composition of the new *Kurultai* fully reflected the changed correlation of class forces. From the materials preserved in the Archives about 390 (out of 425) delegates of the new *Kurultai* it is evident that 227 were *dehkans*, 27 workers, 93 officials, 17 artisans, 17 from the intelligentsia, and 9 others. Deputies belonging to the Party numbered 131. The national composition of the delegates showed the multinational character of the new *Kurultai*. There were 237 Uzbeks, 81 Tajiks, 19 Kirghizs, 22 Turkmens and 11 Jews.¹

The Party purge in 1922 in Bukhara and Khiva had a salutary effect. After this purge only 1,000 members were left in the Bukharan Party out of 16,000. This improved the quality of members and increased their level of class consciousness. In 1923 there were 1,560 members of the Party in Bukhara. Among them 35 per cent were *dehkans*, 13 per cent workers and 8.5 per cent artisans. In the Khivan Party only 547 members were left after the purge, of whom 415 were *dehkans*, 40 workers, 15 officials, 46 artisans and 41 others.²

These political and social changes in the life of the BPSR and KPSR also led to many changes in the enacted laws which moved them further along the path of conversion into socialist republics. Towards the end of 1922, after the defeat of the main band of the *basmachi* led by Enver Pasha, *basmachism* had practically exhausted itself in Bukhara. At about the same time the *basmachi* bands of Djunaid Khan and other Turkmen tribal chiefs had been liquidated. From 1923 began a period of peaceful reconstruction in these republics. Considerable success was achieved in the work of organising the people into various organisations like trade unions, peasants' unions and youth leagues, etc. In Bukhara trade unions had a membership of 16½ thousand by 1923. Peasant unions were also successfully organised there. In Khwarezm they had a membership of 10 thousand in 1923.³ The popular masses were attracted more and more to socialist development. The positive experience of socialist reconstruction in the adjacent Turke-

¹ M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

² M. Vakhobov, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

³ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, pp. 217-18.

stan ASSR convinced the people in Khiva and Bukhara of the need to take that path for their republics too.

The desire to reorganise their republics into socialist republics could be clearly noticed among the masses in Bukhara and Khiva after 1923. The first pre-condition for this was the full democratisation of the organs of power and consolidation of the Soviet apparatus by ridding it of the representatives of exploiting classes. As we have already noted, this had been successfully done in the republics.

The republics of Bukhara and Khwarezm had also achieved considerable success in the task of economic recovery. The measures adopted to implement the new economic policy had produced positive results. There was a marked increase in the area of land sown with cotton and food grains. In 1924 the total sown area in Bukhara almost reached the pre-war level. It stood at 5,486,000 *tanaps* (the figure for 1913 was 5,903,000 *tanaps*). The area under cotton cultivation showed a steady increase from year to year. In 1920 cotton was sown on 100,000 *tanaps*, in 1923 on 136,000 *tanaps*, and in 1924 on 160,000 *tanaps*.¹ As a result of this development of cotton cultivation, there arose the need for a more rapid restoration of cotton-cleaning plants destroyed during the Civil War. In 1923, 6 cotton-cleaning plants were put into operation. The government took measures to encourage cattle-breeding, especially the breeding of Karakul sheep. Special co-operative societies were organised to purchase Karakul sheep. These societies were given aid amounting to two million gold rubles.

In Khwarezm also much progress had been made in the work of restoring the economy to its pre-war level. The area under cotton increased from 8 thousand *dessiatines* in 1922 to 30 thousand *dessiatines* in 1924. By the beginning of 1924, 6 cotton-cleaning plants had been restored and enlarged.²

The complex process of sovietisation and socialist transformation in Bukhara and Khwarezm and their economic development, as also the further development of Turkestan ASSR, was closely connected with the economic unification of the Soviet republics in Central Asia. This question was first raised by the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in February 1922.

¹ A. Ishanov, *Sozdaniye Bukharskoi narodnoi Sovetskoi respubliki*, Tashkent, 1955, pp. 160-61.

² *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 218.

The Central Committee pointed out that such a unification would immensely facilitate the restoration and development of the economy of Khwarezm and Bukhara. The bourgeois nationalists were opposed to this. But their opposition did not meet with success. The Tashkent Economic Conference of the Central Asian Republics took the decision of co-ordinating the economic activities of the three republics on the basis of a unified economic policy and a common economic plan. The general direction of all economic affairs was entrusted to the Central Asian Economic Council which worked in accordance with instructions prepared and confirmed at the Economic Conference. The Conference discussed matters concerning land reforms, internal and external trade, finance, transport, co-operation, post and telegraph and irrigation. It was decided to have a single currency for Bukhara and Khwarezm, the same as for the whole RSFSR. The regulation of post and telegraph, river transport and railways was unified on a Central Asian level. The economic unification of the Central Asian republics was of great significance for Bukhara and Khwarezm as it facilitated the task of their transition to socialism.

In Bukhara and Khwarezm their internal socio-political base alone was not sufficient for socialist transformation. The socialist industries and the working class of the USSR formed the necessary external base. The transformation of the BPSR and KPSR could not have been accomplished without close economic, cultural and political collaboration with the USSR, without the unity of the people of these republics with the revolutionary working class and peasantry of the USSR.

The extraordinary session of the Central Executive Committee of the BPSR summoned on August 14, 1923 was of great importance for the socialist transformation of the Republic. It took the decision to change several articles of the Constitution. According to these amendments all the former big officials of the Emir, big money-lenders and traders were deprived of the right to vote. The exploiting classes were thus denied a share in the political power. The franchise rights of workers and Red Army men were increased. The organised workers obtained the right to elect 1 deputy to the people's Soviet for every 500 workers and the Red Army men 1 for 250. In all ministries, boards were established making it impossible for ministers to act arbitrarily.

In October 1923 the Fourth All-Khwarezm *Kurultai* assembled. It adopted a new constitution and proclaimed the transformation of the Khwarezm People's Soviet Republic into a Soviet socialist republic. The constitution declared that the main task of the government was to create such conditions under which exploitation of man by man would become impossible. All land was declared to be people's property and was given to working peasants for use free of charge. The constitution deprived all exploiting classes of the right to vote. In September 1924, the Fifth All-Bukhara *Kurultai* proclaimed the formation of the Soviet Socialist Republic in Bukhara. It also proclaimed the need for unbreakable and brotherly unity with the USSR which alone could help the realisation of transition to socialism. Thus was completed the transition of the BPSR and KPSR from Soviet statehood to Soviet socialist statehood.

The process of transition to the socialist stage has often been misunderstood. Some writers find fault with the switch over to socialist statehood without any prior radical changes in the pattern of agricultural and industrial relations. Thus A. G. Park describes the campaign to bring Bukhara and Khwarezm into the socialist stage as a campaign "exclusively" on a "political level".¹ He feels as if this was done in a hurry by simply changing externally the "correlation of political forces", i.e., through "step by step elimination of non-Communist leaders" without any prior significant socialist industrialisation or radical changes in agricultural relationship.

But Park forgets that socialist statehood is precisely the instrument for carrying out such changes. It is a socialist state which builds up a socialist society. He ignores, moreover, the socio-economic changes introduced in the Soviet period in Bukhara and Khwarezm and fails to appreciate their role in preparing for a transition to socialist statehood. What precisely determines the social character of a state is the question of who possesses political power. As a result of a tremendous growth of mass activity and political consciousness of the peasantry and its relentless struggle against the exploiting elements like traders and money-lenders, the latter were obliged to quit the Party and state organs. Instead of traders like Yusupov and Usman Khodzhayev, political power

was now in the hands of *dehkans* and representatives of working people's intelligentsia who were keen to develop their republics along the path of socialism. Hence the transition of the republics of Khwarezm and Bukhara into socialist republics was an act fully justified historically. Their peculiar geographical location and the historical context of the October Revolution in Russia obviated for them the need to pass through a capitalist stage of social development. Alliance of their peasantry with the Russian proletariat made good the deficiency of an indigenous working class.

¹ A. G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-27*, New York, 1957, pp. 107-08.

CHAPTER IX
THE FORMATION
OF SOVIET NATIONAL REPUBLICS

The National State Delimitation
of 1924—a Historical Background

National state delimitation was carried out in Central Asia in 1924 as a result of which national Soviet socialist republics were formed. Two of them—the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR were formed as union republics within the USSR; others, the Tajik, for example, came into existence as an autonomous Soviet socialist republic within the Uzbek SSR; the Kazakh areas of Central Asia became united in what was then called the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR; Kara-Kalpakia entered the Kirghiz ASSR as an autonomous *oblast*; the Kirghiz formed an autonomous Soviet socialist republic within the RSFSR under the name of the Kara-Kirghiz ASSR. These national Soviet socialist republics and autonomous *oblasts* united the substantive peoples of Central Asia into their national state forms for the first time in history.

The formation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which voluntarily entered the RSFSR, was the first major step towards the creation of Soviet national statehood for peoples of Central Asia. The multinational autonomous Turkestan which existed up to 1924, i.e., up to the implementation of the national delimitation was the only correct and reasonable form of state structure in the former Tsarist colony, corresponding to the historical conditions of the period. National delimitation was impossible immediately after the October Revolution due to the slow formation process of the peoples of Central Asia into nations, difficulties in mutual relations among various nationalities inherited from the past feudal and colonial regime, as well as other reasons.

First it was essential to defend and consolidate the gains of the October Revolution, to strengthen Soviet power by

defeating internal counter-revolution and foreign military intervention. Moreover, the revolution in Khiva and Bukhara could not take place until 1920 and a national delimitation in Central Asia without Bukhara and Khiva was out of the question. Effecting national delimitation successfully demanded also the participation of the working masses in state activities on a wide scale. Among other necessary preconditions for national delimitation were considerable achievements in the sphere of economic and cultural development and in the formation of socialist nations.

The national-territorial delimitation plan which envisaged the creation in Central Asia of separate national republics for each of the main nationalities of the region in place of the then existing multinational Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khwarezm has been a subject of great controversy between Soviet and non-Soviet scholars. Some anti-Soviet writers have seen behind this plan "the evil design and intention" of the Soviet authorities to split artificially the otherwise "nationally and linguistically homogeneous" overwhelming majority of people belonging to the "Turkic" nationality. Thus Mustapha Chokayev, one time President of the Kokand "Autonomous" government, described this plan as a plan of the "division of Turkestan into tribal states" invented by the Bolsheviks as a counterpoise to the efforts made by "Muslim Communists" to achieve the unification of all the Turkic tribes around the nucleus of a Soviet Turkestan.¹ Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, a Russian émigré scholar, stated that the delimitation plan "was less concerned with solving the ethnographical puzzle than with the political aspect arising from the problem" and that it was merely the Bolshevik reply to the *basmachi* uprising.² Others see in the plan of national delimitation a manifestation of the "old imperialistic principle of divide and rule".³ Hugh Seton-Watson sees national delimitation as the "clear purpose" to manufacture "a number of different nations, which could be kept apart from each other, played off against each other, and linked individually with the Russian nation". This was carried out, in his opinion, in

¹ Mustapha Chokayev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime", *Journal of Royal Central Asian Society*, London, XVIII, 1981, p. 414.

² Lobanov-Rostovsky, "The Muslim Republics in Central Asia", *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, 7 (1928), pp. 249-50.

³ *The Central Asian Review*, London, 8 (1960), pp. 342-43.

order to remove "any danger of a common front of the Central Asian Moslems".¹

Such assertions are, however, highly biased and devoid of any truth. The principle underlying national delimitation of Central Asia stemmed directly from the Bolshevik nationality policy itself. To make the above allegations is to deny the existence of a well-worked out Soviet nationality policy and ignore the complexity of the national problem in Central Asia. The idea of national delimitation was not invented in 1924. It had been present long before then and was implemented in 1924 when historical conditions matured. As early as 1913, Lenin in his work entitled *Critical Remarks on the National Question* had pointed out the need for changing the old mediaeval divisions of Tsarist Russia and creating new divisions as far as possible in accordance with the national composition of the population.² In 1913 the Central Committee of the RSDLP had called for "the demarcation of the boundaries of the regional autonomous and self-governing units by the local populations themselves in conformity with their economic and ethnic distinctions and national composition, etc."³ This was reaffirmed in full by the Seventh Conference of the Party held in April 1917.⁴ The principle of national delimitation had already been applied with the establishment of national republics of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvashes, Kalmyks and Yakuts. But it could not be applied in Turkestan as the conditions obtained there were more complicated. The various Central Asian nationalities were intermingled under three different states—Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva.

The question of national state delimitation in Central Asia was first raised by Lenin in July 1920 in his remarks on the draft submitted by the Turkestan Commission concerning the Turkestan Republic. Lenin rejected the nationalistic draft of Ryskulov concerning the establishment of the so-called Republic of Turks. In visualising the possibility of national delimitation in the near future he requested the preparation of an ethnographical map of Turkestan showing the Uzbek, Kirghiz and Turkmen divisions and a critical, detailed

¹ Hugh Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism*, London, 1964, Third Impression, p. 58.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 48.

³ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh*, Part I, VII ed., 1954, p. 315.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

evaluation of the conditions conducive to merging or separating these three parts.¹ Lenin, though he understood fully the significance of the tendency of the further development of Soviet national statehood of the peoples of Turkestan through the division of the republic into a number of national republics, was also at the same time opposed to rushing matters. All necessary preparations were to be made before carrying out the proposed delimitation.

The Turkestan Commission had decided in favour of carrying out the administrative regrouping of Turkestan in conformity with the ethnographical and economic conditions of the region. Yet it opposed the suggestion to divide immediately the territory of the Turkestan Republic into a number of national republics. On June 5, 1920 it informed the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the RCP(B) telegraphically that such a division would plunge Turkestan into chaos and was bound to help the nationalist elements. The political situation dictated the necessity of retaining for some time a united Turkestan Republic.² The Centre while agreeing to the postponement of national delimitation instructed the Turkestan Commission to continue the preparatory work relating to this question. As noted above, such instructions were issued by Lenin in July 1920. Under these instructions careful preparations for national state delimitation in Central Asia began and its implementation was now only a question of time.

The Tenth Congress of the RCP(B) held in 1921 called on the Party to help the working masses of the non-Russian peoples formerly oppressed by Tsarism develop and consolidate in every way their Soviet statehood in forms corresponding to their national and other conditions of life.³ The Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 again declared the absolute necessity of consolidating and further developing the national republics.⁴

The policies pursued by the Soviet governments of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khwarezm prepared the ground for national delimitation by creation of national divisions, establishment of national autonomous *oblasts*, development of languages, literature and press of indigenous nationalities.

¹ *Leninsky sbornik*, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 323-26.

² Cited by Kh. T. Tursunov, *O natsionalno-gosudarstvennom razmezhovanii Srednei Azii*, Tashkent, 1957, p. 6.

³ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh*, Part I, p. 559.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 715.

The measures taken by the governments of the three Central Asian republics in this direction stimulated the desire of the various peoples for their separate national statehood. The People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs which was established in 1918 had under it separate divisions of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghizs, Tatars, Armenians, Ukrainians and native Jews. On March 31, 1921 a separate Kazakh national division was created within the Turkestan Central Executive Committee to look after the well-being of the Kazakh areas. After the abolition of the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs in Turkestan, national divisions under it were transferred to the Central Executive Committee and they enjoyed a status similar to the Kazakh national division. These national divisions did much to improve living conditions, culture and the language of the people they represented. They acquainted the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan with the needs of the nationalities concerned. In order to prepare the self-determination of the peoples of Turkestan the All-Russia Central Executive Committee proposed to the Turkestan Central Executive Committee in August 1920 the elaboration of a plan on the redivision of the administrative districts of Turkestan in conformity with their national composition. In August 1921 the name of the Trans-Caspian *oblast* was changed into the Turkmen *oblast* as the majority of the people there were Turkmens.¹ In April 1922 the Kirghiz *oblast* was organised by amalgamating the Kirghiz majority areas of the Semirechye, Syr-Darya and Ferghana *oblasts*. In the Central Executive Committees of Bukhara and Khwarezm republics Turkmen and Kirghiz national divisions were created. In the Bukhara Republic a Turkmen *oblast* was carved out with Chardjui as its centre. In 1922 a special commission to administer Eastern Bukhara where the Tajiks were in the majority was created. In October 1923, in the Khwarezm Republic a Turkmen and a Kirghiz-Karakalpak *oblasts* were organised. The Uzbek majority areas were separated to form Novo-Urgench *oblast* and Khiva *raion*.²

The question of national delimitation of Central Asia came to the fore in 1920 with the formation of the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR. In October 1920 the northern part of the Trans-Caspian *oblast* of Turkestan ASSR was transferred to the

¹ Sh. E. Muhamediarov, "K istorii provedeniya natsionalnogo gosudarstvennogo razmezhevaniya Srednei Azii v 1924 g", *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, Vol. I, 1955, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*

Kirghiz ASSR in conformity with the wishes of the Kazakh people. Point 2 of the decree issued by the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on September 1, 1920 regarding the autonomy of the Kirghiz Republic had provided for inclusion of the Kirghiz (Kazakh) territory of Turkestan ASSR in the Kirghiz ASSR because of the desire of the people of these *oblasts*.¹ In January 1921 the First Regional Congress of the Kazakh poor of Turkestan ASSR demanded a merger with the Kirghiz ASSR of the Kazakh areas of Syr-Darya and Semirechye *oblasts* of the Turkestan ASSR. A discussion of this problem in the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs of the RSFSR in March 1922 and a conference of the delegates to the Eleventh Party Congress from Turkestan and Kirghiz ASSR in April 1922 showed that the problem of the merger of the Kazakh areas of the TASSR with the KASSR was inextricably connected with the general question of the national-state delimitation of Central Asia. Thus we find the demand for a national delimitation emanating from the peoples of Central Asia themselves. The local Party and other social organisations were the first to demand it and the Centre only conceded this popular demand by carrying out national delimitation in 1924.

In February 1924 the question of national delimitation was discussed in a conference of Party and Soviet activists of Bukhara. The conference reached the conclusion that the question was quite timely. Following this the question was taken up by the Central Committee of the Bukharan Communist Party in an enlarged plenum held on February 25, 1924. The plenum also approved of it. In March 1924 a conference of Party-Soviet activists of Khwarezm also supported the idea of carrying out national delimitation. In a joint conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan, the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan and the Party-Soviet activists of Tashkent held on March 10, 1924 the idea of national delimitation was fully endorsed. The plenum of the CPT held on March 23-24, 1924 gave its express consent to the plea of national delimitation.

Some difficulties were, however, experienced in the Khwarezm Republic in settling the question of national delimitation where the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Khwarezm expressed itself against

¹ I. Khodorov, "Natsionalnoye razmezhevaniye Srednei Azii", *Novy Vostok* No. 8-9, 1925, p. 66.

it without giving any valid reasons. But the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Khwarezm changed its mistaken stand against national delimitation largely under the pressure of support for it in the Party ranks. It also recognised the need for national delimitation of the Khwarezm Republic.

On April 5, 1924 the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) approved on principle the proposals of the Party organisations of Central Asia concerning the carrying out of national delimitation of Central Asian republics and suggested the making of necessary preparations to the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B). On April 28, 1924 the Central Asian Bureau created the Territorial Commission and other sub-commissions for Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Tajiks. They were entrusted with the task of practically carrying out the delimitation by defining the territory of the republics and *oblasts* to be formed.

The Eighth Congress of the CPT held in May 1924 also discussed this question. In this Congress, Rudzutak was deputed by the Central Committee of the RCP(B) to acquaint himself with the views of local Communists. The Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkestan dealt at length with the question of national delimitation. He described it as "a progressive step forward" in the implementation of the Soviet nationality policy in Central Asia.¹ Many delegates stressed that national delimitation would increase the prospect for the economic and cultural development of Central Asian peoples. Segisbayev, a Tajik delegate, pointed out that national frictions were bound to continue to hamper the work of socialist construction if the proposed reform was not carried through.² Rudzutak warned against a movement of "brain waves" and called upon Party workers to channel such movement along a "healthy Communist path".³

The National-State Delimitation in Practice

On May 10, 1924 the recommendations of national commissions were scrutinised by the National Delimitation Commission. It favoured the establishment of full-fledged Uzbek

¹ *Turkestan'skaya Pravda* No. 100 (377), May 8, 1924.


² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, No. 181 (458), August 18, 1924.



Academy of Sciences of the
Turkmen SSR, Ashkhabad

Academy of Sciences of the
Kazakh SSR, Alma Ata



The atomic reactor at the Nuclear
Physics Institute of the Academy of
Sciences of the Uzbek SSR



Lenin State University in Tashkent

The Palace of Young Pioneers and
Schoolchildren in Alma Ata



Zhdanov Collective Farm in the Gissar
District, Tajik SSR



Kara Kum State Farm along the banks
of the Kara Kum canal in the
Turkmen SSR



Harvesting cotton at the Gulbakh State Farm in Andizhan Region, Uzbek SSR



Yadgar Nasriddinova, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR

A meeting in Tashkent of Prime Minister of India Lal Bahadur Shastri and President of Pakistan Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966. Lal Bahadur Shastri signs the Tashkent Declaration



Alisher Navoi Uzbek State Academic
Theatre of Opera and Ballet

USSR People's Artist Khalima Nasyrova in the Uzbek opera *Takhir and Zuhra* composed by T. Jalilov

and Turkmen national republics and the Tajik and Kirghiz autonomous *oblasts*. It rejected the recommendation of the Kazakh national commission for a merger of Kazakh areas of Turkestan with the Kazakh ASSR and establishment of a Central Asian Federation. The recommendations of the Commission on National Delimitation were forwarded by the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the RCP(B) to the CC of the RCP(B).

The Politbureau of the CC of the RCP(B) scrutinised these recommendations on June 2 and 12, 1924. On June 12 it adopted a resolution on the national delimitation of the republics of Central Asia suggesting the following course:

1. Create independent Uzbek and Turkmen republics and retain the Khwarezm Republic in its present form after separating the Turkmen areas from it.

2. Merge the Kirghiz (i.e., Kazakh) areas of Turkestan with Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR.

3. Establish an autonomous Kara-Kirghiz (i.e., Kirghiz) *oblast* and incorporate it into the RSFSR.

4. Create within the Uzbek Republic a separate autonomous *oblast* of Tajiks, and

5. Conclude a treaty between the USSR and the independent Turkmen and Uzbek republics on their entry into the Union in the forthcoming Congress of Soviets of the USSR.¹

Later on Khwarezm was also included within the purview of national delimitation. In its meeting of July 26, 1924 the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Khwarezm changed its earlier stand against the national delimitation of Khwarezm.

The Territorial Commission concluded its work at the beginning of September 1924. All the nationalities were equally represented on it. On September 16, 1924 an extraordinary session of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan gave its legal affirmation to the delimitation proposal and conferred upon the Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Tajiks and Kirghiz the right to opt out of the composition of the republic and establish their own national state formations. On September 20 and 29, 1924 the Fifth All-Bukhara and All-Khwarezm *Kurultais* respectively conferred similar rights on the various peoples inhabiting the republics. On October 14, 1924 the All-Russia Central Executive Committee confirmed the

¹ Cited by Nepomnin, *Istorichesky opyt stroitelstva sotsializma v Uzbekistane*, pp. 168-69.

resolution passed by the Turkestan Central Executive Committee on September 16, and separated Turkestan ASSR from the RSFSR.¹ The All-Russia Central Executive Committee decided to raise the Tajik autonomous *oblast* to the level of an autonomous republic within the Uzbek Republic. On October 27, 1924 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a statute recognising the national delimitation of the Soviet republics of Central Asia and the entry of the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR into the Union.

Thus was completed the national delimitation of Central Asia. The peoples of Central Asia obtained their own national state formations for the first time in history. This was done by Soviet power in a very smooth manner on the whole, though several difficulties had to be faced. The bourgeois nationalists tried to exploit the situation. They sought to rouse feelings of national chauvinism. The Uzbek bourgeois nationalists wanted to keep the Khwarezm Republic out of national delimitation. Similarly, Kazakh bourgeois nationalists tried to launch a campaign to seek revision of the decision assigning Tashkent city to the Uzbek Republic. They demanded that the entire Tashkent and Mirzachul *uyezds* should be incorporated in the Kazakh ASSR. The Uzbek nationalists in return demanded that such cities of the Syr-Darya *oblast* as had a considerably large Uzbek population be organised into autonomous cities. It may be recalled that the cities of Chimkent and Turkestan had an Uzbek majority, but the surrounding rural areas were predominantly Kazakh.

That such national controversies should have arisen was quite natural under the conditions of 1924 Central Asia. Reactionary nationalist elements, though they had been politically suppressed and somewhat economically curbed, had not altogether disappeared at the time. The former exploiting classes awaited a propitious moment. The land reforms had as yet not been completed and collectivisation of agriculture and socialist industrialisation had hardly begun. Under such conditions bourgeois nationalist elements sometimes succeeded in infiltrating the Party. Nevertheless, it has to be said to the credit of the Party and the Soviet government that the nationalist elements were never allowed to whip up a campaign of hatred between various national groups and let loose a reign of violence. The Communist Party of Turkestan countered the efforts of bourgeois nationalists to split and

¹ Cited by Nepomnin, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69.

disunite the people by launching a mass campaign to educate the people about the principles underlying the plan of national delimitation. In its thesis on national delimitation the Party had warned:

"The working masses of Central Asia must learn that the creation of separate independent Soviet republics does not set before us the ultimate national tasks and goals, much less the national isolation and seclusion of the working masses of a given nation: not national antagonism but proletarian internationalism lies as the basis of future work of the new republics. Everyone who thinks otherwise is consciously or unconsciously an enemy of workers' and peasants' power."¹

The determination of national frontiers was not an easy task. The National Delimitation Commission had to undertake expeditions to study the national compositions of a number of disputed areas and ascertain the wishes of the people concerned. In the determination of territory and frontiers of the Soviet national republics and autonomous *oblasts* the national factor was undoubtedly most important. In organising national state formations special consideration was given to territories where national groups lived in a compact mass. But besides the national factor, such factors as the mode of life and economic integrity of the territory organised into national republics or autonomous *oblasts* were also taken into consideration. In his work *Critical Remarks on the National Question* (1913), Lenin had, while pointing out the need for a division of territory as far as possible according to the national composition of the population, at the same time remarked that though the national composition of the population was one of the most important economic factors, it was by no means the only and the most important factor among others.²

This observation of Lenin was followed in Central Asia while carrying out national delimitation. Whereas national republics and autonomous *oblasts* were formed there on the basis of compact national areas, such individual areas as had a majority of one national group but were economically and geographically closely linked with the territory of other national group (as for example the Uzbek towns in the midst of Kazakh areas in Syr-Darya *oblast*) were joined with the

¹ Cited by Tursunov, *O natsionalno-gosudarstvennom razmezhevanii Srednei Azii*, Tashkent, 1957, p. 18.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 50.

latter as a rule. Similarly, several Tajik areas were incorporated into the Uzbek Republic because of their close economic and cultural ties.

As a result of the national delimitation a number of nationally homogeneous states appeared in Central Asia in place of the former three multinational states. This helped in resolving the complex national tangle which considerably hindered the process of their socialist development. The old demarcation of political and administrative frontiers was solely a product of military, strategic and political exigencies of the time of Tsarist conquest. As such it only aggravated the national problem. The old frontiers cut across the ethnographic distribution of peoples of Central Asia and were utilised by the old regimes of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva to preserve their power by playing one national group against the other. The national delimitation changed the situation, removing thus the very base of national antagonism on which bourgeois nationalists always sought to thrive.

If before the 1924 delimitation a large part of Uzbeks, 66.5%, lived in the Turkestan ASSR but comprised only 41.4% of the entire population of that Republic, after delimitation 82.6% of all Uzbeks in Central Asia entered the composition of the Uzbek SSR where they formed an absolute majority—76.1%. The Turkmens before national delimitation did not form a clear majority in any of the three republics of Central Asia, but now in the Turkmen SSR 94.2% of all Turkmens were joined together, forming 71.9% of the total population of the Republic. Similarly, the Tajiks who had earlier formed 7.7% of the population of the Turkestan ASSR and 31% of the Bukhara Republic now formed 71.2% of the population of the Tajik ASSR within the Uzbek SSR. 75.2% of all the Tajiks in Central Asia joined the Tajik ASSR which was raised in 1929 to the level of a Union republic. The Kirghizs, who had formed only 10.8% of the population of the Turkestan ASSR, constituted 66% of the population of the newly organised Kara-Kirghiz autonomous *oblast* within the RSFSR. 86.7% of all Kirghizs in Central Asia now lived in their autonomous national *oblast* which was converted into the Kirghiz ASSR in 1926. In 1936 it was raised to a Union republic. 79.3% of all Kara-Kalpaks were now organised into the Kara-Kalpak autonomous *oblast* within the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR where they formed a significant portion of the total population of the *oblast*—38.1%. The Kara-Kalpak autonomous *oblast* was made the Kara-Kalpak ASSR within

the RSFSR in 1932. In 1936 it entered the Uzbek SSR as an autonomous republic. In the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR within the RSFSR 93.4% of all the Kazakhs were included, forming 57.4% of its population. In 1936 the Kazakh ASSR was also made a Union republic.

Thus we find the ethnographic map of Central Asia more justly drawn after national delimitation. With the old ethnographic anomalies removed, a better solution of the national problem in Central Asia was found by the 1924 delimitation. It created a stable basis for a speedy removal of economic and cultural backwardness of the Central Asian nationalities by bringing people closer to administration. It introduced a greater degree of democratisation of administration which immensely helped in accelerating the tempo of economic development and cultural progress. It struck a serious blow at the roots of bourgeois nationalism and great-power chauvinism. By ensuring peace between various national groups it promoted friendship and fraternity between the peoples of the USSR. By removing grounds for national frictions it enabled the peoples of Central Asia to be drawn into the historic task of building socialism. In brief, so far as the future progress and prosperity of the peoples of Central Asia is concerned, the results of national delimitation were wholly positive and beneficial.

The national state delimitation carried out in Central Asia in 1924 had a world-wide significance, especially for those countries of the East which faced the task of reorganising their administrative divisions after liberation from the yoke of colonialism. India is one such country where the task of administrative reorganisation was a historical necessity. The old administrative divisions of the country under British rule were a product of colonial conquest and its consolidation, and contrary to the wishes of the population concerned.

The historical experience of Central Asia testifies to the soundness of the measures taken in India for the reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis.

CHAPTER X

ELIMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL BACKWARDNESS

Socialist Industrialisation

Achievement of factual equality for the peoples of the USSR was the task the Soviet government set itself. It was a very difficult and complex task. How could there be real equality when the Soviet republics of Central Asia still had no industry of their own, when their agriculture remained primitive and their population illiterate?

The Tenth Congress of the Party (1921) set before itself the aim of liquidating the factual inequality between the various nations. The Party was to help the toiling masses of the non-Russian peoples to catch up successfully with Central Russia. The Twelfth Congress (1923) also called for the elimination of inequality between the nationalities by raising the cultural and economic level of the backward peoples. To overcome this great economic and cultural backwardness huge capital outlays and a large number of highly skilled specialists were needed. A task of this magnitude could be solved in a historically brief period only with the fraternal assistance of the more advanced Russian people. The Central Asian republics were assisted in diverse ways—politically, financially, technically, and culturally—all through the process of socialist construction. This assistance meant sacrifices and privations for the Russian people as the country was then poor and considerably weaker economically than the leading capitalist countries. But to fulfil its internationalist duty, the Russian working class was prepared to make these sacrifices.

The financial assistance given to the Central Asian republics by the Soviet government was very important for their economic development. There were years when Union subsidies covered 80-90 per cent of the expenses of some of the republics. Central Asia was also supplied with technical equipment and machines for industrial enterprises and agriculture. Numerous experienced political functionaries and

other specialists also went from Russia to Central Asia. This generous assistance was not a humiliating gift to "poor relatives". The more the peoples of Central Asia advanced economically, the greater became their contribution to socialist construction in the Soviet Union. The increase of cotton output in Central Asia made the Soviet Union completely independent of imports in this product. The Turkmen SSR began rapidly to raise the output of oil and oil products, so indispensable to the fast-growing Soviet industry. All-round mutual aid and co-operation among the Soviet republics helped quickly to eliminate their inequality and strengthen their friendship. The latest example of this friendship and brotherhood of peoples in the USSR is the generous help rushed to Tashkent from all corners of the country after the severe earthquake of April 1966. Thousands of volunteers from the different Soviet republics are at present engaged in constructing new houses in the capital of Soviet Uzbekistan. It is reported that the fraternal republics of the Soviet Union will build 1 million square metres of housing in Tashkent.

As with every other social system, socialism required productive forces of a definite level, on a definite material and technical basis. For socialism, such basis is large-scale heavy industry capable of supplying agriculture with machines and artificial fertilisers. Without large-scale industry it is impossible to build socialism. Consequently, to build a socialist economy industrially underdeveloped countries must first industrialise.

As already noted, before the Revolution Central Asia's industry was very much underdeveloped. What is more, it suffered badly during the Civil War. It was only in 1928 that the pre-Revolutionary level was restored in industry.¹ Great success was also achieved in the rehabilitation of agriculture. The goal of fully re-establishing cotton cultivation on its pre-war level was successfully attained by 1927. The

¹ The cotton-ginning industry which was the main industry of Central Asia was still a little short of the pre-war level at the end of the rehabilitation period (147.9 thousand tons as compared to 177.8 thousand tons in 1913). In oil and electricity, however, a satisfactory rise was registered. The production of oil in Turkestan in 1913 was 13.2 thousand tons. In 1927-28, it rose to 47.7 thousand tons, i.e., more than 3.5 times the pre-war level. The generation of power increased from 3.3 million kw hours in 1913 to 34.3 million kw hours in 1927-28 (*Uzbekistan za 15 let*, Tashkent, 1938, pp. 37-39). Wheeler's statement that "the output of Central Asian industry (in 1928) as a whole was still about half the 1913 level" is obviously an underestimation (*op. cit.*, p. 159).

total area under cotton cultivation in 1913 was 423.5 thousand hectares. In 1928 it had surpassed the pre-war level and rose to 588.5 thousand hectares.¹

The working people of Central Asia began the industrialisation of their republics in 1926-27. In March 1927 the Second Congress of Soviets in the Uzbek SSR considered it necessary to create a textile industry, organise new branches of industry to process agricultural raw materials, carry out an electrification plan and organise the production of agricultural machines and implements. Initial steps were taken towards the industrialisation of Uzbekistan in 1927. In that year several power houses were constructed. In Margelan and old Bukhara silk-weaving factories were started. In Ferghana construction of a spinning and weaving factory began and in Tashkent shoe and tobacco factories were opened. Some progress was made in the extraction of oil also. The development of heavy industry was yet to wait for the years of the First Five-Year Plan.

Between 1927-29 some steps were taken towards the industrialisation of Kirghizia also. The Kizil-Kie and Suliukt coal mines were expanded, a cotton-cleaning plant at Kara Su, a silk-winding factory at Osh and two leather factories at Frunze were erected during this period. Two saw mills were also commissioned. Despite these constructions the total value of industrial production in Kirghizia in 1929 still remained twenty-six million rubles as compared to 28 million in 1913.² The real industrialisation in Kirghizia was also to await the First Five-Year Plan period.

In Turkmenia there began the construction of silk-winding and spinning and weaving factories at Ashkhabad. At about the same time a vast geological survey of the resources of the Turkmen SSR was commenced. The task of training Turkmen workers in modern industrial production was of great urgency as the Republic had an acute shortage of its indigenous industrial cadres. In 1916 there were only 242 Turkmen workers of whom 7 were qualified.³ To meet this shortage Turkmen textile and oil workers were trained in Moscow and Baku respectively.

In Tajikistan industrialisation began with the First Five-

¹ *Uzbekistan za 15 let*, p. 53.

² *Formirovaniye sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR*, Moscow, 1962, p. 496.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 597.

Year Plan. Earlier in 1924-25 only a few oil mills and power houses had been built.

It was with the First Five-Year Plan that the first important stage of industrialisation began in Central Asia. The Fourteenth Congress of the Party in its directive for formulating the First Five-Year Plan had pointed out that the plan must give special attention to the question of the pace of economic and cultural development of the backward areas.¹ The first plan turned out to be the beginning of a real industrial revolution in Soviet Central Asia.

In November 1927 the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan discussed the problems concerning the First Five-Year Plan. It viewed the plan for the development of Uzbekistan as an organic part of the plan for the whole of the USSR. One of the important objects of the first plan was the attainment of self-sufficiency in cotton for the textile industry of the USSR. The plan paid great attention to the development of coal and oil industries in Uzbekistan. It also laid stress of the creation of a metallurgical industry in Central Asia. Other industries connected with the processing of agricultural products were also given due attention. The first draft of the plan for Uzbekistan was ready in June 1928. The second revised draft was laid before the Third Congress of Soviets of Uzbekistan in May 1929 for discussion. The third and final draft was approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in July 1929.

A large sum of money was invested in the industrial development of the Uzbek SSR. The allocation for industrial development in the first plan was 288.4 million rubles which constituted 26% of the total capital investment under the plan in the republic. In comparison to the preceding four years (1924-28) it was 6 times greater.²

The Centre's contribution formed a major portion of the investment under the plan in Uzbekistan. Characteristic of the industrial development in Uzbekistan during the First Five-Year Plan was an impressive development of power production, machine building and metal industries. In Tashkent an agricultural machinery plant was built which supplied machines and other implements required by agriculture in the republic, particularly for cotton cultivation. Another plant

¹ *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*, Part II, p. 343.

² Sh. N. Ulmasbayev, *Promyshlennoye razvitiye sovetskogo Uzbekistana*, Tashkent, 1958, p. 108.

was set up for the repair of agricultural machines. The Almalyk copper processing plant and the Chirchik chemical combine came into existence during the first plan. They were to grow into gigantic industrial enterprises of all-Union importance in the second plan. Two cement factories were also established during the first plan. In 1932 the construction of a big textile combine at Tashkent was commenced. A number of silk-winding and spinning factories were established at Bukhara, Ferghana and Margelan. Additionally, several factories for fruit and vegetable preservation were also constructed. The value of gross production in the food industry increased 2.3 times, textile industry 56 times and the silk industry 5.4 times during the period 1928-32.¹

During the First Five-Year Plan the Uzbek SSR achieved a great success in the task of socialist industrialisation. As against an increase of two times in the central areas, the volume of industrial production in Uzbekistan increased 2.9 times.

In Tajikistan during the first plan primarily industries concerned with the first stage of processing agricultural products, e.g., cotton-cleaning, fruit and vegetable preservation factories and silk-winding factories were established. In the first plan only 20% was invested in industrial development while in agriculture, the figure was 50%.²

Remarkable success was achieved in Kirghizia in industrial development during the First Five-Year Plan. A sum of 77,751 thousand rubles was invested under the first plan for economic and cultural development of Kirghizia. Out of this amount more than half, i.e., 40,878.2 thousand rubles were invested in heavy industries.³ Forty-one big industrial enterprises were constructed. Industrial production reached 23.5% of total production in 1932.⁴ Industrial production in Kirghizia increased more than 4 times in comparison to 1929, and 61 times in comparison to 1913.⁵

Textile, chemical and food industries appeared in Turkmenia during the First Five-Year Plan. An investment of 270.4 million rubles in the economy of the republic was pro-

vided for by the plan.¹ This was more than 4 times the investment between 1925-28. Vast construction of cotton-cleaning, textile, oil and silk factories and other industries connected with the first processing of agricultural products was commenced. The plan also laid the foundation for such heavy industries as oil, chemical and construction materials. The number of industrial co-operatives rose steadily during the First Five-Year Plan. Every possible technical and financial help was given to women carpet makers who were organised into industrial co-operatives.

The First Five-Year Plan was successfully implemented in the Central Asian republics. The rate of industrial development during the plan was faster there than in the central regions of Russia. If in the old industrial regions industrial production rose two times during the first plan period, in the national republics it increased 3.5 times.² During the plan the Soviet people succeeded in increasing the productivity of labour through participation of broad masses of workers in socialist competition. Every effort was made to improve the technical and cultural level of the people. The innovators' movement assumed a mass character thanks to the great efforts of the Party and trade unions. The Centre gave tremendous help to the Central Asian republics in their industrialisation task. They were provided with the services of highly qualified specialists and additionally, the construction of giant industrial enterprises such as the Tashkent Textile Combine, the Chirchik Electro-Chemical Combine and several big power houses were financed from the funds of the Union budget. It is clear that the huge deficits in the budgets of the national republics of Central Asia due to the large investments envisaged in the First and Second Five-Year plans were beyond their capacity and resources. The deficit in the budget of the Uzbek SSR in 1926-27, i.e., the year on the eve of the first plan was 30 million rubles. During 1924-28 more than 100 million rubles were advanced to the Uzbek SSR, 70 million rubles to the Turkmen SSR and more than 30 million rubles to Kirghizia from the USSR *Sovnarkhoz* fund to meet budget deficits.³ In Tajikistan 435 million rubles

¹ Sh. N. Ulmasbayev, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

² *Formirovaniye sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR*, p. 532.

³ *Istoriya Kirghizii*, Vol. II, p. 171.

⁴ *Kirghiziya za 30 let sovetskoi vlasti*, Frunze, 1948, p. 37.

⁵ M. Litunovskaya, *Byudzhet i khozyaistvenno-kulturnoye razvitiye Kirghizskoi SSR*, Frunze, 1958, p. 11.

¹ *Istoriya Turkmenskoi SSR*, Vol. II, Ashkhabad, 1957, p. 315.

² *Itogi vypolneniya pervogo pyatiletnego plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, Moscow, 1933, p. 239.

³ A. A. Gordiyenko, *Sozdaniye sovetskoi natsionalnoi gosudarstvennosti v Srednei Azii*, Moscow, 1959, p. 223.

from the Union budget were invested during the two five-year plans.¹

In the Second Five-Year Plan 2.2 milliard rubles (2.2 times the size of the first plan) were invested in the economy of the Uzbek SSR.² 46% of the total investment under the plan was earmarked for industrial development (26% in the first plan). The sum invested in industries in the second plan in the Uzbek SSR amounted to 1,119 million rubles.³

① The second plan had the object of liquidating all exploiting classes and establishing socialism. In the sphere of industries it was fulfilled in four years and three months and in agriculture the targets were overfulfilled. The industrial production in the USSR rose 8 times in comparison to the 1913 level and 4.3 times in comparison to the 1929 level, whereas the capitalist countries in 1937 hardly attained 102.5% of the 1929 level and industrial production there again began to decline in the second half of 1937. In 1938 industrial production in capitalist countries stood at 90% of the 1929 level. But in the USSR there was a rise of 11.3% over 1937. The corresponding figure for capitalist countries was a drop of 13.5%.⁴

② The second plan gave great attention to the development of heavy industries. It set before itself the object of harnessing the Chirchik River in the Uzbek SSR and producing electric power. The construction of the first power house began at the time the first plan was completed and construction of the second began promptly. Using this electric power, the construction of a chemical combine was completed in Chirchik. At Almalyk where copper was extracted, the construction of a copper melting plant was completed. The Tashkent plant for the construction of agricultural machines was enlarged and the construction of a textile combine was completed during the second plan. The value of industrial production in the Uzbek SSR rose from 684 million rubles in 1932 to 1,668 million rubles in 1937 (a rise of 2.4 times).⁵ Production in the cotton textile industry increased 4.8 times during the plan period, 7.8 times in oil and gas industry,

¹ A. A. Gordiyenko, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

² Ulmasbayev, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

³ *Promyshlennost' Uzbekistana. Kratky ocherk razvitiya, 1918-1938*, Tashkent, 1941, p. 14.

⁴ *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, Moscow, 1939, p. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

3 times in power production, and 5 times in the metallic industry.¹

The country-wide popular movement for increase in productivity of labour began in the period of the second plan. The movement began in the Donbass in August 1935 and became known as the Stakhanovite movement, named after a coal miner in the Donbass who set a record by extracting more than 14 times the coal fixed by the norm. In the second plan socialist competition was carried on on the basis of new production techniques. Technical education and training became widespread during the second plan. By 1937 44% of all workers engaged in industry in the Uzbek SSR had undergone one or another kind of technical training. If in 1928 1,400 engineers and technical workers were working in industry in Uzbekistan, in 1937 their number had increased to 6,000. The number of students in technical colleges and other institutions reached 26 thousand by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan.² The productivity of labour in the large industries of the Uzbek SSR increased four times in comparison to 1913.³

The achievements made by the Uzbek SSR during the Second Five-Year Plan may be summed up here. Power output rose from 93.6 million kw. hrs. in 1932 to 276.2 million kw. hrs. in 1937. In 1913 it was only 3.3 million kw. hrs. The increase was thus 73 times over 1913.⁴ The production of oil increased from 46.8 thousand tons in 1932 to 196.4 thousand tons in 1938—an increase of 35.8 times over 1924-25.⁵ The production of cotton textiles increased from 8.5 million metres in 1932 to 61.3 million metres in 1936.⁶ The production of heavy industry in Uzbekistan went up by 15 times in relation to the 1924-25 level. The value of its output increased from 630 million rubles in 1932 to 1,512 million rubles in 1937.⁷ Thus great success was achieved in the industrialisation of Uzbekistan which in a decade's time became a powerful industrial republic.

A big advance was made in industrialisation of the other republics of Central Asia too. In the Turkmen SSR the value

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

² Ulmasbayev, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

³ *Uzbekistan za 15 let*, p. 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

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of industrial production rose from 129 million rubles to 293 million rubles, i.e., 2.3 times, during the Second Five-Year Plan period.¹ Industrial production increased from 27.9% in 1925 to 68.9% in 1937, whereas that of agriculture dropped from 72.1% to 31.1% notwithstanding the general growth of production.² A special feature of industrial development in the Turkmen SSR during the second plan period was the rapid development of the oil and chemical industries. A big stride was made in the chemical industry with the exploitation of the mineral riches of the Kara Bogaz Gol Bay. The production of oil increased from 34 thousand tons in 1932 to 452 thousand tons in 1937 (a rise of 13 times).³

In the Kirghiz SSR 61 big industrial undertakings were constructed in the period 1932-37. A number of heavy industries made their appearance along with light industries connected with local agricultural products. In 1935 work began on the Tash Kumyr coal mine. The Kara-Balty sugar works and Frunze leather works were also established during the same period. Kirghizia became the coal base of the Central Asian republics. The production of coal rose from 720 thousand tons to 896 thousand tons.⁴

Similarly, in Tajikistan industrialisation advanced quite successfully. Before the October Revolution industrial undertakings of the modern type were completely absent in this area. At the end of the first plan the republic had come to have about 100 industrial undertakings. During the second plan the number further increased by 125. The value of industrial production rose 3.7 times, from 51 million rubles in 1932 to 187 million rubles in 1937.⁵ The production of oil increased by 50%. Progress was made in the preparatory work on the Shurab coal fields. Alabaster and lime factories were constructed in Dushanbe and Isfara. A big power house was constructed at Varzob. It was also during the Second Five-Year Plan that work began on the Dushanbe giant textile combine.

Vast changes were effected in the economic structure of the republics and their socio-economic form changed beyond recognition. With socialist industrialisation the gap in the

¹ *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana...*, pp. 53-54.

² *15 let Turkmenskoi SSR*, Ashkhabad, 1939, p. 9.

³ *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana...*, pp. 53-54.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

level of development of the Central regions of Russia and Central Asia was to a very large extent equalised and on this basis the national question was satisfactorily solved. While the increase in the value of industrial production for the whole of the USSR for the second plan period was 220.6%, for the RSFSR it was 220.5%, for the Uzbek SSR it was 243.0%, and for Tajikistan 355.7%.¹ In general the rate of capital investment was also higher in the Central Asian republics than in the USSR. The increase for the USSR during the second plan was 2.8 times; for the Uzbek SSR it was 3.8 times.² The growth in the number of workers in big industries in Central Asian republics was 59.5% in comparison to an increase of 22.2% in the Central regions between 1932-37.³

Balanced Regional Development

G. Wheeler comments on the "colonial" character of the Central Asian economy by referring to the export of 90 per cent of Central Asian cotton as raw fibre to other parts of the Union.⁴ This, however, does not indicate a one-sided "colonial" character of the economy of Soviet Central Asia. Cotton fibre, as is known, is used not only in the textile industry, but also in the automobile and chemical industries and more favourable conditions exist in other regions of the USSR for their development. A considerable part of cotton fibre is sent to textile factories in other parts of the USSR because the central regions of Russia had already before the Revolution specialised in textile industry. Central Asia sends its cotton not only to Russia but also to Poland and Czechoslovakia under the international division of labour which exists between socialist countries. Moreover, if the entire cotton produced in Central Asia were to be consumed in local manufacture, it would result in an imbalance in the economy of the region and deprive it of the possibili-

¹ *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana...*, p. 115.

² *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva Uzbekistana*, Vol. I, Tashkent, 1962, p. 273.

³ *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnego plana...*, p. 44.

⁴ G. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 161. At the same time Wheeler says nothing of the fact that with the population of 4.6 per cent of the USSR's total Uzbekistan now accounts for 15 per cent of the Union's gas production, 7 per cent of mineral fertilisers, 50 per cent of the textile industry equipment, 72 per cent of the cotton-cleaning equipment and 100 per cent of the cotton picking machines.

ties of developing the other 100 branches of industry which it has at present. Even in a highly developed capitalist country like the United States the industrial development of the cotton-producing states is not limited to the textile industry alone and a large portion of their cotton is sent to other states.

Export of a large quantity of cotton from Central Asia does not mean that the textile industry there is not developing. The Uzbek SSR with 3.8% of the population of the USSR contributed 4% of the textiles produced in the country in 1958.¹ The annual per capita production of cloth in the USSR was 25 metres and in Uzbekistan 27 metres.²

Similarly Wheeler is not correct in saying that in 1957 the number of cattle was only 17% higher than before the Revolution with an increase of 75% in the size of the population.³ He also asserts that the number of livestock per inhabitant was smaller than before the Revolution. The number of cattle rose from 2.9 million in 1916 to 3.7 million in 1959, i.e., 27%, and that of sheep and goats was up by 77%.⁴

A comparison of the growth of the number of cattle should be made not with the general increase in population, but with increase in the agricultural population which showed an increase of 50% in Central Asia, though its relative share fell from 81% in 1913 to 55% in 1959.⁵ It should also be remembered that the transition from the extensive cattle-breeding nomad economy (especially in Kirghizia and Turkmenia) to settled agriculture was bound to affect the importance of cattle in the economy of the peasants in Central Asia and also their growth rate. Moreover, the figure of growth or decline in the number of livestock does not prove or disprove anything without taking into consideration the productivity of cattle and their

¹ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, Moscow, 1962, p. 252.

² True, the per capita production of cotton textiles in the Uzbek SSR has somewhat decreased in recent years, 21.3 metres in 1966. This is due to a relative decrease in the demand for cotton fabrics with the simultaneously growing demand for pure and artificial silk fabrics and those made of synthetic fibres. The per capita production of silk fabrics increased from 1.4 m. in 1950 to 2.8 m. in 1960 and to 4.0 m. in 1966 (*Narodnoye khozyaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR za 50 let*, Tashkent, 1967, p. 53).

³ G. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁴ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, p. 384.

⁵ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Srednei Azii v 1963 godu*, Tashkent, 1964, p. 8.

relative share in agricultural power. There has been a marked improvement in the productivity of cattle in Central Asia. In the average collection of sheep's wool Central Asia takes one of the foremost places in the world. As is well-known, India occupies first place in the world in respect to total number of livestock (175.6 million head of cattle), but as regards productivity the country holds last place. Further, in Central Asia the relative share of cattle in the agricultural power has fallen from 60-70% to almost zero. In 1963 out of 13.5 million horse-power of energy in use in agriculture only 200 thousand horse-power was provided by draught animals.¹ In 1963 there were 130 thousand tractors working on the fields in the Soviet republics of Central Asia.

The difference in industrial production of the USSR as a whole and the Central Asian republics is not much. In Uzbekistan industry contributes 73% and agriculture 27% of the aggregate production, whereas the figures for the Union are 80% and 20% respectively.² However, the *per capita* industrial production in Central Asia is only about half the *per capita* industrial production in the USSR as a whole. (In Uzbekistan 52.5%, Turkmenia 50.2%, Kirghizia 42.1% and Tajikistan 46% of the *per capita* production in the USSR.)³ The reason for this "lagging behind" is to be found in two factors. In the first place, it is to be attributed to the remnants of that gigantic economic inequality which existed at the beginning of the thirties as a consequence of Tsarist colonial rule. The Soviet five-year plans from the very beginning endeavoured to raise the level of industrial development of Central Asia. Particularly significant measures were adopted in this direction in the post-war period. Between 1950 and 1963 the gross industrial production of the USSR rose 394%, while in Central Asia it increased 530%.⁴ In the current five-year plan (1966-70) the rate of industrial growth planned for Central Asia is higher than in the USSR as a whole. The industrial production in Uzbekistan during this period is expected to increase by 60%, Kirghizia 70% (46-49% in the USSR).

Secondly, due to more favourable geographical and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

² *Sovetsky Uzbekistan za 40 let*, Tashkent, 1964, p. 28, and *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, Moscow, 1962, p. 76.

³ *Razvitiye sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR v poslevoynny period*, Moscow, 1965, p. 519.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 518, and *Narodnoye khozyaistvo v Srednei Azii v 1963 godu*, p. 23.

climatic conditions the relative share of agriculture in the aggregate production should naturally be higher in Central Asia than in other regions of the USSR. Agriculture, as is commonly known, is a less remunerative branch of economy. Hence the *per capita* national income in Central Asia (1958-61) was 65.1% of the all-Union figure,¹ though the standard of living of the people there was much higher than the *per capita* national income, thanks to the generous help from other regions of the USSR.

Thus, for instance, the national income of the Uzbek SSR was 5,604 million rubles in 1965, while its expenditures for the accumulation and consumption equalled 6,180 million rubles, i.e., they exceeded its national income by 600 million rubles and were covered through the aid of other fraternal Soviet republics. In the *per capita* calculation the deficit in the Uzbek Republic would have been about 60 rubles in 1965.² In 1961 Central Asia was producing 3.5% of the gross Soviet industrial output while its population was 6.5% of the total population of the country.³ With the financial and material help of the other peoples of the USSR, agriculture in Central Asia is being developed along industrial lines. A decisive step shall have been taken in this direction during the current five-year plan (1966-70). The use of mineral fertilisers will increase 2.5 times, in the agriculture of Uzbekistan the number of tractors will be doubled and 5 times more electric power will be used. As a result of all these measures the remunerativeness of agriculture will almost be the same as of industry and the level of national income of all the Soviet republics will be more or less equal.

Yet in spite of this limited "lagging behind" in comparison to the all-Union level, Soviet Central Asia has during the last 35 years taken a big step forward—from a level of industrial production which was behind that of Turkey and almost the equal of the level then obtained in India to that of a highly industrialised country. In 1961 Soviet Central Asia with a population of only 15 million contributed 0.7% of the entire world industrial output. But India with 19% of the world's population contributed only 1.2%.

¹ *Razvitiye sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR v poslevoyenny period*, p. 521.

² *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR za 50 let*, Tashkent, 1967, p. 189.

³ On the basis of *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, p. 9, and *Razvitiye sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki v poslevoyenny period*, p. 519.

Uzbekistan, at the same time, produced 0.45% of the world industrial output with 0.30% of the world's population.

The report of the Economic Commission for Europe *Regional Economic Policy in the Soviet Union* published in 1957 tries to refute the achievements of the two five-year plans towards bridging the gap in the level of development of Central Asian republics and the advanced central regions of Russia. The report points out that Central Asian industry was extremely small in 1926 and a percentage increase over a period of years of the order of magnitude just mentioned (more than twelve-fold between 1926 and 1940) is no unique performance for a country in a reconstruction period, or at the very first stages of industrial development. To mention only one other example, in Pakistan the index of industrial production rose more than four-fold in the six years from 1950 to 1956,¹ but the average annual increase of *per capita* national income was no more than 2 per cent owing to the limited size of the industrial sector and to unfavourable terms of trade.

But a comparison of the growth rate of industrial output in Central Asia for a 14-year period beginning from 1926 and Pakistan for a six-year period commencing with 1950 is meaningless and irrelevant. For an objective comparison it is necessary to take a period of equal length and similar economic trends. It would be more proper to take for comparison the ten-year period (1928-37) for Central Asia which saw the beginning of industrialisation (the earlier period being that of rehabilitation of economy after civil war and foreign intervention) and the ten-year period (1950-59) for Pakistan (the country had by that time, in the main, made good the loss suffered as a result of disturbances following the partition of India). During 1950-59 the national income of Pakistan in the industrial sector rose from 1,191 million rupees to 2,602 million rupees (218%).² In Uzbekistan between 1928 and 1937 the national income from industry increased from 56 million rubles to 755 million rubles (1348%).³ Soviet Uzbekistan with the

¹ Cited by G. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 159, 298% according to *Statistical Year Book*, United Nations, New York, 1958, and 361% according to *Economic Survey and Statistics for 1958-1959*, Karachi.

² *Economic Survey and Statistics for 1958-1959*, Karachi.

³ *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva Uzbekistana*, Vol. 1, Tashkent, 1963, p. 362.

Western authors, Wheeler among them, often commit a blander by

help of socialist methods of industrialisation which enable people to make more rapid economic advance and overcome their backwardness, increased its industrial share in the national income from 12.3% in 1928 to 36.9% in 1937.¹ During these years its national income as a whole rose by 449%. In spite of an annual increase of 2% in the population, *per capita* national income in Uzbekistan rose by 77%. And Uzbekistan was not an exception among other Central Asian republics, for the industrial growth rate was considerably higher in other republics.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, the share of industry in the national income increased from about 10% in 1950-51 to 12% in 1955-56. In 1959 it was 12.5%. (Even in 1962-63 it did not go beyond 14%.)² National income in Pakistan rose by 20.9% and on *per capita* basis only 4.8%. Thus the rate of industrial advance in Uzbekistan was six times more than that of Pakistan, national income as a whole 3.7 times and *per capita* national income 16 times more. This then is the reality of the development of Central Asia in the Soviet period which the Report of the Economic Commission for Europe has described as "no unique performance". Pakistan, it may further be recalled, received 1497 million dollars of foreign aid during 1950-60. If the private foreign investment of 440 million dollars is added to this the amount of total foreign aid received by Pakistan reaches about 2 billion dollars. But with the capitalist development even such a large amount of money could not make the desired impact on the economic progress of Pakistan. Because of the two

directly comparing figures of the industrial growth rates in socialist and capitalist countries. They completely disregard the fundamental differences in the methods of calculating these growth rates. In the socialist countries the growth indices are determined by the gross output, while in the capitalist countries basically by the net or conditionally net production. Therefore, for scientifically comparing the industrial growth rates of Pakistan and the Soviet Central Asian republics it is above all necessary to reduce them to a common basis. The comparing of their net or conditionally net production is just such a basis.

According to Trubnikov, who calculated the growth of industrial production in Uzbekistan between 1928 and 1937 in net production, the figure indicated a 13.5 time increase. (V. Trubnikov, "V krivom zerkale vala", *Ekonomika i Zhizn* No. 9, 1965, p. 39). Thus it is obvious that in the ten-year period set above the industrial growth rates in Uzbekistan were 3.5 times higher than in Pakistan.—Ed.

¹ *Uzbekistan za 15 let*, Tashkent, 1939, p. 27.

² Calculated on the basis of figures given in *Pakistan Basic Facts*, III edition, Rawalpindi, 1964, pp. 104-05.

opposite lines of development the *per capita* annual national income in Pakistan is hardly more than 50 dollars, while in Uzbekistan it had attained 630-640 dollars in 1964. The Central Asian republics are also quite ahead of such advanced capitalist countries as Italy and Japan in respect to *per capita* national income.

The allegation contained in the Report of the Economic Commission for Europe that the average living standards for Soviet Central Asia as a whole "were probably one-fifth to one-fourth lower than the Soviet average"¹ is hardly maintainable in the face of facts. In 1963 the *per capita* sale of goods for the USSR was 408 rubles, but for Central Asia it was 284 rubles (70% of the general level). However, the difference in the living standards was much less, because in Central Asia the relative proportion of agricultural population owning its own kitchen gardens is 63%. In the USSR it is only 48%. Hence the population of Central Asia spends less on food articles and more on industrial goods. If in the USSR a person on an average buys food articles worth 236 rubles a year, in Central Asia this expenditure amounts to only 154 rubles. On industrial goods the average expenditure per head for the whole of the USSR is 172 rubles a year and for Central Asia 130 rubles (i.e., already 24% less and not 30% as it appears from the general figures of *per capita* expenditure).² If the additional expenditure incurred by the people in the northern regions of the USSR on warm clothes and fuel, etc., is added to this, the difference is further reduced. That the difference in the living standards of the people in Central Asia and the peoples in other regions of the USSR is not much is proved by the comparative figures on the sale of durable goods per 10,000 persons in 1966 given below:

Table I

Item of goods	USSR	Uzbekistan	% Uzbekistan vis-à-vis all-Union level
1. Radio sets	203	177	87%
2. Television sets	170	106	64%
3. Sewing machines	63	68	108%
4. Refrigerators	83	70	86%

Source: *Strana sovetov za 50 let*, Moscow, 1967, p. 250

¹ Cited by G. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-67.

² *Razvitiye ekonomiki SSSR v poslevoyenny period*, p. 534.

Additional to the above-mentioned general reasons for the difference in the retail commodity turnover in Central Asian republics and the all-Union level, there are several other specific reasons as well. For example, the difference in the sale of television sets is explained by the smaller TV coverage of Central Asian territory as compared to the thickly-populated regions of Central Russia.

Differences in the living standards of various regions are found everywhere, even in highly developed capitalist countries like Canada, Britain and the United States. But the distinguishing feature of socialist countries is that endeavours are made to rapidly eliminate these differences, while in capitalist countries they either continue to grow or preserve themselves at the same level. That great attention is paid in the USSR to the promotion of sales of goods and improvement of catering in the Central Asian republics is shown by the fact that the sale of goods in Uzbekistan rose 19 times during the period 1928-66, whereas the corresponding rise for the whole of the USSR has been 11 times.¹

Between 1913 and 1959 gross industrial output in Uzbekistan increased 18 times, in Turkmenia 21 times, in Tajikistan 35 times and in Kirghizia 55 times.² Central Asian industries now produce steel, rolled metal, non-ferrous metals, mineral fertilisers, metal-cutting lathes, cotton combines and tractors, excavators, oil and electrical engineering equipment, cotton, woollen and silk fabrics, footwear, clothes, tinned food, glass, cement, prefabricated ferro-concrete structures, etc. Central Asia now exports industrial goods not only to other Soviet republics but abroad as well. Automation and telemechanics are widely employed in its industrial enterprises, power stations and oil fields.

In the meantime industry continues to develop apace. The industry of Soviet Uzbekistan has fulfilled the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) ahead of schedule. Today 69 countries of the world import Uzbek industrial goods—textile and agricultural machinery, chemical and mining equipment,

¹ *Strana sovetov za 50 let*, p. 250; *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR za 50 let*, p. 194.

² A. Roslyakov and Sh. Tashliyev, *How Socialism Came to Central Asia*, p. 73. We have already pointed out in this book that it is impermissible to directly compare, as Wheeler did, the cited here growth rate figures of the socialist republics of Central Asia, estimated in accordance with the calculation method based on the gross output and adopted in the USSR, with the growth rate figures of capitalist countries calculated on the basis of net or conditionally net production.—Ed.

excavators, compressor stations and electrical equipment, etc. In the Seven-Year Plan period, the republic boosted power and radio engineering, gas, chemical, oil, coal, textile and other industries whose volume of production has radically increased. A new enterprise went into operation in Uzbekistan every week, and now the republic has some 1,500 enterprises. Industrial establishments account for nearly 60 per cent of Uzbekistan's national income. During this period Uzbek gas which had been discovered not long ago, was supplied not only to cities, villages and industrial establishments of the republic but also to industrial centres of other republics. The construction of the world's longest gas-pipeline (2,000 kilometres), the Bukhara-Ural gas pipeline, has been successfully completed.

The discoveries of the last few years have made Uzbekistan one of the leading gas producers in the Soviet Union. It has been estimated that within this Central Asian republic there are over 700,000 million cubic metres of natural gas of commercial importance, while its perspective resources run into astronomic figures. In 1966 Uzbekistan produced 23,000 million cubic metres of natural gas, 43 per cent more than in 1965. The first 100 kilometres of a 3,500 kilometre gas pipeline have been built to connect in 1967 the two biggest gas pipeline systems in the country—that of Central European Russia and Central Asia. The Uzbek Republic's industrial output in the first year of the current five-year plan is estimated to increase by nearly 9 per cent over the outgoing year. Under the five-year plan for 1966-70 it will increase by 70%. Above all, such modern branches of industry as gas, chemical and metallurgical industries will be developed.

Other Soviet Central Asian republics are also making remarkable progress in their industrial development. The gross industrial product of the Kirghiz Republic has doubled from 1959 to 1965. Entirely new industries have appeared: electrical engineering, radio electronic, automobile and instrument-making. Products of Kirghizia's engineering industry are shipped to all Soviet republics and exported to 41 countries. Its output in 1966 was 34 per cent above the figure for 1965. Under the five-year plan for 1966-70 the industrial production of the republic will increase approximately 70 per cent. The plan for the next five years provides for rapid development of power generation, non-ferrous metallurgy, machine-building, light and food industries.

Power generation has increased 140 per cent over the 1961 level. The Naryn River was plugged and the giant Toktogul hydro-power station is rising.

Turkmenia's gross industrial output in 1963 was 42 times greater than that of 1924-25 and 3.9 times that of the pre-war year of 1940. It is to grow 70% in the 1966-70 period. Heavy industry developed at a priority rate. Compared with 1940, oil extraction has increased 12 times; oil refining 20 times; the chemical industry 5.2 times; machine-building 6.8 times; building materials 12.9 times; power 11.7 times. In 1963 Turkmenia produced 2 million tons of oil in excess of the Seven-Year Plan target and achieved the 1965 level. The gas industry is also making great headway. In oil output Turkmenia holds first place in Soviet Central Asia and third in the Soviet Union. The republic contributes over 40 per cent to the national output of sodium sulphate as well as a large quantity of sulphur. The machine-building and metal-working industries have also achieved great success. Powerful industrial blowers and oil pumps manufactured in Turkmenia are exported to many countries of the world including many advanced European countries as well.

Gross industrial output in Tajikistan is to increase approximately by 80 per cent in the five-year plan period. Much attention is being given to the development of power engineering, chemical and non-ferrous metallurgical industries. The output of the republic's light and food industries will make a gain of 60 per cent. The big Nurek hydro-power station is also under construction.

Socialist industrialisation has turned Central Asia, once a backward agrarian and raw-material outskirt, into a prosperous, advanced region with a highly developed diversified industry. This has made it possible to solve another major problem, that of reorganising agriculture along socialist lines.

Socialist Transformation of Agriculture

In Central Asia the problem before the Soviet power was to turn a technically backward, small and partially patriarchal and natural peasant economy into a large-scale mechanised collective socialist economy, bypassing the stage of large-scale capitalist farming based on the exploitation of farm labourers.

The history of socialist construction in the Central Asian countryside may be divided into three basic stages:

1. Preparations for transition to the socialist path (1920-29);
2. Mass collectivisation of agriculture (from the autumn of 1929 to the mid-1930s);
3. Consolidation and development of the collective-farm system (from the mid-1930s to the initial period of full-scale communist construction).

In the first stage the Party and Soviet organisations in Central Asia directed their efforts to improving the economic position of the peasants, developing their class-consciousness, organising them, wresting them from the influence of the feudals and the *bais*, rallying them round the Party and the Soviet government, persuading them to join co-operatives of the simplest type, and thus paving the way to the socialist path of development.

To convince a peasant of the need for socialist transformation of agriculture, it is necessary to make him feel in practice that the state is genuinely concerned about him, that his economic position is improving. It was necessary, firstly, to carry out a land and water reform; secondly, to provide irrigation facilities; thirdly, to supply peasants with modern implements, introduce new agrotechnical methods and advance credits to make these improvements possible.

In the early 1920s the Soviet government distributed the private estates of the Russian Tsar, the Khan and the Emir, big counter-revolutionary feudals and the rich Russian settlers among the Central Asian peasants. On the whole, however, most of the feudal and *kulak* farms remained and the peasants continued to suffer from scarcity of land and water. In comparison to Russia, agrarian reforms proceeded slowly in Central Asia because of the political backwardness of the peasants. It was only in 1925-27, when the Peasants' Union *Koshchi*—the mass organisation of poor and middle peasants—and the rural Soviets had become stronger, when Party organisations had appeared in the countryside and the peasants' political consciousness had risen, that a land and water reform was carried out. The landowners, merchants and money-lenders who rented land to poor peasants and did not till it themselves, were expropriated; the *kulaks* were dispossessed of part of their land. This made it possible to distribute about 350,000

hectares of irrigated land among some 140,000 landless and poor peasants.

The reform put an end to feudal land and water relationships existing in most of Central Asia. The peasants' lot improved considerably. The state granted them credits to purchase implements and draught animals, and reduced taxes. The agrarian policy pursued by the Party and the Soviet government in Central Asia was bitterly opposed by the *kulaks*, *bais* and money-lenders who, realising that expropriation of surplus land and water resources, expansion of the network of state machine-hire stations and easy-term credits were depriving them of their weapons of exploitation, launched a violent campaign against Soviet power, formed armed bands, murdered Soviet functionaries and village activists. This aggravation of class struggle also broadened the peasants' political outlook and increased their political activity. The working peasant of Central Asia gave increasing support to the Soviet administration.

The reform measures of the Soviet government intended to improve the lot of small peasants did not radically alter the situation in the countryside. Output and living standards were rising very slowly and agriculture remained backward as before. Lenin was right when he said that "small farms cannot escape poverty". Large, mechanised, highly productive farms alone could radically alter agriculture. Lenin wrote that living in the old way as up to the world war was impossible. Productivity of labour would have doubled and trebled if only a transition could be made to collective economy from this economy of scattered small holdings.¹

But Lenin counselled patience in dealing with the small peasantry. He admitted that it was not possible to transform a small-holding economy into a large one at once.² Addressing the Eighth Congress of the Party, he warned against the use of force to achieve this object. He called for giving utmost importance to the truth that here nothing could be gained through the "method of coercion" as there was not the tower which could be removed leaving the entire base and structure intact. In the villages there were no such capitalists as in the towns. Hence, Lenin had

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 319 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 152-53.

warned that to act through force would be to spoil the whole work. "Prolonged educational work is required," he said.¹

Lenin showed the way to gradual co-operation of small farmers. It was to begin with the simplest forms of co-operation—organisation of the sale of farm produce, supply of goods for peasants and initiation of an agrarian credit system—and end with the establishment of producers' co-operatives, large collective farms equipped with machines and employing the latest farming methods. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, Lenin's co-operative plan went into effect in the early 1920s and many rural co-operatives soon appeared in Central Asia. The simplest were the consumers' co-operatives. A somewhat higher type of co-operative was the credit and marketing co-operative. It received easy-term credits from the state and distributed them among its members. The peasants organised the sale of farm produce to state purchasing agencies through co-operatives. In short, these co-operatives were to a certain extent already tied with production. More closely linked with production were the land improvement and machine co-operatives which united peasants using water from one *aryk* (small canal), repaired, cleaned and re-equipped small irrigation facilities, and drained peasants' fields to prevent their swamping. The machine co-operatives bought modern farm tools from the state on an instalment plan and then used them on their members' fields.

These co-operatives of the simplest types became popular with all peasants. The peasants readily joined them, all the more so because the state gave the co-operatives priority in granting credits and selling machines and implements on easy terms. In 1929 agricultural co-operatives in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia united 80 per cent of the peasants. The simplest forms of agricultural co-operation and the system of state contracts for farm produce played a huge role in preparing the peasants of Central Asia for transition to socialism.

It was in those years too that the first agricultural co-operatives of a still higher type—the collective farms—first appeared in Central Asia. These collective farms were first organised in cotton-growing areas as what was called "*tozs*"—an elementary stage of collective farming under

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 211.

which draught animals and other implements of agriculture and transport were not pooled jointly. These belonged to the individual farmers who were paid not only for their work but also for their animals used in cultivation by the farm. "Tozs" were merely mutual-aid teams formed for the purpose of jointly cultivating land. In 1930 "tozs" began to convert themselves into *artels* which were real collective farms with collective ownership of agricultural implements and draught animals, etc. An important role in this transition was played by experimental stations, agro-technical centres and machine-and-tractor stations. By March 1930 Uzbekistan had 6 machine-and-tractor stations with 374 tractors. In the spring of 1931 the number of machine-and-tractor stations had risen to 48. The state farms also rendered help in organising collective farms. In 1930, there were 14 big state farms in Uzbekistan which helped the collective farms in tilling their fields with machines and in repairing their agricultural implements, etc.

The urban working class of the Soviet Union also rendered great help to the peasants in collectivisation. At the time of the intensive collectivisation drive 25 thousand workers with sufficient technical organisational and political experience were directed to villages to help the peasants in organising collective farms. Industrial enterprises took the countryside under their patronage (*shefstvo*). 26 brigades of 458 skilled workers from Russia came to Uzbekistan alone. The workers of Leningrad assumed the supervision of the Khwarezm area, the textile workers of Moscow of the Tashkent area and the workers of Ivanovo of the Ferghana and Andijan areas. The workers of these cities signed a socialist emulation agreement with the cotton-growers of Central Asia. They floated funds to help the newly organised collective farms with agricultural machines, etc.

Mass collectivisation was fiercely resisted by the hostile classes. The *bais* and their agents went about persuading the peasants not to join collective farms, to slaughter their cattle and flee abroad. This led to the destruction of a vast number of animals. Armed counter-revolutionary bands once again stepped up their activity and began to raid peaceful villages and terrorise peasants. In 1930, 333 cases of assault on peasant workers were registered in Uzbekistan alone.¹ In

¹ *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khozyaistva v soyuznykh respublikakh*, Moscow, 1963, p. 235.

the Zeravshan valley of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the *bais* and *kulaks* openly came out with arms against Soviet power. They gathered the old *basmachi* hordes and attacked Soviet and Party workers. But these attempts of the *bais* and *kulaks* to scare the peasants away from the collective farms proved a dismal failure. The peasants supported the collectivisation of agriculture and defeated the anti-Soviet machinations of the exploiting classes.

The second half of 1929 marked the beginning of a mass movement for collectivisation in the country. The tempo of the movement at this time was, however, confined to the central regions alone and in the Central Asian region the stage of mass collectivisation began a little later. In Uzbekistan in October 1929 collective farms covered but 3.4% of the peasant families and only towards the end of the year did the tempo of collectivisation increase, reaching 10.08%. The movement in Uzbekistan at that time covered only the poor and landless peasants. The middle peasantry still had a wait-and-see attitude.

The question of the tempo of collectivisation and the time limit for it was a significant question. The resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Union Communist Party on January 5, 1930 had not set any concrete time limit for collectivisation in the national regions, though the commission of the Politbureau of the Central Committee while working out this resolution had suggested that the work of collectivisation in these areas should be concluded within three to four years, i.e., by the end of the First Five-Year Plan.

The plan for collectivisation in Uzbekistan was worked out by a special commission of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. This plan was confirmed on November 27, 1929. Noting the growth of collective farms in the republic, the commission pointed out the possibility of quickening the tempo for their establishment. On the basis of the recommendations of the commission, the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party in Uzbekistan decided to bring within the fold of collectivisation a number of peasant families sufficient to supply from the collective sector 60% of the cotton produced.

The Executive Bureau laid down before the Party the task of drawing 30% of the peasant families into collective farms in the first half of the plan. This was revised and increased a little later. In December 1929 the Central Asian Party Confe-

rence issued a mistaken instruction to increase the pace of collectivisation so as to catch up with the other republics and even leave them behind.¹ In January 1930 the Party and Soviet organs of the republic set the target of collectivisation at 36% of peasant families. It was also stressed that given the initiative of local organisations it might be possible to collectivise even 42% of peasant families in 1930.² This forcing of the tempo of collectivisation artificially led to an unhealthy competition between the different regions. On February 17, 1930 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan adopted a resolution on collectivisation and *dekulakisation*. 17 *raions* (areas) were declared to be areas of intensive collectivisation. To this the Central Asian Bureau added one more. This was a wrong decision, for conditions were not yet ripe for a mass collectivisation in all these areas. This artificially forcing up of the pace of collectivisation violated the Leninist principle of voluntariness and the Party line towards the middle peasantry.

Besides this mistaken policy decision, in the actual work of collectivisation several serious mistakes were committed. At several places peasants were forced to join the collective farms. Thus peasants in many villages of Bukhara *oblast* were threatened with punitive measures if they declined to join collective farms.³ Peasants at several other places were threatened with stoppage of water and other supplies and thus forced to join collective farms. At some places the instructors sent to organise collective farms insisted that the peasants organise themselves into communes which were regarded as the highest form of collectivisation. To some over-zealous organisers the idea of organising giant collectives appeared to be quite attractive. Ignoring the then backward agrotechnical level and inadequate organisational experience, they insisted upon organising collective farms with an area of 35 to 45 thousand hectares uniting about 4.5 thousand peasant families. Grave mistakes were committed in the *dekulakisation* work too. At some places it was done on the basis of revenue records without proper discussion in meetings of *batraks* and poor peasants. Consequently, middle peasants also sometimes figured in the *dekulakisation* lists. These mistakes were exploited by the *bais* and *kulaks* in

¹ *Rezolyutsiya II Sredneaziat'skogo partiinogo soveshchaniya*, Tashkent 1929, p. 11.

² *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, p. 282.

³ *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii* . . . , pp. 239-40.

their agitation against collectivisation. In some of the areas of Uzbekistan the situation became very tense and signs of peasant discontent appeared.

But the Central Committee of the Party soon took measures to rectify these mistakes. On February 20 and 25, 1930 the Central Committee took some special decisions which pointed out the necessity of making elaborate preparations before embarking upon collectivisation. These decisions deplored the mistakes committed in the work of collectivisation in Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Kazakhstan and other national republics. The Central Committee directed that collectivisation should be introduced in accordance with the degree of preparedness of the poor and middle peasants for it and the social and economic conditions prevailing in every area taken into consideration.¹ The Central Asian Bureau also discussed these mistakes and recognised its decisions of January 28, 1930 as a mistake. Measures were taken to rectify the mistakes. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan held in April 1930 took active measures to normalise the work of collectivisation. It was decided to concentrate henceforth on the preparatory work and avoid hurrying with the setting up of collective farms. The restoration of the principle of voluntariness resulted at first in a decline in the number of collective farms. Many collective farms had in fact existed on paper only. On March 18, 1930 the number of peasant families covered by collective farms was 393.5 thousand, by May 1, it had fallen to 228.6 thousand.² The movement for organising the collective farms spread more rapidly in the cotton-growing areas than in areas growing food grains and engaged in cattle-breeding.

The reorganisation of Party and Soviet work in villages, the founding of Party units in state farms, collective farms and machine-and-tractor stations led to a big increase in the size of the collectivisation movement. The initiative and self-activity of peasant masses also increased. A new movement for collectivisation began as a result of this in the autumn of 1930. The machine-and-tractor stations played a vital role. In 1931, there were 2,330 tractors working in these stations in Uzbekistan. During the autumn of 1930 there arose in the republic 1,530 new collective farms uniting

¹ *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. II, pp. 283-84.

² *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii* . . . , p. 243.

about 47,488 peasant families. In old and new collective farms 63 thousand peasant families were united in 1930.¹ In that year 37.7% of all peasant families had been covered by collective farms.

In the following years the collectivisation movement continued to make rapid advance. By March 1931 47.9% of the peasants had joined the collectives; by the beginning of May 1931, 56.7%.² In the summer of 1931 there were 14 areas (*raions*) of intensive collective farming in Uzbek SSR. In 38 other areas mass transition of peasants towards collective farms had begun. Collectivisation now embraced not only cotton-growing but also food-growing and cattle-breeding areas. By the end of 1932, 61 areas of the republic (out of 79) had become areas of intensive collective farming. In 1932 collective farms in Uzbekistan united 74.9% of the peasant families. The share of the socialist sector in cotton-growing rose to 80%. By the end of 1932 the work of collectivisation was by and large complete in the cotton areas of Uzbekistan.

In the food-growing and cattle-breeding areas it also continued during the Second Five-Year Plan. By 1937 95% of the peasant families had been united in collective farms which covered 99.4% of the entire land cultivated by peasants.³ The socialist form of production thus became the dominant form in the agriculture of Uzbekistan. Remarkable progress was achieved in the mechanisation of agriculture in the first two five-year plans. In Uzbekistan in 1937 there were 163 machine-and-tractor stations with 18,267 tractors.⁴ The machine-and-tractor stations served 94% of all collective farms by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. With the mechanisation of agriculture in Uzbekistan not only the productivity of labour increased but also the yield per hectare. The average yield of cotton per hectare had risen from 9.6 centners in 1928 to 16.1 centners in 1937.⁵

Similarly, in other republics of Central Asia the collectivisation of agriculture had been successfully completed by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. In Turkmenia, Kirghizia and Tajikistan the task was all the more difficult, for in comparison to Uzbekistan these republics had greater feudal

and tribal survivals and a considerable section of their population was still nomadic. Side by side with collectivisation there was also effected the transition from a nomadic to a sedantic way of life.

The collectivisation of agriculture in Turkmenia was in the main completed by 1932. By that year 1,308 collective farms united 73% of the peasant families and covered 87% of the entire land under cultivation. Of the land devoted to cotton, 90.1% was under collective farms. 27 machine-and-tractor stations with 1,046 tractors worked in the republic.¹ At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the collective farms in the Turkmen SSR united 95.4% of all peasant families and 99.4% of the entire land under cultivation.² In 1938, 4,225 tractors were working in the fields of the Turkmen SSR. The cotton yield per hectare rose 55% as compared with 1913. The average yield now was 18.6 centners.³

In Kirghizia towards the close of 1930 28% of the peasant families had entered collective farms. The settling of Kirghiz on land played an important role in their collectivisation. Between 1931-34, 85 thousand Kirghiz families were settled on land. At first, tribal and patriarchal survivals were strongly reflected in the organisation of collective farms. Some collective farms were organised on a tribal basis which proved to be economically unsound. This attempt was soon given up. Special attention was given to cattle-breeding collectives. In the beginning of 1932 there were 149 collective farms of draught animals with 230 thousand cattle head, and 68 sheep farms with 192.4 thousand goats and sheep.⁴ By the end of 1932, 66.2% of the peasant families in Kirghizia had joined collective farms and 1,522 collective farms working on 75% of the entire land under cultivation had been organised. There were 15 machine-and-tractor stations with 1,300 tractors serving collective farms in Kirghizia. The collectivisation of agriculture was completed in the republic by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. In 1937 there were 1,900 collective farms uniting 89.1% of the peasant families and 97% of the land under cultivation. 53 machine-and-tractor stations with 3,984 tractors served the socialist agriculture of Kirghizia.⁵

¹ *Uzbekistanskaya Pravda* No. 294 (556), December 23, 1930.

² *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii...*, p. 250.

³ *Uzbekistan za 15 let*, p. 49.

⁴ G. Rizayev, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Uzbekistana za 40 let*, p. 133.

⁵ G. Rizayev, *op. cit.*, pp. 134, 151.

¹ *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii...*, p. 498.

² *Ibid.*, p. 504.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 505.

⁴ *Sotsialisticheskoye stroitelstvo Kirghizskoi SSR*, Frunze, 1940, p. 57.

⁵ *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii...*, p. 418.

In Tajikistan also, the socialist transformation of agriculture had been accomplished by the end of the second plan. By 1937, 89.9% of the peasant families in Tajikistan had joined collective farms covering 98.3% of all the land under cultivation. There were 45 machine-and-tractor stations with 3,217 tractors serving the collective farmers in 1937. The average yield of cotton per hectare increased from 7.3 centners in 1933 to 16.1 centners in 1937 and that of wheat from 6.2 centners to 9.6.¹

As a result of socialist industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture socialism became victorious in the whole of the USSR including its Central Asia republics by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period. This was a fact of tremendous importance for the ultimate solution of the national question in the Soviet Union. During the short period of two decades the erstwhile oppressed and backward peoples of Central Asia who joined the Soviet family of nations after the October Revolution completely changed their socio-economic and cultural relations. They obtained not only mere legal equality but also real economic equality.

It took a great deal of effort before the socialist system in the countryside became really well established. The Soviet government, relying on the growing might of Soviet industry, supplied the Central Asian collective farms with the latest agricultural machines. In Uzbekistan alone, the number of tractors increased from 23,600 in 1940 to 69,300 in 1959. The problem of training highly-skilled agricultural specialists was finally solved after years of persevering effort. In Central Asia collective farms achieved particular success in the post-1953 period. In 1958 machine-and-tractor stations were closed down and their farm machines were sold directly to collective farms.

Before the Revolution Central Asia had about 1,500,000 individual peasant farms with primitive ploughs. Lack of land, low yields and exploitation doomed the overwhelming majority of peasants to a hand-to-mouth existence. In 1961 Central Asia had 1,921 collective farms. Each consisted on an average of 607 households and 1,966 hectares of ploughland. There were, moreover, 399 large grain, cotton, stock-breeding and other state farms. Socialist agriculture in Central Asia is conducted on the basis of the latest achievements in technology and science. In 1961 it had 127,800 tractors (in

¹ *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii*... p. 464.

15 h.p. units), a large number of combines, excavators, bulldozers, planes and helicopters, supplied generously to collective and state farms by the Soviet Union's powerful socialist industry. Hundreds of thousands of tons of mineral fertilisers are annually mixed with the soil. There is a whole army of agronomists and veterinary doctors serving Central Asia's agriculture—about 16,000 specialists with higher education and more than 22,000 specialists with secondary special education. Most of them come from local nationalities.

To step up the economic development of formerly backward peoples and to facilitate the production of cotton which is a labour-consuming crop, the Soviet government has supplied Central Asian republics with up-to-date agricultural machines and implements. Table II illustrates the high rates of mechanisation of agriculture in Central Asia.

Table II

Number of tractors per 1,000 hectares of areas
(in terms of 15 h.p. tractors)

	1940	1953	1960
USSR	4.55	7.88	9.78
Russian Federation	6.96	9.79	8.98
Uzbek Republic	7.8	16.49	23.01
Kirghiz Republic	5.87	9.16	14.46
Tajik Republic	5.08	10.7	20.8
Turkmen Republic	10.95	21.85	33.1

Source: O. Jamalov, *The Importance of Industrialisation in the Technical Equipment of Uzbekistan's Rural Economy*, a paper read at the Inter-Regional Seminar on the Role of Industrial Complexes in Economic Development for Specialists from Asia, Africa and Latin America, 1964, Tashkent.

After the Revolution agriculture in Central Asia had made a tremendous leap forward. The level of mechanisation in the Uzbek Republic is shown in Table III.

Generally speaking, the most prominent result in labour-saving within the last 30 years has been a 90% reduction in labour expenditure per acre.

The socialist transformation of agriculture and the sharp increase in agricultural output have tremendously improved living standards in the Central Asian countryside. Poverty is now a thing of the past. In 1960, as compared with 1935, a working day unit was worth 18 times more in cash and about 6-7 times in kind. Most of the collective farmers now live in well-built modern houses. As far as public services

Table III (in per cent)

	1931	1940	1953	1960
Sowing of Spring cereals	0.0	38.6	71.4	84.0
Sowing of cotton	0.0	65.8	97.7	99.3
Row cultivation of cotton	0.0	63.9	90.2	94.0
Ploughing of clean fallow	0.0	58.3	94.9	97.0
Sowing of winter cereals	0.0	23.4	92.0	100.0
Autumn ploughing	0.0	89.3	96.3	100.0
Harvesting of cereals by combine harvesters	0.0	22.1	66.3	91.0
Haymaking	0.0	Not available	16.6	79.0
Cotton harvesting	0.0	"	9.5	15.0*

Source: Ibid.

* In 1964, out of 3,520,000 tons of cotton produced in Uzbekistan, more than 800,000 tons were picked by machines (about 23%).

and amenities are concerned, many collective and state farms compare favourably with towns. They have good schools, clubs, dispensaries, maternity homes, nurseries, radio relay stations, electric street lighting and many farms have their own stadiums and cinemas. In collective farmers' homes one finds radio and television sets, sewing machines, refrigerators, gas stoves, bicycles and motor-cycles. The cultural standard of the peasantry has risen to an unprecedented level. All this has radically changed the appearance of the Central Asian *kishlaks* and *auls*. The experience of the Soviet Central Asian republics clearly shows that the striking successes in rural development of these republics have become possible due to radical changes in the social structure and a technological revolution in agriculture on the basis of industrialisation.

Central Asian agriculture is developing apace. A regular artificial river—the 800-kilometre-long Kara Kum Canal—has been dug in Turkmenia. Large-scale irrigational construction is going on in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Among the projects completed are several large reservoirs like the Katta-Kurgan and Kuyukmazar reservoirs and the Big Fergana (270 kilometres long) as well as several other canals. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of land have been irrigated in the Hungry Steppe and the Vakhsh Valley. Now under construction are canals to irrigate the Karshi Steppe and the huge Char-Darya Reservoir. This will make it pos-

sible to bring at least another 2 million hectares of fertile soil under cultivation within the next few years, substantially increase the output of all sorts of agricultural produce—cotton, grains, silk, fruits, wool, meat, karakul—and further raise the living standards of the peasants.

Cultural Revolution in Central Asia

The tasks of the cultural revolution were closely linked with industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture because mass illiteracy and ignorance is a great hindrance to economic progress. The tempo of material development, productivity of labour and availability of qualified workers to the rapidly growing industrial enterprises—all this needs a big cultural advance. The cultural revolution is an integral part of the socialist revolution. It implies liquidation of illiteracy among adults, introduction of compulsory education for children, creation of a modern public health system, scientific and technological development, promotion of arts, creation of a national intelligentsia, emancipation of women and building of a new spiritual life.

Mass literacy is the foundation of culture. A man who does not know how to read and write cannot operate complex modern machines or appraise socio-political developments. Hence, the drive for adult literacy and for children's education is the main object of a cultural revolution. It was not an easy task. In Uzbekistan the percentage of literacy was only 2 per cent and in other republics it was even much lower. To solve it, it was necessary to have a large number of national teachers and there were almost none in Central Asia.

Cultural advance in Central Asia became an arena of sharp class struggle. The reactionary mullahs, bourgeois nationalists, *bais* and *kulaks*—were all against any new cultural advance, new Soviet schools and particularly against education for girls. So fierce was the struggle that the illustrious son of the Uzbek people, Hamza Hakimzade Niazii fell victim to religious fanaticism. Many other progressive cultural workers met a similar tragic fate. Party organisations had to carry out a firm struggle against nationalists in their ranks who opposed the change from the Arab script to the more progressive Latin script in the first place and thereafter to the adoption of a national script on the basis of the

Russian alphabet. These script reforms made the task of carrying out a popular cultural revolution through a mass literacy campaign easier and brought the working people of Central Asia nearer to the socialist culture of their Russian and other brotherly peoples of the Soviet Union.

The work of the cultural revolution in Central Asia began soon after the October Revolution. In April 1918, when Turkestan was still a beleaguered fortress and when the *basmachis* bands in Ferghana were letting loose anarchy, the Turkestan People's University was opened in Tashkent. Towards the end of 1919, after the removal of the Orenburg blockade, a large group of highly qualified professors and teachers from Moscow and Petrograd reached Tashkent to work at the University. On September 7, 1920 Lenin signed the decree establishing the Turkestan State University to replace the Turkestan People's University. This university took up the important task of preparing highly qualified national cadres for Central Asia.

Conditions making it possible to launch an offensive along the entire cultural front were ultimately created towards the end of the 1920s. By that time there were hundreds of literacy circles and schools operating in town and country. The Central Asian written languages were reformed on the basis of the Latin alphabet, which was more convenient and easier than the old Arab alphabet.

The decisive stage in Central Asia's cultural revolution began in 1929-30. A mass campaign to wipe out illiteracy was launched in the autumn of 1929. Thousands of volunteers took part in this movement called *kultpokhod*. They formed thousands of small literacy circles and groups in towns and villages. It was really a mass movement. In just two years (1930-31) more than a million people, mainly peasants, were taught to read and write in Central Asia. Illiteracy among adults was soon in the main liquidated.

On July 25, 1930 the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to introduce compulsory primary (four-class) education for children. Public education bodies had done a yeoman's job in training the necessary teachers at short term courses in the beginning.

Illustrative of the scope of public education in Central Asia was the case of Turkmenia in 1937 where about half a million people were attending schools in a population slightly over 1.2 million. By 1958 there were 72 times as many people studying in Central Asia as before the Revolution.

Prior to the Revolution there was not a single institution of higher learning in the whole of Central Asia. But in 1959-60 in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan there were 211 thousand students enrolled in higher educational establishments, besides 176 thousand studying in technical schools and other special schools. In 1959-60 in these republics there were an average of 88 students in higher educational establishments and 73 in technical schools per every 10,000 of population. It may be recalled that in France there are only 40 students in higher educational establishments per 10,000 of population, in Italy 34, in West Germany 31. In 1963-64, there were about 205 thousand students in the higher educational establishments of the four Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan about 140 thousand, Kirghizia 25 thousand, Tajikistan 24 thousand and Turkmenia 17 thousand). Over 70 per cent of them came from local nationalities.¹

The successes achieved in public education in the thirties enhanced the significance of newspapers, magazines and books in national languages. The Soviet government allocated large sums for the development of the national press and printing industry in the Central Asian republics. In 1962, 4,138 different books were published running into editions of 39 million copies. Out of these 2,447 books running into editions of 25.4 million copies, i.e., about 65%, were published in the four main national languages of the republics.² 261 journals and other periodicals with a circulation of 29.3 million copies were published in the republics of Central Asia in 1962. 296 papers with a circulation of 2,931 thousand copies were published in the same year (about 60% in national languages).³ In 1962 Central Asia had 41 theatres, 29 museums, 6,801 large libraries, 4,809 cinemas and 6,000 different clubs. It also had 47 higher educational institutions.

Central Asian literature developed in acute ideological struggle between the national writers from among workers and peasants and the bourgeois nationalist writers. The Soviet literature, radically different as it was from the old literature in its themes, motives and forms of expression, could not come into being without a struggle with the tra-

¹ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Srednei Azii v 1963 godu*, Tashkent, 1964, p. 324.

² *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 339-40.

ditionalist writers of the old school. The Soviet period saw a fierce conflict raging between the new Soviet authors and the old traditionalists called the *Chigataists*. Among Uzbeks, writers such as Fitrat and Atajan Hashimov fought against new trends for a very long time. Fitrat pronounced the representatives of the working class as incapable of understanding the beautiful because they came from a class engaged in crude physical labour. Atajan Hashimov declared socialism as an ideology of the proletariat of the West wholly inapplicable to Central Asia. With the progress of socialist construction and the abolition of the exploiting classes, the bourgeois trend in literature gradually grew weaker and weaker. The worker-peasant socialist trends won the day. Many prominent men of letters like Aibek (Uzbek) and Aini (Tajik) who were formerly under the influence of the *Chigataists* crossed over to the Soviet side.

Soviet writers, however, never turned their back on the national classical literary heritage, on national literary traditions. They made good use of the old literary forms in a new creative way. It is Soviet power and Soviet researchers who have given a new life to many great monuments of Central Asia's ancient culture. In Soviet years the epic tales of Central Asia like the *Manas* have been put down in writing and published. The poems of Central Asian classics, fairy-tales and folk-songs are published in the original languages in large editions and translated into the languages of other Soviet peoples. Large sums are allocated for the preservation and restoration of historical and architectural monuments. The rich cultural heritage of Central Asia has, thanks to the efforts of Soviet power, now taken its place in the treasure-house of human civilisation.

The fine arts and the theatre have been recreated. Here, too, development took place in sharp class struggle. The gifted Uzbek actress Tursunoi Saidazimova met her death at the hands of an assassin. But such terroristic acts could not retard the development of Soviet arts in Central Asia.

Today the creative intelligentsia of Central Asia is numerous, gifted and fully dedicated to the people. Tajik historian B. Gafurov, poet Mirzo Tursun-zade, Uzbek writer-statesman Sharaf Rashidov, Kirghiz writer Chinghis Aitmatov are very well known all over the world.

One of the main goals of the cultural revolution in Central Asia was the radical improvement of the public health system. As a result of broad assistance from the fraternal

Soviet republics the state of Central Asia's public health changed completely. By 1961 its republics had 102 times as many doctors as in 1913 and the number of hospital beds had increased to 85,300. There is now one doctor per slightly more than 700 people, and in this respect Central Asia is one of the first in the world. Medical aid is fully ensured not only to the urban population, but to the rural as well.

A remarkable feature of the cultural revolution in Central Asia was the emancipation of women. In the very first months following the October Revolution the Soviet government abrogated all the old laws which humiliated the woman and denied her equal status with man. However, the feudal concept regarding woman as inferior to man was deep-rooted in Central Asia and the adoption of new laws did not yet mean complete genuine emancipation.

To really emancipate the woman it was necessary firstly, to make her politically conscious and convince her that she was man's equal in all spheres of public life; secondly, to overcome man's old arrogant attitude towards her; and, thirdly, to draw her into social production and government.

In the 1920s it was done mainly through a campaign of education and propaganda. At first, Russian women Communists took the lead in this campaign. But soon there appeared a group of heroic local women who boldly challenged the old world, undaunted by the furious resistance of the reactionary forces, threats and even murder. A major role in women's emancipation was played by the land and water reform in Central Asia. Contrary to customs, thousands of women were given land to run farms. Socialist industrialisation and agricultural co-operation contributed decisively to success of the emancipation movement. The establishment of the textile, garment, food and other industries entailed the formation of a numerous army of local working women. Radical changes took place in the 1930s in women's education.

The Central Asian woman, in the past deprived of all rights, ignorant, isolated from the outer world and hidden away from the sun by the feudal household wall and the thick horse-hair veil (*parandja*), has now taken the bright road of creative work and has become an active builder of the new society.

According to the 1959 census the number of women workers engaged in education, scientific work, art and public health exceeds that of men (women 300.6 thousand, men.

227.1 thousand).¹ In the Uzbek Republic today 157 women are deputies to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Uzbek SSR and more than 30,000 are deputies to local Soviets. The President of the Republic is also a woman (Yadgar Nasriddinova). Uzbek actress Sara Ishanturayeva is a remarkable stage actress who has acted in Uzbek, Russian and other plays and delighted her audiences by making them live through the emotions of the passionate Desdemona and the timid Ophelia. Tamara Khanum, another Uzbek actress, was one of the first Uzbek actresses to make a triumphant world tour. She won the hearts of her audiences in many foreign capitals with her enchanting dances of the Ferghana valley and Khwarezm. Mukkaram Turgunbayeva, another remarkable dancer, singers Khalima Nasyrova and Saodat Kabulova, ballerina Galiya Ismailova are other well-known women artistes of Uzbekistan.

A very remarkable socio-cultural transformation has been effected in the lives of the Central Asian peoples by Soviet rule during a historically brief period of about half a century. All that remains of the old views and values of life are the pernicious survivals in some people's minds. But these survivals are tenacious and the Soviet power is working relentlessly to eradicate them.

With the fraternal assistance of other Soviet republics, the Russian Republic in the first place, the peoples of Central Asia have overcome their economic and cultural backwardness, a legacy of feudalism and colonialism, within a very brief historical period, i.e., within the lifetime of one generation. They owe these magnificent successes to the advantages of the socialist system, to planned economic development and friendship and mutual assistance of Soviet peoples.

¹ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Srednei Azii v 1963 godu*, Tashkent, 1964, p. 14.

CONCLUSIONS

The beginning of the 19th century found the peoples of Central Asia under the sway of decadent feudalism. Their rulers—the khans and emirs—were engaged in prolonged internecine wars while the masses lived in conditions of abject poverty and ignorance. Soon Central Asia became an object of rivalry between the two colonial powers of Europe—Tsarist Russia and Britain—advancing towards it from the north and south respectively. There converged upon Central Asia two streams of expansion. Both Britain and Tsarist Russia followed an aggressive policy with regard to Central Asia, each putting the blame on the other. The British began to harbour aggressive designs on Central Asia even before they had annexed India completely. The early years of the 19th century saw the beginning of British activities aimed at political subversion, military espionage, etc., in this region which were meant to prepare the way for its direct annexation later. These activities naturally roused the fear and suspicion of Tsarist Russia which hastened to conquer and annex Central Asia, forestalling the British.

But the British designs on Central Asia were not the primary factor behind the Tsarist annexation of the territory. It is not just a coincidence that the Russian advance in Central Asia took place mainly between 1864-1885, i.e., in the period of the development of capitalism in Russia. The period between the sixties and the nineties of the 19th century constituted a period of final transition of the Russian Empire to the capitalist path of development. The capitalist development of Russia was hampered by many survivals of feudalism. Under such conditions development of capitalism in "breadth" acquired a special significance for the country. Baulked by its West European rivals—France and Britain—in the struggle

for the domination of the Balkans and the Near East, Tsarist Russia began to cast her eyes upon Central Asia.

Aggression against the Central Asian peoples was urged by the British expansionists under the banner of the "defence of India" against the Russian menace. But it had nothing to do with the interests of the Indian people. The Central Asian policy of the British rulers of India emanated from the predatory essence of the imperialist stage of development upon which capitalism in Britain, bearing a sharply colonial character, entered earlier than other countries and with greater speed. The alarmist views propagated by the pen of such advocates of active annexationist policy as H. Rawlinson, Bartle Frere, H. Edwards, MacGregor, G. Curzon and others, had no real basis. Tsarist Russia had neither the resources nor the intention to occupy India, nor even to launch a military expedition against it. Here it will be pertinent to note that the national liberation movement in India under the leadership of the National Congress never fell for this British line of propaganda. It is unfortunate that some contemporary Indian scholars should have missed this aggressive imperialist essence of the British policies towards the Central Asian peoples, and should have tried to discover in them, for the free India of today, the "foundations" of its foreign policy. In the new atmosphere of developed national consciousness among the countries of Asia and Africa, the imperialist circles are deliberately propagating the myth of the policies of the colonial powers having originated in the interest of the colonial peoples themselves and the above-mentioned approach suits them but well.

It was impossible for the weak feudal Khanates of Central Asia to preserve their independence in the face of struggle of the two capitalist powers of Europe for markets, for annexation of colonies, for division of the world—a struggle which became very acute in the second half of the 19th century. The annexation of Central Asia by Tsarist Russia saved its peoples from falling under the domination of imperialist Britain. This is, however, not to suggest that Tsarist imperialism was any better than the British. In fact, there is little to choose between the two rival imperialisms. Both had the same object, viz., to exploit and enslave the Central Asian peoples. But the difference lay in the specific character of the conditions prevailing in the Russian Empire, in the specific political and economic relations between the popular masses of the metropolitan country and the colony,

in the geographical propinquity of the Russian people with the people living on the outskirts of the Russian Empire. In contrast to it, the people of India rarely met common British workers or peasants and knew only of the colonial officials—the *gora sahebs*.

Notwithstanding the annexationist colonial aim of the Tsarist autocracy, the merger of Central Asia with Russia had "in point of history" without any doubt an *objectively* progressive character. The development of capitalist relations after the merger was progressive despite all the negative and dark aspects of capitalism. All this led to the growth of the productive forces and the development of the working class. British annexation would have deprived the peoples of Central Asia of the perspective of drawing closer to the Russian people which proved to be of vital significance for the course of their future historical development. The merging of the national liberation movement of the working people of the colonial territory into a single stream with Russia's revolutionary movement of workers was really a great progressive consequence of the Tsarist annexation of Central Asia.

In Sinkiang, the British imperialists tried to convert this region into a springboard for aggression against Central Asia. They intended using the state of Yaqub Beg to promote the penetration of their influence into the Ferghana valley. To strengthen their position in Kashgar, they also made use of the religious influence of the Sultan of Turkey. After the downfall of their stooge Yaqub Beg and the conquest of his kingdom by the Chinese, the British practised a policy of appeasement of the Chinese whom they sought to win over to their side in their imperialist rivalry with Tsarist Russia.

The October Revolution ushered in a new era in the life of the Central Asian peoples. It made the peoples formerly oppressed by Tsarism really free and equal, giving them not only political equality and statehood, but also ensuring them the possibility of overcoming their economic and cultural backwardness. Under conditions of the Soviet socialist system which abolished social and national oppression and inequality and laid the foundations for friendship and fraternal co-operation among big and small nations, the national question attained its most heartening solution.

The standards of living, public health, education, technical "know-how", communications and productivity in Soviet Central Asia are much higher than those in the great majority of African and Asian countries.

A very remarkable socio-cultural transformation has been effected in the lives of the peoples of Central Asia by Soviet rule during a historically brief period of about half a century. A study of the Soviet techniques and methods of social transformation, their results, and reactions and responses of the people to them is certainly bound to be quite interesting and illuminating for all the newly-liberated Afro-Asian countries who are undergoing a vast process of social change in their march forward along the path of independent national development. In Central Asia the change from the old to the new was not altogether smooth. There were at times mistakes and perhaps a few excesses. An admission of this, however, does not detract from the by and large popular nature of the changes brought about and their voluntary character.

The Central Asian peoples owe these momentous successes to the advantages of the socialist social system, to planned economic development and friendship and mutual assistance of Soviet peoples. The historical experience of the Central Asian nations has a world-wide importance. They were the first in history to switch over to socialism without going through the pains of capitalist development. For the economically underdeveloped countries the capitalist path of development is a path of suffering. It leads to the preservation of backwardness and poverty. The historical experience of the Soviet Central Asian republics has proved that the socialist path of development alone can ensure rapid progress for these countries. The republics of Soviet Central Asia have become a beacon of socialism in the East, illuminating the path of millions of people fighting for peace and socialism.

Some Western writers have tried to ignore the great contribution of the socialist system in the remarkable economic and cultural advance made by the Soviet Central Asian republics. Thus, the American scholar Richard A. Pierce has the following comment to make:

"These achievements are real enough, but there is another side to the coin. First of all, much of this development would probably have taken place even without the Soviet regime. . . . For the world moves forward, and progress is not the monopoly of any one system."¹

But a comparison of the level of advance made by the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 305.

Soviet Central Asian republics with their neighbouring Muslim states leaves no doubt that the system does count for much. In the past Turkey was the most powerful state in the Middle East. Prior to 1917 she was ahead of Central Asia in many respects. The leaders of the Central Asian national bourgeoisie regarded her as an ideal state and as an example to be emulated. But Turkey is still mainly an agrarian country. Her industries account for slightly more than one-tenth of her national income. Turkish exports consist almost exclusively of farm produce; the main import items are machines and other industrial goods. But the victory of socialism has turned the Soviet Central Asian republics into an advanced industrial-agrarian region. Their exports to other Union republics and abroad are not confined to farm produce but include machines and industrial goods. The *per capita* output of electric power in Uzbekistan in 1962 was almost seven times that of Turkey. Yet other countries—Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan—are still a great deal further behind Central Asia than Turkey.

The material and cultural advance made by the backward peoples of Soviet Asia are sought to be explained by commentators like Edward Crankshaw¹ and Hugh Seton-Watson by some "universal law" of imperialism being always a carrier of material advance. Thus imperial Rome is described as having brought benefits to Europe, and Britain to Africa. (Of course, the Malans, Roy Welenskys, Vervoerds and Smiths are the benevolent gifts of British imperialism to the African peoples!) Hugh Seton-Watson tries to explain the difference in the material achievements of the Soviet power and that of the British Empire by two factors. The first was that the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire were very much more advanced in their general level of civilisation than the peoples of the British colonies in Africa and even those of India. (The nomad Kirghizs, Kazakhs and Turkmens, who did not even have a national script for their languages before the Revolution, were more advanced in their general level of civilisation than the Bengalis and Tamils of India with centuries-old traditions in their literatures!) The second factor was the large difference in the proportion of the metropolitan to the colonial peoples, the proportion of Russians to Central Asian Muslims being 1:5

¹ Foreword to *Communism and Colonialism* by Walter Kolarz, London, New York, 1964, p. XIV.

according to Seton-Watson, whereas that of the British to their Asian and African subjects was about 1:50.¹ The essence of the question of material advance, however, is not a particular proportion of whites to non-whites, but the social system under which people work and live.

During the Soviet period the Central Asian peoples who were formerly nothing but mere pawns on the chessboard of imperialist rivalry between Tsarist Russia and Britain have come into their own. Their segregation from the neighbouring countries of Asia has become a thing of the past and they are successfully developing close friendly relations with them and many other countries of the world. Many factories and plants in the important Central Asian towns are at present producing goods and machines which make a vital contribution to the economic development of such countries as India, UAR, Syria, Afghanistan, Burma and Nepal. Quite a large number of young specialists from many Afro-Asian and Latin American countries are being trained at Tashkent. The city of Tashkent has become a meeting place of writers, orientalists, cinematographers, public health workers, plant-breeders and co-operators of the whole world. Tashkent was host to the first conference of Afro-Asian writers held in October 1958. Here too, the international trade union seminar, symposium on sanitary education sponsored by the UN, the conference dealing with diseases in tropical countries, the session of the UNESCO Consultative Committee on the Study of Arid Zones and the international seminar of women of Asian and African countries on women's education were held.

The Tashkent Declaration which established peace between two Asian countries—India and Pakistan—is a brilliant testimony to the increasing role played by the people of Central Asia in restoring normal relations between their two great Asian neighbours. The Uzbek people did their best to create a proper atmosphere for the success of the meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan. Many Central Asian statesmen and public leaders like Sharaf Rashidov, Mirzo Tursun-zade and B. Gafurov are taking a prominent part in the movements for Afro-Asian solidarity, national liberation and world peace. In the family of free and equal Soviet nations, the peoples of Central Asia are

gradually emerging into a position of exercising in the international sphere their collective responsibility as nations. This process has met with active support and hearty welcome from all peace-loving Asian countries, especially India, where people have deeply cherished sincere feelings of traditional friendship towards the peoples of Central Asia.

¹ *New Imperialism*, London, 1964, p. 124.

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